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This dissertation performs economic analysis of search advertising from a comprehen-
sive picture of the competition facing advertisers—by incorporating the price competition
to endogenously investigate advertisers’ bidding incentive, and taking into account con-
sumers’ online search and the unique information structure associated with the search
advertising format. It consists of three essays based on game-theoretic modeling. The
first essay studies the oligopolistic price competition among advertisers placed in different
advertising positions, considering distinctive features of consumers online search behav-
iors. We find an interesting local-competition pattern in which direct price competition
occurs only between advertisers adjacent to each other. The second essay integrates the
price competition into the bidding competition and investigates the endogenous bidding
incentives of advertisers with different competitive strengths. Surprisingly, we find that an
advertising position with a better exposure may not always be profitable for the advertisers
with competitive advantage, even if it is cost free. We also show that the bidding outcome
might not align with the relative competitive strength. The third essay further considers
the effects of organic listing as a competing information source on the sponsored bidding
competition and the outcome performances in search advertising. It provides answers to
questions such as whether and why advertisers with sufficient exposure from the organic
vi
list may still be willing to bid for top sponsored positions, and how the existence of organic
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Search advertising has been recognized as one of the most effective advertising formats
in the Internet era. In search advertising, in response to each user search query (charac-
terized by certain search terms, or “keywords”), search engines return a search engine
results page (SERP), which usually consists of two lists: one list of advertisements (with
each advertisement composed of a link to the advertiser’s website and a short description),
called the sponsored list, alongside a non-advertising list of general search results, or the
organic list. Advertisers bid to be placed in these sponsored advertising positions. Such an
advertising format proves to be very popular among advertisers, evidenced by its rapid rev-
enue growth. According to a latest industry survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) and the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), the Internet advertising revenues
in the United States totaled $26.04 billion for 2010, 14.9% higher than 2009. Internet
advertising surpassed newspapers to become the second largest advertising medium, next
only to television, and is predicted to become the leading advertising medium in just a
few years. Within the great revenues generated by Internet advertising, search advertising
certainly plays a major role. It accounts for about half of the total Internet advertising
revenues, surpasses all of its predecessors such as display banner or email advertising, and
continues to grow rapidly.
The huge industry success naturally drives great academic interest. There has been
a largely increasing volume of research on search advertising related topics in the fields of
information systems, economics, and marketing, including both theoretical studies and em-
pirical investigation. Most of the early theoretical studies focus on the bidding strategies of
advertisers and the auction mechanism design of the search engine. These studies typically
1
treat advertisers’ valuation (or willingness-to-pay) for those advertising positions as given
and assume that the values per click on these ads are exogenously fixed. Nevertheless, in
search advertising, the objects being auctioned are advertisements, whose main purpose is
to disseminate product information and to promote product sales. In this sense, the val-
ues of search advertising positions should be determined endogenously within the product
market competition. Incorporating product market competition into the search advertis-
ing competition thus becomes a crucial step towards a better understanding of advertisers’
optimal strategies. Motivated to fill this gap, this dissertation performs economic analysis
of search advertising from a comprehensive picture of the competition facing advertisers—
by incorporating the price competition to endogenously investigate advertisers’ bidding
incentive, and taking into account consumers’ online search behavior and the unique in-
formation structure associated with this particular advertising format. The dissertation
consists of three essays, detailed in Chapters 2 through 4, respectively.
In the first essay entitled “Oligopolistic Pricing with Online Search,” we start with
the price competition alone. We set up a game-theoretic model to examine the oligopolis-
tic price competition among advertisers placed in different advertising positions along a
list. We consider two features of consumers’ online search: most consumers follow a com-
mon search order and some may have negligible search costs. We find that in equilibrium
advertisers set their prices probabilistically rather than deterministically, and different ad-
vertisers follow different price distributions. The equilibrium pricing pattern exhibits an
interesting local-competition feature, in which direct price competition occurs only between
advertisers adjacent to each other. Further, we incorporate consumers’ search strategies
into the model so that both the search order and the stopping rules are determined ra-
tionally by consumers. We show that similar patterns may continue to hold in the fully
rational framework when consumers have higher inspection costs for inferior positions.
With the understanding of pricing under online search, we next integrate price com-
petition into the bidding competition in search advertising and investigate the endogenous
bidding incentives of advertisers with different competitive strengths. In the second essay
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entitled “Price Competition and Endogenous Valuation in Search Advertising,” we con-
sider a game-theoretic model in which firms compete for advertising positions and then
compete in price for customers in a product market. Firms differ in their competence, and
positions are differentiated in their prominence, which reflects consumers’ online search
behavior. We find that when endogenously evaluated within the product market com-
petition, a prominent advertising position might not always be desirable for a firm with
competitive advantage, even if it is cost-free. The profitability of a prominent advertising
position depends on the trade-off between the extra demand from winning the position
and the higher equilibrium prices when the weaker competitor wins it. We also show that
the bidding outcome might not align with the relative competitive strength, and an advan-
taged firm might not be able to win the prominent position even when it does value that
position. We derive two-dimensional equilibrium price dispersion, with the realized prices
at the same position varying and the expected prices differing across different positions.
We find that the expected price in the prominent position might not always be higher,
implying that an expensive location does not necessarily lead to expensive products.
The first two essays, like most existing studies, focus on sponsored listing alone. Nev-
ertheless, to deepen our understanding of search advertising from a more comprehensive
perspective, we should also consider the effects of organic listing. The third essay entitled
“Interplay Between Organic Listing and Sponsored Bidding in Search Advertising” aims to
explore the effects of organic listing as a competing information source on the advertising
competition (i.e., sponsored bidding) and the outcome performances in search advertising.
We set up a game-theoretic model in which firms bid for sponsored advertising slots and
compete for consumers in the product market. Firms are asymmetrically differentiated
in terms of market preference and are placed at organic slots with different prominence
based on their relative popularity. We suggest that when facing two competing lists, lead-
ing firms’ sponsored bidding incentive is mainly preventive, whereas small firms’ sponsored
bidding incentive is mainly promotive. We show that these two incentives change in op-
posite directions when the difference in advertisers’ competitive strength decreases. As a
3
result, even small firms may outbid stronger competitors and win good sponsored posi-
tions under such a co-listing setting. We further analyze the effects of the organic listing
on equilibrium outcomes by comparing it with a benchmark case in which there is only a
sponsored list. We find that organic listing compensates the leading firms to help smaller
firms win better sponsored positions, which balances the equilibrium information structure
through sponsored list without impairing the objectivity of the organic list. While organic
listing may lower the search engine’s short-term revenue, it increases equilibrium consumer
surplus, social welfare and sales diversity, which are in the long-term interest of the search
engine. Finally, we suggest some possible direction to improve the performance of organic
listing for highly asymmetric markets.
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Chapter 2
Oligopolistic Pricing with Online Search
2.1 Introduction
The Internet has greatly improved the efficiency of information sharing. On the one
hand, the Internet greatly reduces the physical cost of accessing product information; on
the other hand, the rapidly developed ecommerce applications, especially online sponsored
advertising, brings merchants selling similar products together and facilitates consumers’
searching. Nevertheless, the prediction of “the law of one price” has not been realized
in the Internet era. Price dispersion has been well documented and discussed in the in-
formation systems literature Chen and Hitt (2002); Clemons et al. (2002); Smith and
Brynjolfsson (2001). This work draws upon consumer online search behavior and stud-
ies the oligopolistic equilibrium pricing to offer a theoretical explanation of online price
dispersion.
One classical view in economic theory attributes price dispersion to the heterogeneity
in consumers’ search behavior Burdett and Judd (1983); Stahl (1989). These works typi-
cally study price competition in traditional offline search markets, and their model settings
may not fit the online search very well. Compared to the traditional offline search, two
features are more salient in the online environment: First, because of considerable dif-
ferences in the location or the visibility of business positions (e.g., the hyperlinks), there
often exists a common ordering in consumer search. Second, consumers’ search costs are
highly diversified; in particular, there exists a substantial portion of “shoppers” who have
non-positive search costs.
Differences in location and the way of presenting on a webpage, or different virtual
positions in the hyperlinking network on the Internet, cause firms’ links to differ greatly
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in terms of their visibility or prominence level. For example, search engines commonly
display a limited number of premium sponsored links in a highlighted area with a large
size and a bright color on the top of a search result page; they also display a list of regular
sponsored links in the right column of a webpage with no highlighting, among which the
top positions are commonly believed to be superior to the lower positions. When display
space is limited (e.g., on mobile devices), sometimes only one or two ads are displayed
at a time, and users have to switch to another page to view additional ads. Because of
human eye movement patterns and information processing habits, consumers usually pay
different levels of attention to different positions. Experimental studies have shown that
consumers pay more attention to the content with colors and a large size Lohse (1997), and
compared to paper media, consumers are more likely to focus on ads near the heading of
electronic lists Hoque and Lohse (1999). Online statistics also show a significant decrease
in traffic from the top sponsored link downward and much fewer visits after the first page
Brooks (2004). As a result, most consumers browse links following a common order: they
inspect the most prominent positions first, and then some stop while others continue to
inspect the less prominent ones. In fact, there are also examples in the physical world
that resemble such ordering: most consumers first look at shelf slots at the eye level in a
supermarket Dreze et al. (1994) or first visit the storefronts near the main entrance of a
shopping mall, and then some of them continue to the floor-level shelf slots or the corner
storefronts.
In reality such a common ordering could simply be the direct result of human habits
and not necessarily a strategic decision after sophisticated calculation;1nevertheless, we can
also explain such ordering in a fully rational framework. As we show, the ordered search can
be derived as an equilibrium outcome originating from differences in the inspection costs
for different positions. In particular, the inferior positions incur higher inspection costs
than the superior ones. A higher inspection cost can be interpreted as the psychological
1Peterson and Merino (2003) argues that in reality, consumers search in a way different from the
rational assumptions in the economic theory, and this situation continues in the online world.
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resistance to overcoming the information processing habits, or the extra effort in locating
a less prominent link or switching webpages. Given such differences, consumers’ choice to
to follow a certain order is a rational search strategy in equilibrium.
The second feature of online search behavior owes to the convenience brought by
the Internet, which reduces consumers’ search costs from driving to the store to making
several clicks of the mouse. In addition, it has also been shown that some consumers
derive hedonic utility from shopping online Childers et al. (2001). As a result, a certain
portion of consumers actually has a non-positive (zero or even negative) net search cost.
We call them shoppers. However, not everybody shopping online has such time luxury.
The convenience of electronic commerce attracts people with time constraints, whose only
goal is to find a product within the shortest amount of time. Thus, a certain portion of
consumers has positive search costs. They do not conduct an exhaustive search and stop
searching at certain stages, usually after sampling only a few sites (e.g., Johnson et al.
(2004) empirically shows that online customers tend to search very few sites on average).
To study the equilibrium pricing pattern, we set up a game-theoretic model, capturing
the two features of the online search. We consider oligopolistic competition in which
multiple firms compete for consumers in a product market. Firms are differentiated in
the prominence level of their positions, which are reflected in the ranks in consumers’
presumed search sequence. Consumers are differentiated in their search behavior. In
particular, a certain portion of consumers has non-positive search costs and conducts a
thorough search. We eliminate heterogeneity among firms and consumers in all other
dimensions except firms’ position and consumers’ search behavior to show that the driving
forces of the equilibrium pricing pattern are the two distinctive features of the search
behavior.
We find an interesting equilibrium pricing pattern when first taking consumers’ search
strategies as exogenous. The equilibrium exhibits the feature of “local competition,” in
which firms compete directly with their neighbors along consumers’ search order only.
We show that in equilibrium, all firms mix their prices over different supports. Overlaps
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occur only in the supports of two firms adjacent to each other. Hence, there is no direct
competition between any two firms that are not next to each other. We further show
that behind the local-competition feature lies a global mutual dependence across all firms.
We then endogenize consumers’ search strategies so that consumers make fully rational
decisions on their search order and stopping rules. We show that similar pricing patterns
may continue to hold in equilibrium when consumers’ inspection costs for different positions
are different.
The main contribution of this work to the economic theory on search and pricing
lies in that we study the asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium pricing in oligopolistic
competition. To the best of our knowledge, the local-competition pattern revealed in this
study is absent in the previous literature. The investigation on endogenizing the consumer
search enriches the studies that explore asymmetric equilibrium pricing with optimal search
strategies.
Diamond (1971) raises the famous paradox that when consumers have positive search
costs, an endogenous search model leads to a trivial equilibrium in which all firms charge
the monopoly price and consumers do not search. Varian (1980) suggests that when there
exist consumers who are “informed” of all firms’ prices, the equilibrium outcome may
involve mixed-strategy pricing, which leads to price dispersion. Stahl (1989) studies a ran-
dom search model, in which consumers randomly pick a firm to inspect and all firms are
symmetric. That paper considers the existence of a portion of “shoppers” who have zero
search cost, and derives a symmetric equilibrium pricing provided that all non-shoppers
have the same search cost. Weitzman (1979) formulates the optimal search strategies given
firms’ (asymmetric) price distributions in a general setting. Arbatskaya (2007) is among
the very few that study ordered search and price competition. By considering cost distri-
butions atomless at the zero point, that paper focuses on the pure-strategy equilibrium.
There are other studies that analyze mixed-strategy equilibrium in duopolistic competition
in different contexts. For example, Campbell et al. (2005) considers the effect of shoppers
in a symmetric duopolistic setting, and Narasimhan (1988) and Weber and Zheng (2007)
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consider asymmetric duopolistic mixed strategies. In contrast to these works, we consider
the existence of shoppers in the ordered search market, and explicitly derive asymmet-
ric mixed-strategy equilibrium in oligopolistic price competition with both exogenous and
endogenous consumer search.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we start with a model
in which consumers’ search behavior is exogenously given. Section 2.3 details the analysis
and shows the main results. In Section 2.4, we endogenize the consumer search such that
consumers rationally decide what search order to follow and when to stop. We consider
both cases of position-invariant and position-dependent inspection costs. We show that
the local-competition pattern may arise in the fully rational framework when consumers
have higher inspection costs for inferior positions. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter with
a discussion on managerial implications.
2.2 Model
There are n (≥ 2) firms selling homogeneous products and competing for consumers
in a product market. These firms have the same marginal production cost, which is
normalized to zero without loss of generality. A continuum of consumers with unit mass
exists in the market. Each consumer has a unit demand of the product and realizes a unit
utility from consuming the product. Therefore, consumers will buy the product only if its
price does not exceed 1. Firms are identical except for their ranks in the search ordering,
and consumers are identical except for their search behavior. By eliminating differentiation
in all other dimensions, we are able to show that the distinctive features of consumers’
online search behavior alone could drive an interesting price dispersion pattern.
Consumers obtain product information through an information portal with a list of
hyperlinks directed to firms’ websites where purchases can be made directly. Firms are
placed in different positions in the list, which can be viewed as the outcome of a pre-
game competition, such as a bidding competition. Because all firms are identical ex ante,
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the location competition outcome is irrelevant for analyzing the price competition. Any
assignment of positions becomes identical after relabeling firms by their position rank.
Therefore, we do not include the location competition in the model but start from after
firms get placed at different positions. Different positions have different prominence levels,
which can be strictly ordered. Without loss of generality, we call the most prominent
position the first position, the second most prominent position the second one, and so on.
For convenience, we call the firm at the ith position firm i (i = 1, ..., n).
We start with the case in which consumers’ search strategies are exogenously given,
in a way reflecting the two unique features of online search patterns: First, there exists
a common search ordering so that all consumers start searching from the first position
and may continue to the second, then the third, and so forth. Second, consumers’ search
costs are highly diversified so that they may stop searching at different stages. Especially,
there exists a certain portion of shoppers who have non-positive search cost and sample all
positions before making the purchase decision. Specifically, we assume that after sampling
the ith position, a portion of αi (0 < αi < 1) stops searching, while the other 1 − αi
continue to sample the next position. Therefore, the portion of consumers who visit the
ith (i ≥ 2) position is Πi−1j=1(1 − αj). To simplify notation, we denote βi = Πi−1j=1(1 − αj),
and let β1 = 1 and α0 = 0. To rule out violent fluctuation in the attention declining rates
αi’s, we assume that αi ≥ αi+1(1 − αi) (1 ≤ i < n). This condition requires that the
rate of decline in attention (i.e., αi’s) does not increase dramatically from one position
to the next, which can be easily satisfied (e.g., the same rate of decline across positions
(αi = αi+1) satisfies this condition).
2
The timing of the game is as follows. Firms at different positions price their products
simultaneously. Consumers sample the position(s), learn the price(s), and make the pur-
chase decision. For those who sample at least two positions, they purchase from the firm
with the lowest price. When there is a tie in the lowest price, they randomly pick one of
2When the condition does not hold, which implies that a lower position retains a larger portion of the
visitors than an upper one, the firm at the upper position may deviate to a lower price range.
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the firms, with equal probability.
2.3 Equilibrium with Exogenous Search
We first derive firms’ equilibrium pricing strategies and then analyze the pattern of
equilibrium price dispersion. In deriving the equilibrium pricing, we notice that any static
pricing is unstable due to the existence of shoppers.
Lemma 2.1. (Lack of Pure-Strategy Equilibrium)There is no pure-strategy equilib-
rium in the price competition.
Proof. We prove the above result by contradiction. Suppose there is a pure-strategy pricing
equilibrium. If there is no tie in the lowest price, then it is profitable for the firm with
the lowest price to deviate by increasing its price closer to but still lower than the second-
lowest price. If there is a tie in the lowest price that is strictly positive, then any of the
firms with the lowest price has profitable deviation by slightly cutting the price. If there
is a tie in the lowest price that is zero, then among all these firms with zero price, the
one with the highest prominence level can achieve positive profit by slightly increasing its
price. Therefore, pure-strategy pricing cannot be an equilibrium.3
Since there exists a certain portion of consumers who sample all positions to look for
the lowest price, a slight cut in price to offer the lowest can lead to a significant increase in
market share by capturing this portion of consumers. As a result, competing firms tend to
lower their prices relative to the rivals. However, once the price is pushed to a certain low
level, the firm at a better position in terms of prominence can be better off by charging
a higher price and exploiting those consumers who stop searching right there. Therefore,
any pricing strategy in which firms statically charge one price cannot be stable. Clearly,
the driving force here is the presence of shoppers and the locational asymmetry created
by the search ordering.
3The arguments apply to cases both when money is infinitely divisible and when there is a finite money
increment, as long as it is sufficiently small.
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We next examine the mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium. We use Fi (p), i = 1, ..., n, to
describe firm i’s mixed strategy of pricing. Like regular cumulative distribution functions,
Fi (p) measures the probability that firm i charges a price less than or equal to p.
Proposition 2.1. (Equilibrium Pricing and Local-Competition Pattern) When








p ∈ [p̄i+1, p̄i)
p ∈ [p̄i, p̄i−1]
(1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1),
Fn(p) = 1− αn−1(p̄n−1−p)(1−αn−1)p p ∈ [p̄n, p̄n−1],
(2.1)
where p̄i’s are recursively defined as
p̄0 = p̄1 = 1,
p̄i = ki−1p̄i−1 (i = 2, .., n),
(2.2)




αi+αi+1(1−αi)ki+1 (i = n− 2, ..., 1).
(2.3)
Proof. All proofs are presented in the Appendix, unless indicated otherwise.
We next use an example to illustrate the pattern of the equilibrium mixed-strategy
pricing.
Example 2.1. Consider a case of four positions with the same declining rate. Specifi-
cally, n = 4 and α1 = α2 = α3 = 1/2. According to the above recursive definition in
Equation (2.3), k3 = α3 = 1/2, and it can then be derived that k2 = 4/5 and, further, that
k1 = 5/7. Thus, according to Equation (2.2), p̄1 = 1, p̄2 = k1p̄1 = 5/7, p̄3 = k2p̄2 = 4/7,
and p̄4 = k3p̄3 = 2/7. Notice that by definition, the sequence of price support bounds{p̄i}ni=1
is monotonically decreasing, so that p̄1 > p̄2 > p̄3 > p̄4. The pricing strategies of the four
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the supports and distributions for the pricing strategies of the firms
in these four positions.
Figure 2.1: Price Supports and Cumulative Distributions for Different Positions
Figure 2.2 depicts the simulated results of the equilibrium in Example 2.1 with each
point representing an independent draw from the price distributions in Equation 2.4. No-
tice that the dotted square areas which the diagonal passes through in (a), (b) and (d)
indicate the direct price competition between two adjacent firms.
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(a) Simulated Prices at Positions 1 and 2 (b) Simulated Prices at Positions 2 and 3
(c) Simulated Prices at Positions 1, 2 and 3 (d) Simulated Prices at Positions 3 and 4
Figure 2.2: Simulation of the Equilibrium in Example 2.1 (10,000 Simulated Points)
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In equilibrium, each firm achieves a constant expected payoff by charging any price
within its price support. On the one hand, the constant payoff makes each firm willing
to randomize price over its entire support. On the other hand, each firm randomizes its
price in a way that gives its competitors a constant payoff within their price supports.
Specifically, firm i’s expected profit can be written as{
πi(p) = pαiβi + pαi+1βi+1[1− Fi+1(p)] p ∈ [p̄i+1, p̄i)
πi(p) = pαiβi[1− Fi−1(p)] p ∈ [p̄i, p̄i−1].
(2.5)
When firm i (2 ≤ i ≤ n − 2) charges a price within the lower half of its price support
[p̄i+1, p̄i), the firm captures all consumers who sample its site and stop searching there
(i.e., a portion of αiβi). This is because its price is lower than firm (i− 1)’s price for sure
(recall that firm (i − 1)’s price support is [p̄i, p̄i−2]), which accounts for the first term of
the right-hand side of the first equation in (4.4). Firm i can capture those who continue
to sample the (i + 1)th position and stop searching there (i.e., a portion of αi+1βi+1)
only when its price is lower than firm (i+ 1)’s price, which accounts for the second term.
Naturally, firm i forgoes all those consumers who continue to sample the (i+2)th position,
since firm (i + 2)’s price support is [p̄i+3, p̄i+1] and its price is lower for sure. The second
equation in (4.4) is the expected profit when firm i prices within the upper half of its price
support, which can be interpreted in a similar way. Substituting in the firms’ equilibrium
pricing strategies and by simple algebra, we can show that by charging any price within
its strategy, firm i achieves a constant expected profit αiβip̄i.
The most interesting feature of the equilibrium pricing is the local-competition pat-
tern; that is, firms compete directly with their neighbors only. There is no overlap between
the price supports of any two firms more than one position apart and thus no direct price
competition between firms “distant” from each other. The driving forces of such a pattern
are the two features of consumers’ search behavior. Because of the existence of shoppers,
firms do not statically charge one single price but have to mix their prices to compete for
consumers. Nevertheless, such competition is localized because of the decrease in visits
along the common search order. The firm at a lower position cannot be better off by en-
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tering a higher price range, because it would then lose its already quite limited customer
base. The firm at a higher position will not undercut its price because in doing so, it
would only entangle itself in a fiercer price competition against the lower-ranked firms,
which would result in little gain in extra demand but significant loss in the profit from the
captured demand. As a result, to compete locally is the equilibrium outcome.
Another interesting aspect of the local-competition pattern is that each firm’s equilib-
rium pricing strategy only involves “local” information. According to Equation (2.1), firm
i’s price distribution Fi only contains consumer search parameters αi−1, αi and αi+1. Also,
firm i’s price support is determined by (the lower bound of) firm (i−2)’s support and (the
upper bound of) firm (i+2)’s support; within its support, firm i’s profit is determined only
by firm (i+ 1)’s and firm (i− 1)’s pricing strategies, according to Equation (4.4). In this
sense, although the formal equilibrium analysis needs to be based on the whole picture of
the game, to formulate optimal pricing strategy in practice, decision makers can simply
focus on the traffic information at the adjacent positions and the pricing strategies of the
neiboring firms (i.e., firms that are adjacent and one position apart).
It is worth noting that the local-competition pattern is the result of global considera-
tion. Although no direct price competition is explicitly observed in equilibrium, even firms
distantly above or below have an impact on a particular firm’s pricing strategies. In fact,
although firm i+ k (i− k) does not compete directly with firm i, it affects firm i’s pricing
through a chain effect, from firm i + k − 1 (i − k + 1) through firm i + 1 (i − 1). To see
this, reconsider Example 2.1. When the fourth firm is eliminated, for example, although
the first two firms still have the same neighbors as before, the price support of the first
firm shifts toward the right from [5/7, 1] to [4/5, 1], and the second firm’s support shifts
to the left from [4/7, 1] to [2/5, 1]. In fact, when the competitor from below disappears,
the third firm tends to increase its price (and shifts its price support from [2/7, 5/7] to
[2/5, 4/5]). In response, the second firm lowers its price support to capture more demand.
Meanwhile, the more intense competition between the second and the third firms drives
away the first firm’s interest, which leads to the increase of the lower bound of its price
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support. As we can see, behind the local-competition phenomenon actually lies the global
mutual dependence among all firms.
Several other features of equilibrium pricing are also worth noting. First, except the
first one, all firms’ equilibrium pricing strategies are atomless within their entire supports,
including the upper and lower bounds. This is because a mass point in one firm’s price
distribution would result in a downward jump of another firm’s expected demand at that
point and, consequently, lower profit levels in a contiguous region right to that point. For
this reason, the only possible place where a mass point may occur is the common upper
bound of the first two firms’ price supports p̄1: although the mass point in F1 (·) causes
a downward jump in firm 2’s expected profit at p = p̄1, firm 2’s actual expected profit
is not affected because F2 (·) places a non-positive probability measure on that particular
point. This feature under our oligopolistic model is in line with the results derived from
duopolistic competition in other settings Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
The kinks in firms’ pricing distributions can be explained by the localized competition.
The pricing distributions in the first and second part of the support for firm i (2 ≤ i ≤ n−1)
are determined by the competition against its direct neighbors, firms i − 1 and i + 1,
respectively. As the competition against the firm above and the firm below are generally
different, naturally, a kink arises in firm i’s pricing distribution at p̄i. The shape of pricing
distributions for the first and last firms is distinctive from the rest because those two firms
have one direct neighbor only.
The next corollary reveals the monotonic decrease of the expected profit of firms at
different positions, which explains why the top position of a sponsored list in online search
advertising is usually the most popular and engenders fierce bidding competition.
Corollary 2.1. (Decrease of Expected Profits)The firms’ equilibrium expected profits
decrease monotonically from the first toward the last; that is, πi > πi+1, i = 1, ..., n− 1.
Proof. Notice that πi = αiβip̄i. Since p̄i > p̄i+1 and αi ≥ αi+1(1− αi), πi > πi+1.
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The above corollary shows that location advantage is rewarding in the sense that
the firm in the advantageous location earns a higher profit. It is worth pointing out
that the profit difference between a higher-ranked position and a lower-ranked one should
dissipate in the pre-game location competition if all firms are ex ante identical. That is,
a firm has to pay a higher price for a superior position, which counterbalances its profit
advantage. There is a rich literature on the competition for better locations or exposure,
from the classical advertising literature Robert and Stahl (1993) to the recent work on
online advertising and position auctions Weber and Zheng (2007).
The next corollary indicates that the equilibrium pricing under the ordered search
with shoppers exhibits two levels of dispersion: not only are the realized prices at different
positions different, but the expected prices are also different across positions.
Corollary 2.2. (Decrease of Expected Prices) The expected price decreases monoton-
ically from the first position toward the last one; that is, E(pi) > E(pi+1), i = 1, ..., n− 1.
Notice that firms adjacent to each other adopt similar pricing strategies over the
overlapped interval of their supports. In fact, according to Equation (2.4), the conditional
probability density functions of their pricing strategies over the overlapped interval are
the same, which implies the same conditional expectations; that is, E(pi|p ∈ [p̄i+1, p̄i]) =
E(pi+1|p ∈ [p̄i+1, p̄i]). Because firm i prices within the upper half of its price support
[p̄i, p̄i−1] with positive probability and firm i + 1 prices within the lower half of the sup-
port [p̄i+2, p̄i+1] with positive probability, the unconditional expectation of firm i’s price is
strictly higher than that of firm (i+ 1)’s.
Corollary 2.2 shows that the equilibrium price expectation decreases monotonically
along the direction of consumers’ search ordering. As a result, search is rewarding in the
sense that those who keep searching are more likely to find a lower price.
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2.4 Equilibrium with Endogenous Search Order
In the previous analysis, we take consumers’ search behavior, including the search
order and stopping rules, as exogenously given. In this section, we extend the analysis to
endogenize consumers’ search strategies. The focus is to explore whether and under what
conditions a similar equilibrium pricing pattern continues to arise in the fully rational
framework. As we show, the inherent difference among positions is necessary for the local-
competition pattern to arise in equilibrium pricing. When consumers are free to sample
any position with no particular ordering constraint and inspecting different positions incurs
the same cost, such a pattern disappears. The pattern arises only if the more prominent
position incurs a lower sampling cost than the less prominent position, which reflects
the underlying distinction between ordered search and random search. In this case, we
further show that under certain parametric conditions, equilibrium pricing with the same
local-competition pattern can be derived in the fully rational framework.
We now consider consumers as active players in the game. We assume that all con-
sumers are fully rational and decide their search order and stopping rules strategically. We
consider the rational-expectations equilibrium (REE), in which consumers’ search strate-
gies are rational given firms’ pricing strategies and firms have no profitable deviation in
pricing given consumers’ search strategies. For shoppers with zero search cost, it is al-
ways optimal for them to sample all positions before making a purchase decision. For
non-shoppers, we consider a sequential search process: the consumer inspects one position
and learns the price, and then he or she decides whether to continue searching or to stop
and, if to continue, which position to inspect next. In other words, an individual con-
sumer’s search strategy consists of a sequence of decisions; each decision d (z,C) can be
to stop, to inspect a position, or to randomly inspect several positions with a probability
distribution; d (z,C) depends on the lowest price z from all the inspected positions, and
the choice set C, which contains all the uninspected positions. To determine d (z,C), the
consumer needs to calculate the net expected gain from all possibilities for the next step.
The net expected gain from inspecting the ith position, given the lowest sampled price
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z and the choice set C, EG (i; z,C), equals the expected decrease in purchase price plus
the net expected gain from another rational search afterwards, minus the inspection cost.
Notice that when no position has been inspected yet, let z = 1, and we thus only need to
consider z ≤ 1 throughout the rest of the chapter. Formally, for an individual consumer
with positive inspection costs ki, given firms’ pricing strategies Fi, similar to Weitzman
(1979), the net expected gain can be formulated recursively as
EG (i; z,C) =
∫ z
p
(z − p) dFi (p)− ki +
∫ p̄
p
EG∗ (min{z, p},C\{i}) dFi (p) , (2.6)
where
EG∗ (z,C) = max
j∈C
{EG (j; z,C) , 0}.
To determine the rational search decision is to compare the net expected gain of all the
options in the choice set. If further search yields no positive net expected gain, stopping is
the rational decision and EG∗ = 0. Otherwise, the rational search decision is to continue
to inspect the position that generates the highest net expected gain. In the case of a
tie, randomly inspecting any of them is rational. We next use an example to illustrate
consumers’ rational search strategy.
Example 2.2. Consider two firms. Firm 1 sets its price equal to 1 or 0 with equal
probability. Firm 2 prices uniformly over [0, 1
2
]. Consumers’ inspection costs are the same
for both firms, and let k1 = k2 =
1
8
. The rational search strategy in this case is to inspect
the first firm at first: if the quoted price is zero, stop searching; otherwise, continue to
inspect the second firm.
In this example, the expected price of the first firm (1/2) is higher than the expected
price of the second firm (1/4). This example shows that it may not be rational to start
searching from the position with a lower expected price even if the inspection costs are
the same. In fact, consumers’ rational search strategies generally depend on the full
distributions of equilibrium prices, which in turn are determined by consumers’ rational
search strategies. Such interdependence makes the analysis complex, especially when we
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consider asymmetric oligopolistic competition and heterogeneous consumer search costs.
For this reason, equilibrium analysis of oligopolistic pricing with rational search generally
results in no closed-form solution. In this section, we seek to derive explicit equilibrium
under certain conditions.
We consider the simplest oligopolistic case of three firms. The three firms are located
in three different positions. Again, we refer to the firm located in the ith position as
the ith firm or firm i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Consumers are different in their search costs. To
be consistent with the previous settings, we assume that among all consumers with total
mass 1, α1 of them have the highest search costs and are referred to as type-1 consumers;
α2 (1− α1) of them have lower search costs and are referred to as type-2 consumers; the rest
(1− α1) (1− α2) are shoppers. For simplicity, we let α1 = α2 = α (0 < α < 1). Assume
type-1 consumers incur a cost ki to inspect the ith position, while type-2 consumers incur
a cost k
′
i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, 0 ≤ k
′
i ≤ ki ≤ 1. All other settings follow the previous model setup.
We first study the case in which consumers’ inspection costs are position-invariant;






3. In this case, there is essentially no difference
among positions, and firms thus are symmetric. We derive symmetric equilibrium under
certain conditions and uncover an interesting equilibrium pricing pattern that involves
segmentation of price supports. We also show that the local-competition pattern from the
previous analysis does not hold in the case of position-invariant inspection costs. We then
allow inspection costs to vary across different positions and give a necessary condition and
a sufficient condition for the local-competition pattern to arise in equilibrium.
2.4.1 Position-Invariant Costs
In this subsection, we consider the case that the inspection costs are the same for all








, and we assume 0 < k
′
< k < 1.
Because we now do not impose any ordering constraint, when there is no difference in
the inspection cost for different positions, all positions, and thus all firms, are essentially
the same. Naturally, this case reduces to the symmetric random search setting. When
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non-shoppers have the same search cost, the symmetric equilibrium price distribution can
be explicitly derived and analyzed Stahl (1989). When non-shoppers have heterogeneous
search costs, like in our setting, the equilibrium analysis is more complicated because non-
shoppers may adopt different search strategies, which in turn complicates firms’ pricing
decisions. Stahl (1996) shows that with continuous cost distribution, a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium always exists, although the actual distribution patterns depend on
the cost distribution and generally have no closed-form solutions. To better contrast with
the local-competition pattern from the previous analysis, we next explicitly derive the
symmetric equilibrium under certain conditions.
In the symmetric case, because firms adopt the same pricing strategies in a symmetric
equilibrium, the search order becomes trivial: In each step, the rational strategy is either
to stop or to randomly pick one of the uninspected firms. In other words, the search
strategies simply reduces to the stopping rules. In addition, to determine the stopping
rules, the expected gain in Equation (2.6) is easier to calculate. As we can show, when
firms adopt the same pricing strategy, the optimal stopping decision based on the expected
gain from all the future searches is exactly the same as the decision based simply on the
expected gain from the next one search. Therefore, in the symmetric equilibrium where
each firm prices according to F (·), consumers’ search strategies (with search cost k) can
be characterized by an optimal stopping price r∗, which is determined by∫ r∗
p
(r∗ − p) dF (p)− k = 0. (2.7)
When the current lowest price exceeds r∗, it is worthwhile to conduct an additional search;
otherwise, it is optimal to stop. Thus, in the following symmetric equilibria, we consider
consumers’ rational search strategies as follows: Shoppers always inspect all positions
before making a purchase, and non-shoppers randomly inspect one firm with equal prob-
ability. If the price does not exceed their optimal stopping price (denote as r∗1 for type-1
consumers and r∗2 for type-2 consumers), they stop searching and purchase the product.
Otherwise, they continue to randomly inspect one of the firms left with equal probability,
22
(a) F (p) in Example 2.3 (b) F (p) in Example 2.4
Figure 2.3: Examples of Price Distributions in the Symmetric Equilibrium
until the price is no greater than their optimal stopping price or there is no firm left to in-
spect. They then buy from the one with the lowest price. Therefore, a complete description
of the symmetric equilibrium only needs to specify firms’ common pricing strategy (rep-
resented by the cumulative distribution function F ) and non-shoppers’ optimal stopping
prices (r∗1 and r
∗
2).
Proposition 2.2. (Symmetric Pricing with Continuous Support)There exists a
mixed-strategy equilibrium in which all firms price according to the distribution
F (p) = 1−
√
[1−(1−α)2](p̄1−p)
3(1−α)2p p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1] , (2.8)
where p̄1 = r
∗








2 + k − k
′
and
r∗2 is determined by
∫ p̄1
p̄2
F (p) dp = k
′
, if the inspection costs k and k
′
are commeasurable
such that 0 < r∗2 < r
∗







The next example illustrates the equilibrium described in Proposition 2.2.
Example 2.3. When α = .3, k = .3, and k
′
= .2, we can calculate non-shoppers’ optimal
stopping prices r∗1 = .62 and r
∗






1), and firms’ price-support bounds
p̄1 = .52 and p̄2 = .13. The price distribution is depicted in Figure 2.3(a).
When the search cost of the type-1 consumers is not too high relative to that of the
type-2 consumers, firms set the upper bound of the price support equal to the optimal stop-
ping price of the type-2 consumer so that all non-shoppers stop searching after sampling
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once. In this case, the firms forgo the option of charging a higher price to take advan-
tage of the high-cost type-1 consumers because the benefit from exploiting the high-cost
consumers cannot counterbalance the loss of business from the low-cost consumers.
Proposition 2.3. (Symmetric Pricing with Segmented Support)There exists a









3(1−α)p p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1]
, (2.9)
























termined by {∫ p̄3
p̄4
F (p) dp = k
′∫ p̄1
p̄2




if the inspection costs k and k
′
are different enough such that 0 < r∗2 < r
∗











The next example illustrates the equilibrium described in Proposition 2.3.
Example 2.4. When α = .3, k = .5, and k
′
= .1, we can calculate non-shoppers’ optimal
stopping prices r∗1 = .88 and r
∗










1), and firms’ price support
p̄1 = .88, p̄2 = .56, p̄3 = .37 and p̄4 = .13. Also, ϕ = .29. The price distribution is depicted
in Figure 2.3(b).
Intuitively, when the search cost of the type-1 consumers is significantly higher than
that of type-2 consumers, the optimal stopping price of the type-1 consumers is thus con-
siderably higher than that of the type-2 consumers. As a result, charging a higher price to
exploit the high-cost consumers could be as profitable as charging a lower price to compete
for more market share, which explains the rightward expansion of the price support com-
pared to the previous result. Particularly, it is worth noticing that segmentation of price
supports arises in equilibrium in this case. The gap between p̄3 and p̄2 results from the drop
of expected demand for prices right above p̄3. Because p̄3 equals the type-2 consumers’
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optimal stopping price r∗2, when pricing below p̄3, a firm can stop all type-2 consumers
who inspect its position from further searching. However, once its price exceeds p̄3, the
type-2 consumers will continue to inspect other positions and are very likely to purchase
from elsewhere (unless all the other positions charge even higher prices). Therefore, the
expected demand drops substantially at p̄3. As a result, the expected profit jumps down-
ward at p̄3 and does not rise back until p ≥ p̄2. For this reason, charging any price between
p̄3 and p̄2 is suboptimal.
One question of our particular interest is: could the local-competition price pattern
arise in equilibrium in the case of position-invariant costs? The answer is negative, as
we show in Proposition 2.4. In fact, we can conclude that the typical symmetric random
search market cannot induce the local-competition equilibrium pricing pattern.
2.4.2 Position-Dependent Costs
We now allow consumers’ inspection costs to be different for different positions.
Position-dependent inspection costs reflects the inherent difference across different po-
sitions, which lies in the difference in terms of visibility and accessibility. Just like bending
over to check the bottom-level shelf space in the supermarket could be costly for seniors,
scrolling down and looking for an unhighlighted link on a webpage or switching multiple
webpages could be troublesome for non-tech-savvy users and/or in the case of unsatisfac-
tory network connection.
We first give a necessary condition for the local-competition pattern to arise in equi-
librium.
Proposition 2.4. (Local-Competition Pattern under Endogenous Search: A
Necessary Condition)A similar pricing pattern as in Equation (2.1) may arise in a
rational-expectations equilibrium only if at least one group of consumers have a higher





Proposition 2.4 shows that for the pattern to appear in REE, at least some consumers’
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inspection cost for the third position should be strictly higher than that for the first
position. Otherwise, because the price at the first position is always higher than that at
the third position, as in Equation (2.1), inspecting the first position would be dominated
by inspecting the third one for all consumers. In this case, the rational search decision
would be to inspect the second and the third positions only. If this is the case, then both
the first and the second firms will deviate from the presumed pricing strategies. As a
result, the pattern in Equation (2.1) cannot hold as an equilibrium.
Proposition 2.4 thus excludes the possibility that the local-competition pattern is an
equilibrium when there is no inherent difference among different positions. It reveals the
fact that the special pattern of equilibrium price dispersion is an outcome of position-
dependent inspection costs, which induce certain search ordering of consumers as rational
equilibrium behaviors.
We next explicitly derive an equilibrium with the same pricing pattern as Equa-
tion (2.1) under certain conditions.
Proposition 2.5. (Local-Competition Pattern under Endogenous Search: A
Sufficient Condition) When non-shoppers’ inspection costs for different positions in-
crease with position ranks and the differences are large enough; precisely, when k1 <
α(1−α)−ln(1+α(1−α))




1−α ln (1 + α (1− α)), k
′
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√
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Table 2.1: Consumers’ Search Decisions d (z,C)
Choice Set C Type-1 Consumers Type-2 Consumers
{1, 2, 3} If z = 1, inspect 1st position If z = 1, inspect 1st position
{2, 3} If (1 ≥) z > p̄1, inspect 2nd position;
If z ≤ p̄1, stop
If z > r2, inspect 2nd position;
If z ≤ r2, stop
{1, 3} If z > r1, inspect 1st position;
If z ≤ r1, stop
If z > p̄2, inspect 1st position
{1, 2} If z ≤ p̄2, stop If z > p̄2, inspect 1st position
{1} If z ≤ r1, stop If z > p̄2, inspect 1st position
{2} If z ≤ p̄1, stop
If z > r2, inspect 2nd position;
If z ≤ r2, stop








(r2 − p) dF2 (p) = k
′
2. (Notice that p̄3 < r2 < p̄2.)
p̄2 =
1
1+α(1−α) p̄1, and p̄3 = αp̄2; consumers adopt the search strategies specified in Table
2.1.4
The conditions needed are that the inspection costs are higher for the inferior positions
than those of the superior ones and that they differ in the same order for all non-shoppers






3). In addition, the differences between the inspection
costs for two different positions are heterogeneous across consumers. In other words, while
some consumers (i.e., shoppers) are insensitive to location difference, others (i.e., non-
shoppers) are quite sensitive, and these non-shoppers have different levels of tolerance
toward locational inconvenience. For example, some consumers might not mind scrolling
down and looking for an unhighlighted link on the same webpage but would not bother
to switch to another webpage to continue their search, or it might be fine for some to
bend over and check the bottom shelf in the supermarket but it would be too troublesome
to get a ladder and check the top shelf. As an equilibrium outcome of such differences, a
commonly observed search order arises in equilibrium, and meanwhile, different consumers
stop at different stages of the search process.
4Alternatively, we can describe consumers’ search strategies based on Pandora’s Rule, which relies upon
a major result from Weitzman (1979). Here, we opt to formulate and solve the whole problem within a
self-contained framework.
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Anticipating consumers’ rational search strategies, firms also optimize their pricing
strategies by selectively retaining some consumers from further search, competing for some
who sample multiple positions and forgoing the others. As an equilibrium outcome, type-1
consumers choose to start their search from the first position because it yields the highest
expected gain according to Equation (2.6). After learning the price from the first position,
they decide to stop searching because further inspection of either the second or the third
position yields a negative expected gain. Similarly, type-2 consumers stop searching after
inspecting the first two positions because of the higher search cost for the third position.
Shoppers inspect all three positions before making a purchase, and the order they pursue
actually does not matter.
Table 2.1 lists non-shoppers’ search decisions d (z,C) when facing values of {z,C}
which are relevant to the equilibrium analysis. From the table, we can identify non-
shoppers’ equilibrium search strategies. For instance, the lowest price is z = 1 before
consumers start the first search, and the decision facing consumers is d (1, {1, 2, 3}). For
type-1 consumers, according to Table 2.1, d (1, {1, 2, 3}) is to inspect the first position.
After that, they learn a price p from the F1 (p) so that p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1]. Then the decision
d (p, {2, 3}) for the type-1 consumers is to stop, which completes the type-1 consumers’
search strategies in equilibrium. We also specify consumers’ off-equilibrium strategies. For
instance, the type-1 consumers will not actually face the decision d (z, {1, 3}). Nevertheless,
this decision and the associated payoff should be taken into account when they calculate
the expected gain of inspecting the second position in the first place. Also, the type-2
consumers face the decision d (z, {2, 3}) after inspecting the first position. Despite the
fact that the price quoted from the first position always falls in [p̄2, p̄1] in equilibrium, we
also need to specify the off-equilibrium search decision when z < p̄2 because such decision
affects the first firm’s profitability of possible deviation. As we can verify, all the decisions
listed in Table 2.1, both in-equilibrium and off-equilibrium, are rational.
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2.5 Conclusion
In addition to the theoretical contribution to the literature on search and pricing,
this study has managerial implications for sellers, consumers, and information systems
designers. For sellers seeking the optimal pricing strategy, we emphasize the importance
of recognizing the features of consumers’ online search behavior and adjusting the price
accordingly. Because the online environment makes it relatively easy to sample around,
a competitive price could quickly be noticed and result in a surge of sales. Therefore,
it would be beneficial to provide occasional promotions or limited-time deals from time
to time, which could not only boost short-term sales but also attract more visits in the
long run. Nevertheless, the optimal pricing strategies would avoid being too aggressive or
too conservative in price competition. The local-competition pattern suggests competing
only against commensurable opponents with similar visibility. In most cases, it would be
suboptimal to compete against sellers that are much stronger or weaker. Moreover, to
form their optimal pricing strategies, sellers only need “local” information on consumers’
search behavior at the positions with similar visibility and on the pricing strategies of the
firms at these neighboring positions.
For consumers looking for the best deals, it might sound discouraging that the exact
price at a particular position is usually difficult to predict. It could be the case that the
firm at a prominent position offers a good deal, or a firm at an inferior position might not
charge as low a price as expected. Stopping the search process early is thus rational for
consumers who have high search costs. Nevertheless, since the price expectation decreases
as the location prominence drops, it is generally rewarding to keep searching, especially
for those who are not sensitive to locational inconvenience.
For designers of the online information portals, this study highlights the critical role of
the inherent difference among business positions in affecting consumers’ inspection costs,
which then determine the search behavior and, in turn, sellers’ profits. Appropriately
differentiating the visibility of links (e.g., by special decoration, large display areas, or
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color highlighting) is essential to make the superior positions more appealing to sellers. In
addition, notice that the advantage of prominent positions would diminish once consumers
get fully accustomed to the webpage design and linking structure. In this sense, occasional
updating the structural design would also be necessary.
This work can be extended in several directions. The major limitation of the analysis
in Section 4 is that it is somewhat incomplete, as we only study the equilibrium with full
rationality in the three-firm case under certain conditions. A future extension would be to
explore the general case of asymmetric oligopolistic pricing with optimal consumer search.
Another interesting direction for future work would be to consider a dynamic setting in
which consumers arrive at different times, and firms compete against each other intertem-
porally. In addition, the local-competition pattern predicted from the current study could
be an interesting topic for future empirical investigation of online price dispersion.
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Chapter 3
Price Competition and Endogenous Valuation in
Search Advertising
3.1 Introduction
Search advertising, in which advertisers bid to be listed alongside search results or
content pages for specific keywords, has been recognized as a successful revolution of
the traditional online and offline advertising. The Internet advertising market generated
$22.7bn in the United States in 2009 despite the global economic downturn (PwC and IAB,
2010), and the Internet is predicted to surpass newspapers and television to become the
leading advertising medium by 2011 (VSS, 2007). Inside this prosperity, search advertising
undoubtedly plays a leading role. Search-related advertising accounts for nearly half of
the total Internet advertising revenue, outperforms all of its predecessors (e.g., display or
email ads), and continues to grow rapidly.
While spending millions of dollars on search advertising, marketing managers always
wonder whether a seemingly attractive advertising position is indeed worth pursuing, how
much value a premium sponsored slot creates for them, and how to optimally allocate their
marketing spending. Should they bid aggressively to win a good position and charge a price
premium to compensate for the spending, or should they save money in the bidding and
capture demand with price discounts through sales and promotions? From consumers’
perspective, one typical question is where to find the best deal. Will the price from a
prominent advertising slot be higher or lower than those from the less-prominent positions?
This study is intended to answer these questions.
A crucial step leading to the proper evaluation of sponsored advertising slots is to
investigate their values endogenously within the competitive environment, which would be
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easily neglected in industrial practice and academic research. Prominent positions (e.g.,
advertising slots listed on the top of a web page, or highlighted in special color with extra
space) usually generate high click-through rates and hence are commonly believed to be
highly desirable. The existing literature on position auction mechanism design (e.g., Athey
and Ellison, 2010; Liu et al., 2010), which carefully studies how advertisers shade their
bids strategically in the bidding competition, usually assumes the value of per-ad-click as
exogenously given and fixed. Under such an assumption, a prominent advertising slot that
attracts more click-throughs, naturally, creates higher value for advertisers. Nevertheless,
whether these clicks lead to final conversion also depends on the pricing of the product.
In other words, the value of advertising slots is not realized without considering the price
competition outcome. In this study, we suggest that the true value of a particular ad-
vertising slot to a particular advertiser should be understood endogenously in the price
competition facing that advertiser. We show that, depending on the competitive situation,
a more prominent slot may or may not be more valuable, even if it is cost-free. Instead of
emphasizing the strategic bidding details, we focus on the value of advertising positions
to advertisers and examine advertisers’ willingness-to-pay for a prominent slot. We also
analyze the resulting price dispersion associated with the bidding outcome. To the best
of our knowledge, we are among the earliest to integrate price competition with bidding
competition under the search advertising setting.
Like the advertising model itself, the price and bidding competition in search ad-
vertising is different by its nature from the traditional pricing and advertising topics in
marketing and economics literature. Major distinctions are two: the unique features of
online consumer search behavior and the asymmetric nature embedded in the competition
for an exclusive advertising resource.
Compared with traditional offline searching, consumers’ online search behavior ex-
hibits unique features: (1) a commonly observed search ordering, and (2) a highly di-
versified consumers’ search cost. The first feature originates from the organization of
advertisements in search engine result pages. The common format is that the sponsored
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links are listed in the right column alongside the organic search results, one after another
from the top downward. Because of the reading habits and eye-movement pattern of most
human beings, consumers usually process the information following the order of the list,
from the top downward. Therefore, consumers generally first pay attention to the top
advertising slot of the sponsored list, and then the next, and so on, while some of them
stop searching before reaching the bottom.1 The arrangement of advertisements and the
resulting ordering of the search creates a huge prominence difference among advertising
slots with different ranks. Both online traffic statistics and empirical studies based on
clickstream data have shown that the click-through rate attracted by the top link on a
web page is generally the highest, and it decreases significantly from the top downward
(e.g., Brooks, 2004; Ansari and Mela, 2003; Ghose and Yang, 2009).
The second feature of online search behavior owes to the advance of information
technology, which greatly facilitates informational searches. The physical cost to sample
a product and get a price quote from a store, which would otherwise be a non-negligible
expense with necessary travel to the store, is now only several mouse clicks. In addition,
some consumers do derive hedonic utility from shopping online (e.g., Childers et al., 2001):
They enjoy the process of searching different places, comparing prices, and finding the best
deal, evidenced by those who spend hours surfing the web to shop. Altogether, with the
flourishing of the Internet and online search engines, there arises a certain portion of
consumers who have a non-positive (zero or even negative) net search cost. We call them
shoppers. However, not everybody purchasing online has such luxury. The convenience
of e-commerce brings many people with stringent time constraints, whose only goal is to
find the product with a minimum of time spent. In addition, the information overload
with the Internet and the extra skills needed to accomplish computer-based searches add
to the cost for some online consumers. Therefore, there also exists a certain number of
1Hoque and Lohse (1999) use experimental data showing that, compared with traditional paper media,
consumers are more likely to pay more attention to the advertisements near the beginning of the heading
in online directories.
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consumers who have a positive search cost, whom we call non-shoppers.2
In addition to the distinctive features of online search behavior, the exclusiveness of
the advertising resource and the asymmetry inherent inside the bidding competition distin-
guish our study from existing ones. Traditional advertising technology allows advertisers
to choose their advertising levels independently, which makes the competition outcome
less sensitive to the asymmetry among firms’ competence. In light of this feature, start-
ing from Butters (1977), the classical economics models of price advertising unanimously
consider symmetric competition among advertisers and derive equilibrium outcomes in
which all firms choose the same advertising level and adopt symmetric pricing strategy
(e.g., Stegeman, 1991; Stahl, 1994). In contrast, in search advertising, the prominent ad-
vertising slot is sold via auction and by its nature is exclusive: Only one firm can win a
prominent position. Hence, a slight difference in firms’ competence would lead to a huge
difference between winning and losing the best business location. This type of advertising
thus demands that we capture even a small difference in firms’ competence and tease out
the bidding result explicitly. As asymmetric competition deals with firms that play differ-
ent strategies in equilibrium, it brings challenging yet intriguing aspects into the analysis,
such as the determination of the winning bid and the comparison of the price expectation.
This work is among the very few studies that handle asymmetric competition under the
price advertising setting.
To study the interaction between pricing and bidding competition under search adver-
tising, we set up a game-theoretic model involving asymmetric competition among firms
and capturing the aforementioned features of online consumer search behavior. Firms
first compete for advertising slots via auction and then compete for customers in a prod-
uct market. Firms differ in their competence, which is represented by production cost.
Positions are differentiated in their prominence, which reflects the ordering of the list.
2Early consumer research shows that a consumer’s search effort is determined by various factors, such
as time availability, purchase involvement, and attitudes toward shopping, and consumers do not always
search thoroughly, even when purchasing expensive items (Beatty and Smith, 1987). A recent empirical
investigation shows that online shoppers tend to search very few sites on average (Johnson et al., 2004).
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Consumers start searching from the prominent position. The shoppers conduct a thor-
ough search, while non-shoppers stop searching once their reserve price is satisfied. We
thus provide an integrated framework to endogenously investigate the value of advertising
slots in the context of both bidding and pricing competition, taking into account firms’
relative competitive strength as well as consumers’ online search behaviors.
Based on this framework, we show that a prominent advertising slot might or might
not be desirable. In some cases, even without any extra cost, the prominent position
is not desirable for the firm that has a competitive advantage, which underscores our
early argument that whether a seemingly prominent position is indeed superior should be
determined endogenously, taking competitors’ responses in pricing into consideration.The
major trade-off facing the firm with a competitive advantage is exploiting the extra demand
when winning the prominent position versus charging high prices when letting the weak
competitor win the better position. We also find that the bidding outcome might not
always be in favor of the firm with a competitive advantage. In some scenarios, the
disadvantaged firm is able to outbid its competitor and wins the prominent position.
By analyzing the equilibrium pricing, we identify a unique pattern of two-dimensional
price dispersion: First, we show that the presence of shoppers makes any static pricing
unstable, and in equilibrium, the realized price from the same position varies. Second,
because of the common search ordering and the resulting location prominence difference,
firms at different positions adopt different pricing strategies, and the expected prices from
different positions differ. Interestingly, we reveal that the price expectation from a promi-
nent position might not be higher, somewhat contradicting the common wisdom that an
expensive location comes with expensive products.
It is worth noting that in addition to online search advertising, we formulate and ana-
lyze the whole problem in a way that the model and its implications are also applicable to
other settings involving price promotion and location acquisition, from storefront location
competition to slotting space allocation in retail stores, as is discussed in more detail in the
last section of this chapter. Along this line, there is rich literature on price promotion and
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geographical location competition. Varian (1980) studies the symmetric mixed-strategy
pricing when some “informed” consumers are fully aware of the prices from all firms and
the others are “uninformed.” Narasimhan (1988) and Raju et al. (1990) consider duopolis-
tic price competition when some consumers are “loyal” to one brand. These works consider
only the price competition and take the information structure or the market segmentation
as exogenously given. In contrast, we consider both price and bidding competition so that
the “guaranteed” demand is acquired endogenously. In addition, the location advantage
is exclusive so that which firm wins reflects the subtle interactions embedded in the asym-
metric competition, and firms adopt asymmetric pricing strategies upon winning. Other
literature focuses on geographical location competition. For example, Dudey (1990) shows
that sellers choose to cluster together when buyers incur higher search costs across differ-
ent locations. In contrast, we explicitly model prominence difference among locations and
consider exclusive location choice decisions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we start with a baseline
model to capture the essence of our interest, so as to derive neat results and clear insights.
We consider two heterogeneous firms competing for a prominent advertising slot to sell
products to consumers. We temporarily leave consumers’ search behavior exogenous. Sec-
tion 3.3 details the analysis and derives results from the baseline model. In Section 3.4, we
endogenize consumers’ search strategies. We first endogenize consumers’ choice of search
ordering and allow them to deviate from the presumed order. We then endogenize con-
sumers’ sequential search decision and let them strategically decide whether to continue or
stop searching. We show that the qualitative results derived from the baseline model stay
the same. In Section 3.5, we further extend the baseline model along various directions.
We show that the main results continue to hold when search advertising is not the only
information channel, when consumers have heterogeneous preferences over firms’ products,
and when there are more than two firms competing. In addition, we provide some sup-
portive observations that are consistent with our modeling results. Section 3.6 discusses
the managerial implications and concludes the chapter.
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3.2 The Baseline Model
Two firms compete for a prominent advertising position via auction. The winning
firm gets placed in the prominent position, which is called the first position or position
1. The other firm stays at a less prominent position, the second position or position 2.
The prominent advertising position can be interpreted as the top sponsored advertising
slot listed on a search engine results page. Depending on whether they win the prominent
position, the firms compete for consumers by setting different prices. The firms are selling
a homogeneous product. The homogeneity assumption is partially motivated by the high
degree of standardization and digitization of products or services on the Internet. More
fundamentally, suppressing heterogeneity among products allows us to see clearly how
locational effect (and essentially consumers’ online search behaviors) alone generates a
significant level of price dispersion (for the same product). Relaxing this assumption to
consider heterogeneous consumer preferences does not change the main insights, as we
show later. The firms are differentiated in their competence, which is represented by the
marginal production cost. The firm with competitive advantage, termed as high type or
H, has a lower marginal production cost c1, while the firm with competitive disadvantage,
termed as low type or L, has a higher marginal production cost c2. Without loss of
generality, we normalize c1 to zero and denote c2 as c, c > 0.
There is a continuum of consumers of measure 1. Each consumer has a unit demand
of the product. Consumers obtain price information of the product by sampling the ad-
vertising slot(s) (e.g., clicking the sponsored link(s)). We assume that all consumers start
sampling products from the prominent position. Among them, α (0 < α < 1) are non-
shoppers who sample the first position only. The other 1 − α are shoppers who sample
both positions. Here, we leave consumers’ search behavior exogenous to avoid unneces-
sary technical complexity in the baseline model, while still capturing the characteristics of
consumer online search behavior (i.e., a commonly observed search ordering, and highly
diversified consumers’ search costs). In Section 4, we relax the ordering assumption to al-
low consumers to choose the search ordering strategically, not necessarily starting from the
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prominent position. Also, we endogenize consumers’ sequential search decisions, showing
that the equilibrium outcome coincides with the exogenous assumptions. Again, to keep
the baseline model simple and to avoid unnecessary distraction from the demand factor,
we assume that all consumers have the same willingness-to-pay for the product, w, w > c.
Relaxing this assumption to a case with consumers of heterogeneous willingness-to-pay
does not change the main results (as is detailed in Appendix C.1). Consumers buy the
product when the price is no greater than w. Consumers who sample both positions have
perfect recall on price and make the purchase from the firm with the lower price; if the
price is the same for both, they randomly pick one, with equal probability.
The determination of the auction outcome is based on a score that equals a unit-
price bid times a weighting factor. Each firm submits a per-visit (or per-click) bid bi
(i ∈ {H,L}). The weighting factor ωi equals the expected visits (clicks) if firm i is placed
in the first position. In the baseline model, the weighting factors simply equal 1 for both
firms. In the extensions, ωi may take different values depending on different settings.
The firm with the highest score si = ωibi wins the first position and pays on a per-visit
basis such that the per-visit payment generates a score equal to the second highest score





bi′ per click ({i, i
′} = {H,L}). The firm
that does not win the first position stays in the second one and pays a reserve price, which
is assumed to be zero for simplicity.3
We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, the two firms decide their bidding
strategies and get placed in the corresponding positions according to the auction rule. In
the second stage, the firms price their product, and consumers sample the position(s) and
make purchase decisions.4 Considering the transparency of business information within
3Imposing a positive reserve price may involve issues of firms’ entry decision; however, it does not
change the main results.
4The chosen timeline of the game allows us to explicitly examine the values of different advertising
positions. It is also a natural timeline applicable to general contexts involving pricing and location
acquisition. In fact, the equilibrium outcomes of bidding and pricing competition exhibit similar patterns
under different timeline settings. For example, when bidding and pricing decisions are simultaneous or
in a reverse order, in equilibrium, the low-type firm is likely to win the first position only if c and α are
relatively small, and very similar pricing strategies arise in equilibrium.
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the same industry and highly repetitive interaction in search advertising, we follow the
common approach in the literature (e.g., Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2007) and consider
complete information structure (i.e., the game structure, auction rules, and all parameters
are common knowledge to both firms).
3.3 Main Results
Along the line of backward induction, we look for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We first consider the second stage price competition given the winning positions and then
study the bidding competition in the first stage.
Because of the existence of shoppers, meaning that there exist a certain portion of
consumers who search around, know all price information, and purchase from the firm
offering a lower price, a slight price cut relative to the competitor can help a firm capture
this portion of demand and thus results in a significant increase in the sales profit. As
a result, any static prices from the two firms cannot be an equilibrium. In other words,
there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in the second stage price competition.
We next explore the mixed-strategy equilibrium. We use Fi(p), i ∈ {H,L}, to describe
a firm’s mixed strategy of pricing. Like regular cumulative distribution functions, Fi(p)
measures the probability that the firm will charge a price less than or equal to p.
Lemma 3.1. (i) Given that H wins the first position, the equilibrium mixed strategies of














where m = max{αw, c};5




(ii) Given that L wins the first position, the equilibrium pricing strategies are
FH(p) =
p−c−α(w−c)





p ∈ [c+ α(w − c), w)
p = w
(3.2)
The above lemma describes an asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in the second
stage price competition under different situations. Notice that when H wins the first
position and cost advantage is the dominating factor (specifically, c ≥ αw), H would play
pure strategy and charge a competitive price equal to L’s marginal cost, so as to grab
the entire market; Meanwhile, L mixes over prices, ensuring that H has no profitable
deviation, and earns zero profit itself. In this sense, this scenario is close to a standard
Bertrand competition with asymmetric production costs.6
In all other cases, both firms play mixed strategies and achieve positive expected
profit. Similar to other asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria found under different set-
tings (e.g., Amaldoss and Jain, 2002), the equilibrium pricing strategies should satisfy the
following properties. First, both firms’ equilibrium price distributions have a common
and continuous support such that FH(p) and FL(p) are strictly increasing on the common
support [p, p̄]. Otherwise, pricing within those non-overlapped ranges would lead to a sub-
optimal profit level. Second, there is no mass point in both firms’ distributions on [p, p̄)
such that FH and FL are continuous on [p, p̄). This is because a mass point in one firm’s
price distribution would result in a downward jump of the other firm’s expected demand at
that point and consequently lower profit levels in a contiguous region on the right side of
that point. In addition, by similar arguments, at most one firm may have a mass point at
p̄. These properties ensure that the equilibrium identified in the above lemma is a unique
equilibrium in the second stage pricing game.
Given that H wins the first position and αw > c, the highest price that H can charge
is consumers’ willingness-to-pay w, which ensures H a profit level of αw by exploiting all
6When there is a finite minimum money increment ε, L pricing c and H pricing c − ε can be a pure-
strategy equilibrium in this scenario. Here, we follow the convention and treat money as infinitely divisible.
As we can see, either case does not affect the main results.
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the surplus of its guaranteed demand α. In light of this line, H will never take any price
below αw, since charging a lower price would certainly lead to a profit lower than αw. This
explains the price range [αw,w]. Similarly, in the case where L wins the first position, L
can earn at least α(w− c) by charging w such that it will never take any price lower than
c+ α(w − c).
Notice that when adopting mixed strategies, firms earn the same expected profit
across the price range involved. Therefore, firms’ expected profits can be specified by
examining the expected profits when firms charge the lowest equilibrium prices, as is
summarized in Table 3.1, in which πji denotes firm i’s expected sales profit in position j.
Table 3.1: Firms’ Expected Profits in Different Situations
When H wins When L wins
H ’s expected profit π1H = m π
2
H = (1− α)(c+ α(w − c))
L’s expected profit π2L = (1− α)(m− c) π1L = α(w − c)
Note: m = max{αw, c}
One question of particular interest is whether a prominent position is always desirable,
which means whether a firm can achieve higher expected profit in the prominent position
than otherwise. The following proposition shows that a seemingly prominent position is
not always desirable.
Proposition 3.1. (Endogenous Valuation) For the low-type firm, staying in the first
position always brings higher profit than staying in the second one; for the high-type firm,
however, when α
2
(1−α)2w < c <
1−α
2−αw, the second position is more profitable.
As is illustrated in Figure 3.1(a), in the shadowed region, H can achieve higher
expected profit in the less prominent position than in the prominent one. This surprising
result reveals the nature of price competition and captures the trade-off facing the high-
type firm between exploiting the prominent location and benefiting from its lower cost.
Intuitively, once winning the prominent position, the low-type firm exploits it thoroughly
by charging a relatively high price, since it is at a cost disadvantage and the prominent
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position ensures a guaranteed demand. For this reason, even though staying in the second
position and receiving less attention, the high-type firm may earn reasonable revenue by
grabbing most of the residual demand at a relatively high price. On the other hand, when
it is at the prominent position, the high-type firm may face fierce competition from the
low-type firm on the residual demand, since the low-type firm is desperate to appeal to
some consumers. Therefore, when the the loss of demand on the less prominent position
is not too high (i.e., α is small), staying in the second position could be more profitable
for the high-type firm as long as the benefit from the cost difference is not too low (i.e.,
c > α
2
(1−α)2w). Nevertheless, the cost advantage cannot be too high either; otherwise,
the high-type firm could enjoy the profit from the prominent position by excluding its
opponent and occupying the entire market, which far exceeds what it can earn in a less
prominent position. This explains c < 1−α
2−αw. In brief, whether the prominent position is
worth pursuing for the firm with competitive advantage essentially depends on the trade-
off between capturing the non-shoppers (when winning the advantageous position) and
charging higher price premium to the shoppers (when letting the weaker opponent win).
(a) Endogenous Valuation (b) Bidding Outcome (c) Price Dispersion
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium Outcomes: The Baseline Model
Proposition 3.1 illustrates a scenario where a prominent advertising position, although
generating more clicks, may have less value than a less prominent one for the high-type
firm, which indicates that the per-click value of the prominent position could be signifi-
cantly different from that of the less prominent one. The result underscores that rather
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than blindly pursuing a prominent advertising position with a high click-through rate,
firms should evaluate an advertising position endogenously within the actual competitive
environment, taking into consideration firms’ relative competence and consumers’ search
pattern.
Meanwhile, in many cases, the prominent position does have its value, and thus both
firms will compete for the position. We next consider the bidding competition in the first
stage. We first derive firms’ equilibrium bidding in a general way to show clearly to what
degree the equilibrium bidding depends on the model parameters. Recall that the firm
with the higher score si = ωibi wins, where bi is the per-click bid and ωi is the weighting
factor, and i ∈ {H,L}. Also, denote the expected clicks when firm i stays in the first
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i − π2i .
Therefore, bidding bi =
π1i −π2i
λi
is firm i’s weakly dominant strategy. Thus, we show that
in equilibrium, independent of the weighting factors ωi, firms bid in such a way that
the total willingness-to-pay (biλi) equals π
1
i − π2i . Moreover, since we let the weighting
factor ωi equal the expected clicks λi, which is commonly believed to be the major search
engines’ practices, the score si = ωi
π1i −π2i
λi
= π1i − π2i , and thus advertisers are ranked
essentially according to their endogenous valuation of the prominent position. Here, in
the baseline model, the situation is simpler because ωi = λi = 1 for i = H,L. As a result,
bi = max{π1i − π2i , 0}, and the firm with a higher bid wins the position. By comparing bH
and bL under different situations, we can conclude the equilibrium bidding outcome, as is
summarized in Proposition 3.2 and illustrated in Figure 3.1(b).
Proposition 3.2. (Bidding Outcome) (i) When α < 2 −
√
2 and c < 2−α
3−αw, the low-
type firm wins the first position; (ii) When α > 2 −
√
2 or c > 2−α
3−αw, the high-type firm
outbids its rival.
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Proposition 3.2 reveals an asymmetric equilibrium in the bidding for the prominent
position. It provides the rationale for firms to determine their spending on location com-
petition based on their relative competitive strength and consumers’ search behavior, so
as to better position themselves in the marketing campaign. This proposition implies
that when either the competence difference or the prominence difference is a dominating
factor, the firm with a competitive advantage should compete aggressively to acquire the
prominent position.
The intuition is as follows. A firm with a cost advantage can easily outperform its
competitor in the price competition and grab most of the market share. Therefore, a
prominent location is worth pursuing only if a significant difference in prominence exists;
otherwise, as long as a certain portion of consumers will visit both sites, the firm can
stay in a less prominent position, still win over most of the residual demand, and attain a
satisfactory profit level. This explains why only a high-α position motivates the high-type
firm to bid aggressively. On the other hand, a firm with a cost disadvantage suffers a lot
when its cost disadvantage is huge, which greatly diminishes the profitability of staying in
a prominent position. Therefore, the prominent position is more desirable to the low-type
firm when c is relatively small.
An interesting aspect revealed by this proposition is that the bidding outcome may
not always be in favor of the firm that has a competitive advantage. When endogenously
considered within the integrated framework, firms’ relative competitive strength may not
align with the competition result. In some scenarios, although the high-type firm does
value the prominent position and wishes to win, it cannot afford to bid as high as the low-
type firm. This result is in contrast to the efficient allocation property of the auctions (i.e.,
high-type bidder wins the prominent position) revealed in the framework with exogenous
bidder valuations (e.g., Liu et al., 2010).
It is worth mentioning that the above equilibrium outcome incorporates the extreme
cases, namely, c = 0, α = 0, or both. When the cost difference disappears (c = 0),
meaning that firms are homogeneous, the model reduces to the commonly seen symmetric
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competition model, in which symmetric bidding and pricing strategies arise in equilibrium.
By Table 3.1, π1H −π2H and π1L−π2L will become the same. Therefore, they will bid equally
at b = α2w and achieve the same net profit (1−α)αw, regardless of whether they win the
first position or not. Moreover, Eq.(3.1) and Eq.(3.2) will give the same equilibrium pricing
strategy of H and L when in the same position. Likewise, when the location prominence
difference vanishes (α = 0), meaning that all consumers visit both positions, it reduces to
the typical Bertrand competition. Since the two positions thus become the same, neither
firm is willing to spend any money in the bidding. By Table 3.1, π1H = π
2
H = c and
π1L = π
2
L = 0. Regardless of their positions, H always charges pH = c whereas L plays
the same mixed strategy FL(p) =
p−c
p
, according to Eq.(3.1) and Eq.(3.2). If both α = 0
and c = 0, then we arrive at the trivial case where both firms charge the competitive price
p = 0 and gain zero profit.
Next we examine the prices from different positions. Intuitively, since bidding is
costly, the winner of the prominent position tends to charge a higher price to compensate
itself, and hence the expected price from the prominent position is supposed to be higher.
Nevertheless, as is summarized by the following proposition, it might not always be the
case.
Proposition 3.3. (Price Dispersion) (i) When α < 2−
√
2 and c < 2−α
3−αw, the expected
price from the first position is higher than that from the second one. (ii) When α > 2−
√
2
or c > 2−α
3−αw, if α > α
∗(c, w), the expected price from the first position is higher; if











lnα∗ = 0 (3.3)
Interestingly, the price expectation from the prominent position may be lower when
the high-type firm has a significant cost advantage that is not overwhelmed by the promi-
nence difference. In this case, the high-type firm wins the prominent position and would
rather take advantage of its low cost to grab more market share via intense price cutting.
As is illustrated by the unshadowed region (II and III) in Figure 3.1(c), region II accounts
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for the case when the high-type firm plays pure strategy, while region III accounts for the
mixed-strategy case, in which the high-type firm puts the most mass on the price range
close to the lower bound of the support, yielding a lower price expectation.
In all other cases, as can be expected, the prominent position winner reaps its location
advantage by charging non-shoppers a higher price in general (shadowed region in Figure
3.1(c)). In fact, when the low-type firm wins the first position (region I in Figure 3.1(c)),
according to Eq.(3.2), its price distribution first order stochastically dominates that of the
high-type firm.
Notice that we derive two dimensions of price dispersion at the same time from the
model. First, firms mix their prices in equilibrium, indicating that rather than charging
one price for sure, they price with uncertainty. Therefore, the realized price from the same
position can vary over a certain range probabilistically. This feature coincides with the
complexity and uncertainty in determining the final prices of products observed in real-
ity (e.g., different shipping and handling fees, various coupon discounts and cash rebates,
etc.). Moreover, as is proposed by Varian (1980), when considered over a long time period,
the mixed-strategy pricing can lead to price fluctuation over time (e.g., with occasional
promotions or mark-ups), which accounts for the temporal price dispersion. Second, firms
at different positions adopt different pricing strategies in equilibrium so that the expected
prices from different positions differ, which accounts for the spatial price dispersion. Em-
pirical evidences of online price dispersion in both dimensions have been well documented
in the literature.7
It is worthwhile to pinpoint the driving forces of the unique two-dimensional price
dispersion pattern derived here. The first dimension is due to the presence of shoppers who
always search around and thus make any static pricing unstable. The spatial dispersion
7Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) and Chen and Hitt (2002) show that significant levels of price dispersion
exist online across different firms, even after control for various heterogeneities. Baye et al. (2004) find
that the identities of the lowest-priced firms for various online products keep changing over time, which
suggests a persistent level of temporal price dispersion. See Pan et al. (2004) for a detailed literature
review.
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originates from the search ordering and its resulting prominence difference. With the ma-
jority of consumers observing a common search ordering and the existence of non-shoppers,
a prominent position gets its prominence advantage by easily attracting consumers’ atten-
tion and retaining a portion of them. Such an asymmetric prominence leads to different
expected prices for different positions. Moreover, the two dimensional dispersion is further
enriched by the asymmetry in advertisers’ competitive strength. Partially reflecting the
bidding outcome, spatial dispersion can occur in one way or the other, depending on the
competence difference (compared to the prominence difference).
Next, we present some comparative statics results on how model parameters affect
advertisers’ net profits (i.e., sales profit net of bidding cost), social welfare, and the revenue
of the advertising provider (e.g., the search engines) in equilibrium.
(a) w = 1, c = 0.2 (b) w = 1, c = 0.5 (c) w = 1, c = 0.8
Figure 3.2: The Changes of Advertisers’ Net Profits (ξ) in α
For advertisers’ net profits, simple algebra shows that in equilibrium, the high-type
firm always achieves higher net profit than the low-type firm, despite all the complexity
of gain and loss in the bidding and price competition. This result simply implies that the
cost advantage is by all means rewarding. Furthermore, Figure 3.2 shows how both firms’
net profits change with α given different c, where the bold curves highlight the net profit
of the prominent position winner. Notice that neither firm’s equilibrium net profit changes
monotonically in α. The non-monotonicity originates from two counteracting effects that
α impacts the sales profit at the second position: On the one hand, a larger α takes away
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more market share. On the other hand, a larger α leaves higher profit margins, since
the prominent position winner tends to charge a higher price. Since the winner has to
pay a total price equal to the competitor’s profit difference between staying in the two
positions, such non-monotonicity is thus introduced into the bidding cost and then into
the net profit. An interesting aspect of this result is that even from the prominent position
winner’s perspective, a higher prominence advantage α may not necessarily lead to a higher
equilibrium net profit.
(a) The Changes of Social Welfare in α (w = 1) (b) The Changes of Social Welfare in c (w = 1)
Figure 3.3: The Changes of Social Welfare in α and c
The overall social welfare equals the sum of consumers’ surplus, advertisers’ net profit,
and the advertising provider’s revenue. Essentially, it equals the total consumer value
realized from the consumption of the products minus firms’ production costs. For example,
when L wins the first position in equilibrium, the expected social welfare can be written
as:





FL (p) dFH (p)
]
c, (3.4)
where the integral represents the probability of L’s charging a lower price than H, which
in turn measures L’s expected sales to the shoppers. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the welfare
changes in α and c under different scenarios. Notice that the jumps depicted in both
(a) and (b) correspond to the points when the bidding outcomes reverse (H wins on the
right-hand side of the jumps and L wins on the left). As we can see, the “V”-shaped
welfare curves indicate that once the winning (low-type) firm causes too much welfare
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loss, it automatically gets replaced by its competitor. In this sense, in allocating the
exclusive advertising resource, the auction mechanism serves as an auto-adjustment to
prevent substantial welfare loss.
Figure 3.4: The Level Curves of Search Engine’s Revenue
The search engine’s revenue is determined by the winning firm’s payment, which in
turn is determined by the second highest bid. Thus, it also reflects the competitiveness
of the bidding. Figure 3.4 depicts the level curves of the search engine’s revenue. As we
can see, the revenue increases rapidly toward the right bottom corner. Small c means
that the two firms are close to each other in terms of competitive strength. Meanwhile,
a large α indicates a huge difference between winning the prominent position and not.
The combination of the two induces firms to compete ultra-intensively for the prominent
position.
3.4 Endogenous Consumer Search
In the baseline model, we leave consumers’ search behaviors as exogenous to induce
easily understood analysis, neat results and clear insights, while avoiding too much techni-
cal complexity. In this section, we endogenize consumer search. In particular, we consider
consumers’ strategic choice of search ordering by allowing them to start searching from the
position with a lower expected price; we also consider consumers’ endogenous sequential
49
search decision (i.e., whether to conduct another search) by allowing them to rationally
assess the expected gain from an additional search. As we show, the qualitative results
from the baseline model remain the same.
3.4.1 Strategic Choice of Ordering
Under the assumed consumer search ordering, we have shown that spatial price dis-
persion does exist, and the expected price from the prominent position could be higher.
Understanding this, some sophisticated consumers may anticipate firms’ pricing strategies,
and start sampling from the position with the lower (expected) price instead of simply fol-
lowing the presumed search behavior. We now consider the case in which some consumers
are sophisticated and strategically choose their search ordering. We continue to consider
the diversification among consumers’ search behavior—shoppers and non-shoppers coex-
ist. Notice that for sophisticated shoppers, it actually does not matter which position
they start with. For the sophisticated non-shoppers, however, their rational behaviors
may affect firms’ decision and alter the competitive picture to some extent.
Following the framework of the baseline model, we continue to assume that α of the
consumers are non-shoppers who sample only once while 1 − α are shoppers who sample
both positions. Now we consider that among all the consumers, a small portion of them,
β (0 < β < 1), are sophisticated, and they can anticipate firms’ strategies and start
sampling from the position with the lower (expected) price. The rest of them (1 − β)
simply start sampling from the first position. In other words, 1 − α of all the consumers
sample both positions (it does not matter which position they start with), while αβ of
the consumers sample the position with the lower (expected) price only and the rest
α(1 − β) only look at the first position. In the first stage, firms decide their bidding
strategies and obtain different positions according to the auction rules. In the second
stage, sophisticated consumers observe the bidding outcome and decide which position
to start with, and meanwhile firms price their product. Then, all consumers sample the
position(s) and make purchase decisions.
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The strategy profile can be written as {bi, Fi(·; sH , sL), σ(sH , sL) : i ∈ {H,L}}, where,
as in the baseline model, bi is firm i’s per-click bid in the first stage and Fi(·; sH , sL) is the
cumulative distribution function of firm i’s pricing strategy in the second stage, contingent
on the bidding outcome (i.e., the comparison of the bidding scores sH and sL). Here we
use σ(sH , sL) to describe the strategy of those sophisticated consumers: Observing the
outcome of the auction, they start sampling from the first position with probability σ ,
and they start from the second position with probability 1 − σ, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1. For a strat-
egy profile to be a subgame-perfect rational-expectations equilibrium, it should satisfy the
following two conditions: First, given the outcome of the bidding competition in the first
stage, {Fi(·; sH , sL), σ(sH , sL) : i ∈ {H,L}} must be a rational-expectations equilibrium.
Specifically, given the assigned positions and sophisticated consumers’ strategy, the firms
have no profitable deviation in their pricing strategies in the second stage. Meanwhile,
sophisticated consumers are rational, which means that their belief about which position
has a lower expected price is consistent with firms’ equilibrium outcome. That is, σ = 1
if E(p1) < E(p2); σ = 0 if E(p1) > E(p2); 0 < σ < 1 only if E(p1) = E(p2), where E(pj)
is the expected price from the position j, j ∈ {1, 2}. Second, anticipating the equilibrium
play in the second stage, the firms have no profitable deviation in their bidding strategies
in the first stage.
As we can see, now the price competition consists of two levels: One is to compete for
sophisticated non-shoppers by price expectation, and the other is to compete for shoppers
by realized price.
We can conduct a similar analysis as in the baseline model, though with more com-
plexity. (A brief analysis can be found in Appendix C.2.) Figure 3.5 illustrates the equi-
librium outcome with β = 1
4
. Following the basic patterns found in the baseline model,
in the shadowed region in Figure 3.5(a), the high-type firm does not value the prominent
position at all. The high-type firm can win the auction only when either prominence differ-
ence or competence difference is significant (the unshadowed region in Figure 3.5(b)), while
the low-type firm outbids its rival when both α and c are small (the shadowed region).
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The expected price from the prominent position is lower when a significant competence
difference is not overwhelmed by the prominence difference (the unshadowed region in
Figure 3.5(c)). If the cost difference is not so salient, however, the expected price from the
prominent position will be higher (the shadowed region).
(a) Endogenous Valuation (b) Bidding Outcome (c) Price Dispersion
Figure 3.5: Strategic Choice of Ordering: β = 1
4
Further scrutiny may reveal the effects of consumers’ strategic ordering choice on the
equilibrium outcomes. Comparing Figure 3.5(b) with Figure 3.1(b), the shaded region
expands as a result of the presence of the sophisticated consumers, which implies that the
low-type firm has a greater chance of winning the prominent position. This is certainly
not because the low-type firm becomes more competitive here. Instead, it means that
the prominent position becomes less attractive to the high-type firm as the portion of
sophisticated consumers increases. By staying at the less prominent position and charging
a lower price in expectation, the high-type firm not only has a greater chance to win over
shoppers but also can attract sophisticated non-shoppers. Expecting the extra demand
from the sophisticated consumers, compared to the case without sophisticated consumers,
the high-type firm feels less motivated to acquire the prominent position. This trend is
clearly evidenced by the expansion of the “no-interest” region in Figure 3.5(a) (compared
to that region in Figure 3.1(a)).
Regarding the expected prices, in the unshadowed region of Figure 3.5(c), the high-
type firm charges a lower expected price and thus attracts all the sophisticated consumers.
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In the shadowed region, the winning firm charges a higher expected price and thus forgoes
those sophisticated consumers to its competitor. The winning firm does not charge a lower
expected price to attract the sophisticated consumers either because the winning firm is
the low-type firm, which has a cost disadvantage, or because the prominence advantage
is salient. The dotted region, in which the expected prices from the two positions are
the same and thus sophisticated consumers are indifferent in sampling the first or second
position, serves as a transition between the two deterministic cases. In this region, the high-
type firm wins the prominent position, and the relatively intermediate advantage of the
location prominence compared with its cost advantage makes any deterministic choice by
sophisticated consumers unsustainable. On the one hand, if all sophisticated consumers
start from the first position for sure, the guaranteed demand becomes too significant
to prevent H from exploiting them with a higher price, which contradicts sophisticated
consumers’ expectation. On the other hand, the relative prominence advantage is not
salient enough such that H can afford to forgo all those sophisticated consumers. As
a result, H charges the same expected price as L and grabs some of the sophisticated
consumers, and sophisticated consumers randomize their sampling strategies. With the
emergence of such a middle region, in which the expected prices from the two positions are
the same, we can see that consumers’ strategic ordering choice reduces the price dispersion.
As the portion of sophisticated consumers increases, firms are more likely to charge the
same expected price level.
As the portion of sophisticated consumers further grows, the equilibrium pattern
slightly changes while the main results of interest remain. Figure 3.6 illustrates the equi-
librium outcomes when β = 3
4
. One distinctive feature is the existence of a region in
which both firms are indifferent about winning the prominent position (the dotted region
in Figures 3.6(a) and 3.6(b)). The reason is as follows. Since the portion of sophisticated
consumers is significant enough that their deterministic choice could create a large amount
of guaranteed demand, neither type of firm can resist charging a higher price for this guar-
anteed demand, which in turn contradicts sophisticated consumers’ rational expectations.
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(a) Endogenous Valuation (b) Bidding Outcome (c) Price Dispersion
Figure 3.6: Strategic Choice of Ordering: β = 3
4
Therefore, no matter which firm wins the prominent position, sophisticated consumers
playing pure strategy cannot arise as an equilibrium. Instead, they randomize their sam-
pling in equilibrium. It is such mixed strategy that gives either firm the same share of
guaranteed demand from being in the two positions, which results in firms’ indifference
between them. In consequence, the price dispersion is further reduced and the expected
prices from the two positions are the same in a large region (dotted region in Figure 3.6(c)).
When all consumers are sophisticated (i.e., β = 1), it reduces to an extreme case in which
the first position’s “advantage” vanishes completely and there is essentially no difference
between the two positions.
3.4.2 Endogenous Sequential Search
The analysis so far treats the consumer sequential search decision as exogenous, that
is, some portion of consumers are assumed to search only once, while others are assumed to
sample both positions. This seemingly strong assumption, in fact, reflects the equilibrium
outcome when consumers are allowed to make their sequential search decision endoge-
nously. We now extend the baseline model to endogenize consumers’ sequential search
decision (i.e., whether to continue or stop searching). As we shall show, as long as both a
commonly observed search ordering and a certain portion of consumers with non-positive
search cost exist, the equilibrium bidding outcome and price dispersion pattern derived
54
from the baseline model continue to hold.
Following the framework in the baseline model, we modify the setup about consumer
search behavior as follows. Section 3.4.1 has explained the effect of strategic choice of
ordering; Here, we assume that all consumers follow the presumed search ordering to
simplify analysis. Suppose that all consumers first sample the prominent position and
learn the price, and then they assess the expected gain from an additional search. If the
expected gain from the additional search exceeds the search cost, they proceed to sample
the second position, compare the prices, and purchase from the position with the lower
price; otherwise, they stop searching and purchase from the first position (provided the
price does not exceed their willingness-to-pay w). Following the common assumption in
literature (e.g., Stahl, 1989), we assume that all consumers sample at least one position. We
consider consumers with heterogeneous search costs. Particularly, assume that 1−α of the
consumers have zero search cost, and α of them have positive search cost k (0 < k < w).8
Similar as before, firms first submit their bids, then firms and consumers observe the
bidding outcome and decide pricing and searching strategies simultaneously.
We first characterize consumers’ optimal searching strategies. Given the pricing strat-
egy of the firm in the second position F (·) (which again is a cumulative distribution func-
tion defined on a price support [p, p̄]), for any individual consumer, the expected gain from
sampling the second position, after already knowing the price p from the first position,




(p− x)dF (x) (3.5)
Notice that the price from the first position, p, must belong to the interval [p, p̄] due to the
common support properties discussed earlier. As G(p) ≥ 0, it is always optimal for those
shoppers with non-positive search cost to conduct an additional search. For those non-
shoppers with positive search cost, however, it is worthwhile to sample the second position
8Alternatively, we might allow k to vary following a certain distribution over some positive interval. In
that case, the mixed-strategy pricing continues to be the only possible outcome, but there is generally no
closed-form solution (similar to Stahl, 1996).
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only if G(p) > k. Similar to Weitzman (1979), we can equivalently define a reserve price
r, such that ∫ r
p
(r − x)dF (x) = k (3.6)
When the price quoted from the first position, p, exceeds r, it is profitable for non-shoppers
to conduct an additional search; otherwise, they will stop searching and purchase from the
first position.
After characterizing consumers’ optimal searching strategies, we can specify the equi-
librium concept. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile {bi, Fi(·; sH , sL), r(sH , sL) :
i ∈ {H,L}} such that: First, observing the bidding outcome, {FH(·), FL(·), r} is an equi-
librium in the second stage. In other words, given both firms’ pricing strategies FH(·)
and FL(·), shoppers always sample both positions, while non-shoppers sample the first
position and learn the price p, and proceed to sample the second position if and only
if p > r, where r is defined by Eq.(3.6) by substituting the pricing strategy of the firm
at the second position for F (·). Meanwhile, given consumers’ sequential search strategy
(specified by r) and the other firm’s pricing strategy Fi′ (·), either firm has no profitable
deviation. Second, anticipating the equilibrium play in the second stage, either firm has no
profitable deviation in its bidding strategy, that is, {bH , bL} is an equilibrium in the first
stage bidding competition. Following a similar approach to that of the baseline model, we
can derive the equilibrium mixed-strategy pricing and the corresponding expected profits
of both firms, and then compare their bidding amounts.
The price competition in the second stage follows a similar pattern as in the baseline
model, except that now firms have to take account of non-shoppers’ reaction when setting
the highest price they may charge. In particular, when H wins the first position, firms’
















where r is the reserve price for consumers with a positive search cost defined as r =
min{ 1−α
1−α+α lnαk, w}, and m = max{αr, c}.
9 Similarly, the expected sales profits of both
firms in this scenario can be written as π1H = m and π
2
L = (1− α)(m− c).
When L wins the first position, the reserve price of those non-shoppers becomes
r′ = min{ 1−α
1−α+α lnαk + c, w}, and the equilibrium pricing strategies can be written as
FH(p) =
p−c−α(r′−c)
(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [c+ α(r






p ∈ [c+ α(r′ − c), r′)
p = r′
(3.8)
In this case, H achieves an expected profit level of π2H = (1 − α)(c + α(r′ − c)), and L
attains π1L = α(r
′ − c).
We summarize the equilibrium bidding outcome and price dispersion in Figure 3.7
(with arbitrarily k = 1
5
w). As we can see, the equilibrium outcomes remain unchanged in
pattern. The prominent position is always profitable for the low-type firm, while the high-
type firm does not value the prominent position sometimes (shadowed region in Figure
3.7(a)). Only when both α and c are small (the shadowed region in Figure 3.7(b)) can the
low-type firm win the first position. The expected price from the first position is higher
than that from the second one, unless the cost advantage is overwhelming (the unshadowed
region in Fig.3.7(c)).
When considering consumers’ sequential search strategies, especially when non-shoppers’
search costs are not too high, the firm at the prominent position no longer fully exploits
them by setting the upper bound of the price support equal to consumers’ total surplus w.
The reason is simply that the firm cannot afford to lose the entire market. By charging an
upper bound price as high as w, the firm would not only lose those shoppers but also invite
non-shoppers to conduct an additional search and lose them as well. Realizing this, the
firm with location advantage adjusts its price to retain those consumers with relatively
high search costs, by setting the upper bound of price support equal to non-shoppers’
9In the case when m = c, the non-shoppers’ actual reserve price r′′ could be different from r, but
r ≤ r′′ < c/α so that it does not affect the equilibrium outcomes.
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(a) Endogenous Valuation (b) Bidding Outcome (c) Price Dispersion
Figure 3.7: Endogenous Sequential Search: k = 1
5
w
reserve price to keep them from further searching. Correspondingly, the firm at the less
prominent position adjusts its price as well, to compete for the shoppers who sample both
positions. Such auto-adjustment of pricing lowers the equilibrium prices from the two
positions simultaneously, with the relative price pattern unchanged; so is the relative equi-
librium profit. Naturally, as the comparative result, both the equilibrium bidding outcome
and the comparison of price expectation exhibit no substantial change in pattern.
The analysis and results on consumer sequential search are also consistent with recent
empirical findings. For example, Kim et al. (2010) estimate an elegant structural model of
consumer sequential search using online product search data from Amazon.com and show
that consumers have different search costs and high-cost consumers perform very limited
search.
3.5 Extension and Discussion
3.5.1 External Information Channels
In the baseline model, we assume that all consumers obtain the product information
from search advertising. Now we relax this assumption and consider the case where con-
sumers can obtain product information from other channels. In particular, we now assume
that among all consumers (with total mass 1), only 1 −M (0 < M < 1) of them obtain
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price information from search advertising (i.e., from the two advertising positions consid-
ered here). The other M portion of consumers obtain price information from external
channels (e.g., newspapers, television) and are assumed to be aware of both firms’ product
information. In fact, we can also consider different information coverage rates of firms in
the outside channels and further consider overlap of information coverage between different
channels, which can be shown not to affect the qualitative results. Firms charge the same
price to both the search advertising and outside markets. (If the pricing decisions are made
separately, then these are essentially separate markets.) In sum, M + (1−M) (1− α) of
consumers (i.e., consumers from the outside channels plus shoppers in the search market)
are informed of both firms’ prices and purchase from the one offering a lower price, whereas
(1−M)α of consumers (i.e., non-shoppers in the search market) sample the firm at the
first position only and purchase from there (if the price does not exceed w).
Firms’ pricing strategies can be derived accordingly. For example, when H wins the













p ∈ [p, w)
p = w
, (3.9)
where p = max{(1−M)αw, c}. When H wins, firms’ expected sales profits are π1H = p




; when L wins, firms achieve profit levels π1L =
(1−M)α (w − c) and π2H = [(1−M) (1− α) +M ] [(1−M)α (w − c) + c]. Firms bid
bi =
max{π1i −π2i ,0}
1−M per click and are ranked based on the score si = max{π
1
i − π2i , 0}, where
i ∈ {H,L}. Notice that when M = 0, all results reduce to those from the baseline model.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the results when M = 1
3
. As we can see, the high-type firm’s
endogenous valuation, the bidding outcome, and the spatial price dispersion all follow
patterns similar to those in the baseline model. For example, H achieves higher profit in
the second position than the first one in the shadowed region in Figure 3.8(a), and the
expected price from the first position is lower in the unshadowed region in Figure 3.8(c).
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(a) Endogenous Valuation (b) Bidding Outcome (c) Price Dispersion
Figure 3.8: External Information Channels: M = 1/3
An interesting aspect worth noting is that as M increases, the regions where H does
not value the first position and where H fails to outbid L both expand rather than shrink
(compared to the baseline model where M = 0). It implies that when the search advertis-
ing market is only part of the entire product market, as it is in reality, the trade-off pointed
out in this study is even more salient. Recall that two counterbalancing effects determine
the profitability of winning the prominent position for the high-type advertiser: capturing
non-shoppers when winning the position versus benefiting from a higher premium charged
to shoppers when letting the weaker competitor take the location advantage. When M
increases, the relative size of the search market decreases and thus the loss from losing the
non-shoppers decreases, which reduces the relative significance of the first effect. Mean-
while, the extra demand from the external market increases the benefit from weakening
the price competition and raising the equilibrium prices, which enforces the second effect.
As a result, the first position actually becomes less appealing to the high-type firm.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Consumer Preference
We now relax the homogeneous product assumption and allow consumers to have het-
erogeneous preferences. Starting from the baseline model, similar to Narasimhan (1988),
we now assume among all consumers (with total mass 1), t1 of them are loyal to H’s
product, t2 of them are loyal to L’s product, and the rest 1− t1 − t2 (0 < t1 + t2 < 1) do
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not have a particular preference and purchase from the firm offering a lower price. Assume
firm i’s loyal customers visit firm i’s position directly and buy if the price does not exceed
w (i ∈ {H,L}). The rest of the consumers follow the same search pattern: α of them are
non-shoppers and 1− α are shoppers.
Following a similar analysis, we can derive the equilibrium outcome. For example,













p ∈ [p, w)
p = w
, (3.10)
where p = max{ (1−t1−t2)α+t1
1−t2 w,
t2
(1−t1−t2)(1−α)+t2 (w − c) + c}, and firms’ expected profits













1−t1 , whereas the scores are still si = max{π
1
i −π2i , 0}
(i ∈ {H,L}), as is shown before. Figure 3.9 illustrates the results when t1 = t2 = 0.1,
showing that the pattern remains unchanged.
(a) Endogenous Valuation (b) Bidding Outcome (c) Price Dispersion
Figure 3.9: Heterogeneous Consumer Preference: t1 = t2 = 0.1
Consumers’ heterogeneous preferences affect the results only to the extent that they
change the total size of the market for which firms compete. Nevertheless, as long as there is
still a certain portion of consumers willing to switch between products, the aforementioned
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trade-off remains. Therefore, the results of interest change only quantitatively rather than
qualitatively.
3.5.3 Multiple Competing Firms
Although mainly based on duopoly analysis, the results actually hold beyond the case
of only two firms. In this section, we consider a case of three competing firms to show that
the main results can be extended to the oligopolistic setting.
Extending the baseline model, we now consider three firms with different production
costs c1, c2, and c3. We consider a simple case in which c1 = c2 > c3. The more general
case that c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3 would add further technical discussion, whereas the qualitative
results of interest can be expected to hold. Without loss of generality, we normalize c3 = 0
and denote c1 = c2 = c (0 < c < w). Again, we call the low-cost firm the high type, or H,
and the two high-cost firms the low type, or L. There are three advertising positions with
different prominence levels, reflecting consumers’ search ordering. Similarly, assume that
all consumers (with total mass 1) start searching from the first position; among them,
α1 stop and purchase from the first position if the price does not exceed w. The rest
1 − α1 continue searching and sample the second position; α2 of them (i.e., with a total
mass α2 (1− α1)) stop searching after knowing the first two firms’ prices and buy from
the one offering the lower price. The rest (1− α1) (1− α2) are shoppers, who sample all
three firms and buy from the one offering the lowest price. For ease of exposition, we let
α1 = α2 = α (0 < α < 1). The analysis and results can be naturally extended if α1 and
α2 take different values. The other settings follow the baseline model.
The price competition among three firms becomes much more complex than the
duopoly case. A complete description of the equilibrium pricing is detailed in Appendix
C.3. Figure 3.10 illustrates two equilibrium price patterns that exhibit interesting features.
Figure 3.10(a) depicts the cumulative distribution functions for the equilibrium pricing




1+α(1−α) . Notice the stair shape of the
equilibrium price supports. Overlap of price supports exists only between directly adjacent
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(a) α = 0.4, c = 0.1, w = 1 (b) α = 0.4, c = 0.3, w = 1
Figure 3.10: Equilibrium Pricing with Three Firms
firms. There is no direct price competition between firms placed far from each other. The
localized competition reflects the subtle interaction between cost advantage and location
advantage. With limited cost advantage (i.e., c
w
is relatively small), H would rather take
advantage of its good location by charging high prices than enter the competition for
shoppers with very low prices. Likewise, getting into the high-price range is not profitable
for L in the third position, which has neither cost nor location advantage. In contrast,






[1+α(1−α)]2}. The probability mass near the lower bound of H’s price support
(which does not appear in Figure 3.10(a)) indicates that with considerable cost advantage,
H is willing to compete for shoppers with more competitive prices. This unique pricing
pattern that involves segmented price supports and localized price competition is absent
in the typical price competition literature.
Table 3.2 summarizes firms’ equilibrium profits from price competition under different
scenarios. If we compare H’s profits in different positions, similar results arise in the
three-firms case: When evaluating endogenously in the product market competition, a less
prominent position might not mean less profit. As is shown in Figure 3.11, in region I, the





H); in region II, the third position is more profitable than the second one (i.e.,
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Table 3.2: Equilibrium Profits from Price Competition in the Case of Three Firms




Profit in 1st Position αw α (w − c) α (w − c)





α (1− α) w+(1−α)c
1+α(1−α) α (1− α) (p̄2 − c)
















Profit in 1st Position αw α (w − c) α (w − c)
Profit in 2nd Position (1− α) (αw − c) α (1− α) w+(1−α)c
1+α(1−α) α (1− α) (p̄2 − c)






When cw > α
Profit in 1st Position c α (w − c) α (w − c)
Profit in 2nd Position 0 (1− α) c α (1− α) (p̄2 − c)
Profit in 3rd Position 0 0 (1− α)2 p̄3
Note:











H). In other words, in the shadowed region, the “worst” position actually
outperforms a “better” position for the high-type firm. In addition to the endogenous
valuation, similar results on the equilibrium bidding outcome and spatial price dispersion
pattern can be derived as well (see Appendix C.4 for details).
In the case of multiple firms with different competitive strength competing against
each other, when we endogenously investigate the price competition, the weaker firms
tend to charge less competitive prices once placed in the good positions, which leaves a
higher profit margin for the stronger firm in a lower position and hence reduces its bidding
incentive. Therefore, the trade-off of interest remains, and similar results can be derived.
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Figure 3.11: Endogenous Valuation in the Case of Three Firms
3.5.4 Supportive Observations
While the new perspective on location choice and pricing decisions proposed in this
study might easily be neglected by some marketing managers in practice, there are many
empirical observations consistent with the results from our modeling analysis as well. We
provide some examples in this section.
To investigate advertisers’ bidding behaviors in reality, we track the actual sponsored
ranking results from the leading online search engine Google. A program was designed
to automatically enter search queries using the given keywords every five minutes and to
record the ranks of targeted firms’ sponsored links for three consecutive weeks starting
from the noon on May 18, 2010. Notice that in addition to the regular sponsored links
on the right side of the web page, Google also provides premium sponsored positions in a
highlighted region right above the general search results, which are much more noticeable
and usually much more costly. We thus rank the premium sponsored positions higher than
the regular ones. For example, if there are two premium positions, then the first regular
sponsored link is ranked number three. Keywords are chosen to fit our model setting as
closely as possible. Table 3.3 summarizes the statistics of the data recorded.
The observations shown in Table 3.3 can be well interpreted by our model results.
Both textbooks and photo prints are a relatively standard product or service, so price
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of the Sponsored Ranking Data (Total time periods: 6048)
Appearance Mean Rank St. Dev.
Keyword: Textbooks
Textbooks.com 5993 1.065076 0.260501
Amazon.com 6040 2.443543 0.743103
Keyword: Online Photo Print
YorkPhoto.com 6042 1.002979 0.070407
Shutterfly.com 6040 2.395530 0.717865
Keyword: Car Rental
Budget 6043 2.098957 0.922594
Avis 6040 2.488079 1.530998
Enterprise 5466 4.600256 2.893965
Keyword: Dell Laptop
Dell 6042 1.000331 0.025730
Staples 5715 4.280315 1.220876
would be the primary consideration. Textbooks.com is a website selling new and used
textbooks. In contrast, Amazon, as the largest online bookstore and marketplace, could
have lower average marginal costs, probably owing to economy of scale, better managed
information systems, or greater bargaining power over the supply chain. Thus, we might
consider Amazon as the high-type firm. Similarly, compared to the NASDAQ-listed leading
digital photo service company, Shutterfly, YorkPhoto.com is smaller in scale and probably
weaker in competitive strength. Nevertheless, given the highly standardized products, it
can be expected that the cost differences should be small in both cases. Since the price
quoting process is relatively straightforward in both cases, consumers can easily compare
prices, which could result in a small α value. As is shown, when α and c are small, the
low-type firm may have higher bidding incentive, which is reflected by the consistently
higher ranks of both Textbooks.com and YorkPhoto.com.
In the car rental example, North America’s largest rental car company, Enterprise,
stays at a lower sponsored rank in general, which can be interpreted similarly as the pre-
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vious two examples. Interestingly, the high variance in its ranking is worth attention.
Because the search process is more complex than the previous two examples, which po-
tentially corresponds to a higher α value, and because the cost advantage of the market
leader versus smaller firms might also increase, therefore, by our results, with an increased
α and/or c, the high-type firm’s bidding incentive might increase accordingly. In fact,
from the collected data, Enterprise wins the first position about one-fourth of the time
and stays in the fifth or lower positions more than half of the time. It fits our results in
the case of multiple competing firms: With considerable α and/or c values, H may adopt
mixed-strategy bidding and either outbids both L firms or stays in the lowest position (see
Appendix C.4 for details).
The fourth example corresponds to the case of dominating cost advantage. Because
Google restricts the bidding to brand names, only authorized firms can bid for keywords
containing particular brand names. Staples is Dell ’s authorized retailer and meanwhile is
the competing channel of Dell ’s direct marketing. When they compete in search advertis-
ing, their decisions may be considered as roughly independent. Producing and selling the
same laptops, Dell undoubtedly possesses significant cost advantage. Similar to the model
results, Dell tightly holds the best advertising position, with no exceptions.
There is also evidence supporting the results on equilibrium pricing. In addition to
the aforementioned literature, websites that watch the real-time product prices on Ama-
zon.com find significant levels of temporal price fluctuation in various product categories.
Figure 3.12 shows some findings from one such website. The spatially differentiated price
expectation pattern can also be examined using the examples given. For instance, Ama-
zon generally offers more competitive textbook prices and Dell online store is generally
believed to sell cheaper Dell laptops than other retailers,10 which are consistent with the
model predictions.
10A random price comparison on June 9, 2010, finds that the classical microeconomics textbook, Mi-
croeconomic Theory, is sold at $114.94 on Amazon but $118.68 on Textbooks.com. Another random price
check on June 27, 2010, finds that the Dell Inspiron 15” laptop is sold at $639.98 on Staples.com, but it
can be bought from Dell.com at $584.99 with the same configuration.
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(a) Electronics: Casio Exilim Camera (b) Book: Too Big to Fail
(c) DVD: Toy Story 2 (d) Tool: String Trimmer Spool
Figure 3.12: Daily Prices of Different Products on Amazon
(Source: http://www.frozenwarrior.com/˜pricewatch)
In addition, other model results are also supported by real-world data. For example,
recall that, as is shown in Figure 3.4, the bidding competition is the keenest when α is
very large and c is quite small. Interestingly, a website called CyberWyre (www.cwire.org)
keeps an updated list of the highest paying search terms. Currently, the most expensive
search terms are mesothelioma-related lawsuits, which can cost as high as $69.1 per click.
As reported in a New York Times article (Liptak, 2007), mesothelioma cases are relatively
routine and “settle rather easily,” which indicates negligible cost differences. In contrast,
the search process can be quite consuming because lawyers “will steer you into highly
tendentious information” so as to capture these clients, which results in a high α value.
As a result, law firms “compete on Google instead of competing on price,” which fits the




When marketing managers deal with location choice, such as competing for online
advertising slots, understanding the value of a premium location is a fundamental issue.
Only if they comprehend the value difference between locations can managers optimally
allocate their spending to achieve the best possible marketing results. In this study, we
investigate the value of a prominent advertising position endogenously in the context of
price competition among asymmetric advertisers in the search advertising setting. We
examine the equilibrium outcome of the bidding competition, as well as the resulting price
dispersion pattern in various scenarios.
Compared with the existing literature, we are the first to illustrate that, in search
advertising, the value of the advertising slots should be determined endogenously in price
competition rather than taken for granted exogenously. For a particular advertiser, the
per-click value, instead of being fixed, could vary across different slots depending on the
competitor it faces and how consumers search. A prominent advertising slot is not always
desirable, even if it is cost-free. We identify a sophisticated pattern of price dispersion
resulting from the unique features of online consumer search behavior. This work is among
the very few studies focusing on the asymmetric competition among advertisers on the issue
of price advertising.
Our analysis has several implications for marketing managers. We underscore the fact
that advertisers’ willingness-to-pay for prominent locations should not be determined in
isolation. In-depth investigation of a firm’s relative competitive strength within the indus-
try are crucial in determining firms’ advertising spending. Firms in different competitive
situations should tailor their advertising strategies accordingly. In particular, a firm with
competitive advantage in some cases could even be better off by staying at a less prominent
position and by pricing properly to soften price competition. Such competence-dependent
evaluation calls for coordination and communication between marketing teams and other
business functions (e.g., production and sales) in a company.
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Likewise, thorough market investigation regarding consumer search behavior is indis-
pensable. Consumer search patterns may vary across different products (e.g., books vs.
computers) or across different time periods (e.g., weekdays vs. weekends). Thanks to the
advance of information technology, the investigation can be conducted at a lower cost and
the information collected more easily than ever before (e.g., search engines usually track
the clicks of sponsored links at different ranks for different keywords).
Most importantly, our analysis provides the rationale for firms to determine their
spending as they compete for a prominent advertising position. The rule of thumb is that
both the relative competitive strength and prominence difference matter in determining
firms’ bidding strategies. Firms that have a competitive advantage, when neither their
competitive advantage nor the location prominence difference is salient, should forgo the
most prominent slots and leverage their revenue instead by lowering the price to capture
consumers. In contrast, disadvantaged firms should bid aggressively in this scenario to
reap the benefit of the prominent position. When either the competence difference or the
prominence difference is significant, disadvantaged firms should avoid being too ambitious
and over-investing in the bidding competition.
The price dispersion patterns derived from our model are also of interest to consumers.
Because of the two-dimensional price dispersion, in general there is no straightforward way
to find the lowest price in a one-shot search. For consumers who have low search costs,
we recommend conducting a thorough search. For those who are not willing to search a
lot, sampling only the prominent position might be wise because it might sometimes offer
good deals as well.
While we use online search advertising as the setting for our discussion, our model
and analysis might also apply to other settings involving location acquisition and price
competition. This is because the rank of an advertising slot in the online world is similar
to the degree of prominence of business locations in the physical world—from stores in a
shopping mall to gas stations along a highway to shelf space in grocery stores. Take slotting
in supermarkets as an example. It is commonly believed that product location on the shelf
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has an important effect on sales, and a central location at eye level is most desirable (Dreze
et al., 1994). Given the significant difference in prominence and the scarcity of prominent
shelf space relative to the number of products, firms compete intensely for shelf positions
by paying various forms of “slotting allowances,” which are lump-sum advance payments
made to retailers by manufacturers for stocking their products on the shelf. The results and
insight delivered in this study also shed light on slotting allowances, in that manufacturers
compete for prominent shelf positions and battle for consumers via pricing, resembling the
search advertising case in many ways.
This work triggers interesting directions for future research. Here, firms’ valuation of
the prominent position is endogenized in the pricing competition; this can be viewed as
an example of an unexplored class of auctions in which an object’s value to a particular
bidder depends on its competitors. The study of such auctions becomes even more exciting
if extended to a general case in which heterogeneous firms compete for multiple display




Interplay Between Organic Listing and Sponsored
Bidding in Search Advertising
4.1 Introduction
Search advertising, in which advertisers bid for sponsored advertising slots listed on
a search engine results page (SERP) alongside a list of organic (non-sponsored) links,
has proven itself to be a successful revolution of traditional online and offline advertis-
ing. Internet search-related advertising is predicted to generate annual revenue over $45
billion worldwide by 2011, becoming the leading advertising medium (VSS, 2007). The
huge industrial success has attracted increasing academic interest, which includes recent
theoretical studies on advertisers’ sponsored bidding strategy and the optimal auction
mechanism to sell the sponsored slots, and some empirical work investigating factors that
affect the profitability of sponsored advertising. Nevertheless, the organic list, despite its
being the origin and the major information source of search advertising, has been generally
neglected in the literature. This study aims to systematically analyze the effects of organic
listing as a competing information source on the advertising competition (i.e., sponsored
bidding) and the outcome performances in search advertising.
Two features deserve special attention in studying the role of organic listing. One is
the unique information structure associated with a SERP; the other is the characteristics
of the commonly used organic ranking mechanism.
In response to each user query of a particular keyword, the search engine returns a
SERP that contains hyperlinks to websites related to the keyword. In practice, major
search engines (e.g., Google, Yahoo!, and Bing) organize the SERP in a similar way.
Two lists of links are paralleled: A list of non-sponsored links, or organic links, is placed
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Figure 4.1: Eye movement of users viewing Google pages (Hotchkiss et al., 2005)
in the wide column on the left, and a narrow column on the right (and sometimes a
highlighted area on the top as well) contains the list of sponsored links. Organic links are
ordered based on search engines’ proprietary ranking algorithm, and the ordering typically
reflects different links’ relative relevance to the keyword. The sponsored list is composed
of advertising slots for sale. They are usually sold via auction, in which the bidder with
the highest bid (or score) wins the first sponsored slot, the second highest wins the second,
and so on.
One distinction of the co-listing structure is that it creates two lists competing with
each other for consumer attention. Figure 4.1 shows the result from an experiment tracking
eye movement of users viewing Google search result pages (Hotchkiss et al., 2005). The
reddest region indicates the highest attention level (i.e., 100%). As we can see, the top
organic links attract the most attention (e.g., the top three organic links are viewed by
almost all experiment participants), while the top sponsored link attracts a certain level of
attention but could be less significant compared to its organic counterparts (e.g., the first
sponsored link is viewed by about half of the participants). Notice that those merchant
websites interested in sponsored advertising may also appear in the organic list and thus
could get significant attention from the organic list without paying anything. In this sense,
the organic list not only competes for consumer attention but also plays a dominating role
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in such competition. Then why would advertisers placed at prominent positions in the
organic list still be willing to spend money on sponsored bidding? By creating a competing
list to its revenue source (i.e., the sponsored list), is the search engine jeopardizing its own
revenue?
In addition to the information structure of SERP, the organic ranking rule is another
key element. Although kept private in most cases, organic ranking rules, such as Google’s
PageRank-based ranking rule, are commonly believed to fairly reflect relative relevance or
popularity of different websites by utilizing the inter-linking structure of websites and many
other factors. Economic analysis also validates that websites’ relative quality or relevance
is aligned with their equilibrium number of incoming links, which is consistent with the
essence of the typical link analysis algorithm (e.g., PageRank algorithm) used by search
engines (e.g., Katona and Sarvary, 2008). In other words, a website with greater popularity
or relevance is generally given a better position with higher prominence in the organic list,
and vice versa. Among those merchant websites that are potential sponsored advertisers,
the typical organic ranking mechanism tends to favor the leading firms by giving them
higher organic ranking and allocating them a greater level of prominence. Under such
asymmetric allocation of the organic prominence resource, how different advertisers react
in the sponsored bidding and what the bidding outcome is become subtle questions. Will
the leading firms take advantage of their preempted prominence advantage and patronize
the sponsored advertising actively, or might small firms bid aggressively as a fight back for
the disadvantage in organic listing?
Directly related to the organic ranking mechanism, another issue of interest is whether
typical organic ranking promotes sales diversification. It has been well documented that
in the ecommerce environment, millions of small firms and individual sellers are able to
survive and flourish, and the overall sales diversity is greatly increased, all of which add to
the richness and diversity of the online community and become the spirit of the dot-com
era. As the leading online marketing medium and major information gatekeeper, search
engines recognize their role in promoting small advertisers and increasing the sales diver-
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sity. For example, Eric Schmidt, CEO of the dominating search giant Google, describes the
company’s mission as “serving the long tail.”1 Nevertheless, given the fact that large-scale
mainstream firms are normally given prominent positions in the organic list, is the typical
organic ranking mechanism really promoting the “tails,” or just making the big bigger? If
the latter, it would be appealing to think of any possible improvement of organic ranking
to better achieve the goal of “serving the tails.”
Motivated by these intriguing issues, this study intends to capture the unique feature
of the co-listing structure (i.e., organic list attracts most attention) and the essential
characteristics of the organic ranking mechanism (i.e., organic ranking aligns with relative
popularity), so as to explicitly address the following research questions related to organic
listing:
• What are advertisers’ bidding incentives for sponsored slots in the presence of the
organic listing? How do such incentives differ across various advertisers, and what
is the expected bidding outcome?
• How does organic listing affect the outcome performance, particularly social effi-
ciency and search engine benefit? How does organic listing affect the resulting sales
diversity, and how well does it serve the tails?
• In certain cases, is there any possible way to improve the organic ranking mechanism
to benefit both the search engine and the online society?
We consider a game-theoretic model in which firms in different organic slots compete for
sponsored slots via auction and then compete for consumers in price after getting different
sponsored slots. Firms are asymmetrically differentiated in terms of market preference.
The mainstream firm is preferred by the majority of consumers in the market, while
the niche firm is preferred by a small portion of the market. We model the organic
ranking outcome in a way that the leading firm in terms of market preference gets a
1http://longtail.typepad.com/the long tail/2005/05/google longtail.html
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top organic position with high prominence advantage. Consistent with the experimental
findings, we assume that the top several organic positions attract a fairly high level of
attention while the first sponsored link attains less but still reasonable attention level.
Prominence decreases rapidly from the top downward in both organic and sponsored lists.
We investigate the equilibrium outcome of the bidding competition, in which the value of
sponsored slots is endogenously determined in the pricing competition. We analyze the
effects of organic listing on equilibrium outcomes (including social welfare, sales diversity,
and search engine benefit) by comparing with a benchmark case with the sponsored list only
(without the organic list). We then propose possible improvement of the organic ranking
mechanism so that search engine benefit, welfare, and diversity can all be increased in
certain cases.
In analyzing the bidding competition, we identify two interacting effects that drive
advertisers to compete for sponsored listing in the presence of the organic list, namely, the
promotive effect and the preventive effect. The promotive effect, which means a firm can
promote its exposure by winning a prominent sponsored slot, decreases when the firm’s
organic prominence increases; in contrast, the preventive effect, that a firm can prevent
its competitors from increasing their prominence by occupying the prominent sponsored
position, increases as the firm gets a better position in the organic list. We find that firms’
equilibrium profit functions are submodular, that is, the marginal benefit of improving
sponsored prominence changes in the same direction as firms’ relative competitive strength.
As a result, we show that when the competing firms are relatively comparable to each
other, the disadvantageous one bids aggressively and wins the prominent sponsored slot;
when the market preference is highly asymmetric, the leading firm outbids its competitor,
occupying prominent positions in both organic and sponsored lists.
Compared to the case with no organic list, organic listing subsidizes the leading
advertisers in prominence for free to dilute their sponsored bidding incentive and to adjust
the competence difference among advertisers. In general cases with moderate levels of
market asymmetry, the effects of such subsidy are two-fold. On the one hand, the co-listing
76
structure induces weak advertisers to win better sponsored positions, which effectively
increases their exposures without impairing the objectivity of the organic list. As a result,
while keeping general search engine users satisfied, the co-listing structure improves the
surplus of potential consumers (who are looking for product information), overall social
welfare, and sales diversity. On the other hand, the free exposure from organic listing
reduces advertisers’ sponsored bidding incentives, which reduces the search engine’s direct
revenue. In this sense, organic listing serves as a balance between short-term and long-
term benefit—sacrificing short-term revenue to enhance consumer surplus, total welfare
and sales diversity, which could lead to better long-term growth.
While organic listing’s beneficial effects function well in general, they may malfunction
when coming to highly asymmetric competition among advertisers. For small firms at the
very tail facing strong competitors, their bidding incentive would be too low to win a
prominent sponsored position. As a result, the search engine not only bears direct revenue
loss but also fails to induce structural improvement of consumer surplus, social welfare and
sales diversity. To explore possible ways of mitigating such shortcomings and better serving
the tail, we generalize the typical popularity-based pure organic ranking and propose a
mixed organic ranking mechanism, which probabilistically places less popular websites to
a prominent position in the organic list rather than ranking strictly based on popularity.
We show that introducing mixed organic ranking in a highly asymmetric market could
improve the search engine’s short-term revenue, as well as consumer surplus, social welfare
and sales diversity concurrently.
In addition to its substantive contribution to the literature on search advertising, this
study also has notable theoretical contributions. Compared to traditional economics of
advertising literature and recent studies related to search advertising, the substantially
new understanding added by this work, from theoretical perspective, lie in at least two
aspects. First, we view organic list as an extra information source in addition to the
advertising channel (i.e., the sponsored list), and we study how such a unique information
structure affects advertisers’ advertising strategies as well as the equilibrium outcomes.
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Second, we consider advertising resources as differentiated and exclusive.
Organic listing serves as a competing information source added into the advertis-
ing campaign, which brings new perspectives into informative advertising studies. From
the informative advertising perspective, advertising competition is essentially competition
for information coverage (Bagwell, 2007). In typical informative advertising, advertising
channels function as the major information sources that convey the information of firms’
existence, product details, and prices. In search advertising, however, a non-advertising
channel (i.e., the organic list) coexists with the advertising channel, provides similar in-
formation, and even plays a dominating role as the major information source. Unlike
sponsored positions, organic ranking and exposure levels are supposed to be out of ad-
vertisers’ control and thus exogenous. Moreover, the ordering of organic links and the
resulting differences in organic exposure correlate with advertisers’ intrinsic competence
(e.g., relative popularity in market preference). Such a unique source of information, which
any traditional advertising channel can hardly resemble, naturally affects advertisers’ ad-
vertising strategies in a distinctive way, as is elaborated in this study.
The advertising resource is exclusive in search advertising by nature, as different
slots have very different prominence levels and only one advertiser can stay at the most
prominent advertising position. Advertisers have to compete against each other for good
advertising positions, and auction is naturally introduced to sell these positions. Conse-
quently, a small difference in competence could mean the huge difference between winning
or losing the best advertising resource. This feature compels us to model the very small
difference in firms’ competence and to explicitly analyze the bidding outcomes. Tradi-
tional economic models of advertising, starting from Butters (1977), consider advertising
technology in which advertisers independently decide advertising levels, which makes the
equilibrium outcome less sensitive to the competence difference among firms. Naturally,
symmetric competition remains the theme of traditional advertising literature (Grossman
and Shapiro, 1984; Stegeman, 1991; Stahl, 1994). In contrast, we consider asymmetric
competition among advertisers and incorporate asymmetric differentiation, as a combina-
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tion of horizontal and vertical differentiation, into the model.
There is a large volume of literature on mechanism design and bidding strategies
in sponsored auctions (e.g., Athey and Ellison, 2010; Edelman et al., 2007; Liu et al.,
2010). As they consider the sponsored list only, we deepen the understanding of search
advertising beyond these works by considering the interactions between the two lists.
Another key distinction of our work is that most of these works treat the per-click value
of a sponsored link as exogenously given, while we endogenously investigate the valuation
of sponsored positions in price competition, connecting the product market competition
with the sponsored bidding competition.
A limited number of studies focus on the role of organic listing in search advertising
from different angles. Katona and Sarvary (2010) study the bidding patterns in search ad-
vertising when considering organic listing. Yang and Ghose (2010) are among the earliest
to empirically investigate the potential synergistic effect between organic and sponsored
links. This study complements their works by systematically examining the effects of
organic listing as an additional information source on advertisers’ bidding incentive for
sponsored slots, search engines’ revenue, consumer surplus, social welfare, and sales diver-
sities in equilibrium.
Some recent studies on referral intermediaries also provide relevant implications. We-
ber and Zheng (2007) develop an elegant model of search intermediary to study firms’
bidding strategies and the search engine’s optimal design, considering consumers’ search
behavior. Their work relates to our study to the extent that with the optimal quality-
weighting factor, the single list of sponsored positions considered in their model also ex-
hibits certain features of organic listing in that the ranking partially conveys the informa-
tion about advertisers’ relative performances. Nevertheless, since they look at a different
question and focus on the sponsored list only, their model does not capture the unique in-
formation structure under the co-listing setting and thus does not consider the interaction
between the difference in organic exposure and the response in sponsored bidding, which
is the focus of our study. White (2009) studies the interaction between advertising and
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non-advertising lists from an interesting angle: by incorporating more firms in the non-
advertising list, the intermediary can improve its quality to attract more users, but more
firms in the lists bring down the market price (as a result of Cournot competition), lower
the advertising firms’ profits, and may hurt the intermediary’s revenue. Since all posi-
tions in both lists are considered the same and one firm cannot appear in both lists, there
is no informative interactions between the two lists and no bidding competition among
advertisers in his model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we lay out the model.
Section 4.3 derives the equilibrium pricing and bidding outcome. In Section 4.4, we first
set up a benchmark case with no organic list and derive the corresponding equilibrium
outcome. We then compare it with the equilibrium outcome derived under the regular
case as in Section 4.3, to illustrate the effects of organic listing. As such analysis reveals a
potential drawback of organic listing, we propose possible directions for improving organic
ranking in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter with discussion on managerial
implications.
4.2 The Model
We consider a search engine providing information about products. The search engine
returns a SERP in response to each query of a particular keyword describing a certain type
of product. Each SERP contains two lists of hyperlinks, namely, the organic list and the
sponsored list. The organic list is composed of n organic links. These organic links are
ranked by a proprietary algorithm designed by the search engine, in an order that reflects
websites’ popularity and relevance to the keyword. The sponsored list contains s sponsored
links. The slots for these links are sold via auction.
Consumers’ click behavior on each SERP is modeled in the following general way:
When a firm’s link appears in only one of the two lists (e.g., in either the ith organic slot
or the jth sponsored slot), an individual consumer clicks the ith organic link with probabil-
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ity αi and clicks the jth sponsored link with probability βj. When a firm’s link appears in
both lists (e.g., in both the ith organic slot and the jth sponsored slot), an individual con-
sumer clicks at least one of that firm’s links with probability 1− (1− αi) (1− βj) (1− γij).
Without loss of generality, let α1 ≥ α2 ≥ ... ≥ αn and β1 ≥ β2 ≥ ... ≥ βs. We assume
βi < αi, as it is generally believed that, compared to organic listing, consumers have a
negative bias against the sponsored list due to the aversion to advertising. We use γij to
capture the potential synergistic effect between organic and sponsored listing in terms of
attracting click-throughs. As is implied by the probability expression, γij > 0 indicates
complementary effect, whereas γij < 0 implies substitute effect and γij = 0 means no
significant synergistic effect.
We consider two competing firms selling a certain type of product in the market.2
Their products are differentiated with asymmetric market preference. The firm whose
products are favored by the majority of consumers or the mainstream of the market is
denoted as M ; the firm selling products preferred by the minority of consumers or the
niche market is termed as N . Assume the two firms have the same production cost, which
is normalized to zero.
There is a continuum of consumers with unit mass in the market. Each consumer
has a unit demand of the product. Consumers differ in their taste. The majority of the
market, with a portion 1−θ (0 < θ < 1
2
), prefer firmM ’s product to N ’s, while the others,
with a proportion θ, prefer firm N ’s product. We sometimes call the former M -type
consumers and the latter N -type consumers. Consumers derive utility v from consuming
their preferred product, and derive a discounted utility k̃v from the less preferred product,
where k̃ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] across all consumers. Without loss of generality,
we normalize v to 1. Consumers are not aware of their preferences before the search process
and therefore use the search engine to explore product information. On clicking the link
of a firm, consumers visit the firm’s website, see the product information and the price,
2We focus on duopolistic analysis in the main body of the chapter. In fact, the qualitative results and
main implications can be extended to oligopolistic competition. See Appendix E for details.
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and learn their valuation of that firm’s product. We define a consumer’s net utility as
the utility from consuming the product minus the price of the product. Consumers will
purchase a product only when it generates a net utility exceeding a certain reservation
value, which is normalized to zero. For those consumers who visit both firms’ websites,
they purchase from the one giving a higher (positive) net utility.
In the organic list, firms are ranked in an exogenous order reflecting their market
popularity or relevance to the keyword. In this sense, representing the mainstream of the
product market, firm M is listed at the iMth slot, which is around the very beginning of
the organic list with a fairly high prominence level αiM . In contrast, firm N has a lower
organic rank iN with a lower prominence level αiN (αiN < αiM ). Note that such difference
in position rank and prominence level could be significant due to the existence of other
non-merchant links (e.g., Wikipedia entries and news sites) appearing in between. Since
the idea here is that αiM is close to 1 and αiN is significantly less than αiM , for simplification
of expression, we let αiM = 1 and 0 < αiN < 1. As we will see, the underlying spirit of this
simplification is to highlight the established prominence advantage of the top organic link
and the diminishing benefit of sponsored listing for the firm already occupying a prominent
organic slot.
In the sponsored list, firms can bid for a prominent position. For all purposes of
asymmetric duopoly analysis, let s = 2. The sponsored slots are sold via a second price
auction, in which the firm with the highest bid wins the first sponsored slot and pays
an amount equal to the second highest bid. The firm with the lower bid stays in the
second sponsored slot, paying a reserve price which is normalized to zero for simplicity.
Here, we ranking advertisers based on their bids on the total payment, which is in fact
consistent with the common practice. In auctions of sponsored links, advertisers typically
bid per-click unit prices and are ranked based on their per-click bids and the expected click-
throughs on their sponsored links. Liu et al. (2010) shows that it is socially efficient to
rank advertisers by the product of their per-click unit-price bids and their expected click-
throughs, which exactly equals advertisers’ total willingness-to-pay. In our framework,
82
both the search engine and the advertisers rationally anticipate the expected click-throughs
on the links placed at different positions. As a result, advertisers make the per-click
bidding decision in the same way as if they submit a total bid. For example, if a firm in
the ith organic slot and the jth sponsored slot will attract σij sponsored clicks, to win over
another bidder with σi′j′ expected sponsored clicks and per-click bid b
′
, the firm has to
bid pay-per-click b such that bσij ≥ b
′
σi′j′ (i.e., its total willingness-to-pay has to exceed
its competitor’s). Considering total bid rather than unit-price bid in our study is simply
to avoid unnecessary assumptions on the click-through of each sponsored link, and all the
analysis and results remain unaffected.
In sum, the timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, firms submit bids for
the sponsored slot. In the second stage, after observing the bidding outcome, both firms
set their price simultaneously. Finally, consumers browse the SERP, sample firms’ web-
sites and make purchase decisions. Notice that consumers sample firm M ’s website with
probability 1, regardless of the sponsored bidding outcome. Consumers sample firm N ’s
website with probability 1−(1− αiN ) (1− β1) (1− γiN1) if firm N wins the first sponsored
slot; otherwise, they sample its website with probability 1− (1− αiN ) (1− β2) (1− γiN2).
To further simplify the notation, we define ψ1 ≡ (1− αiN ) (1− β1) (1− γiN1) and ψ2 ≡
(1− αiN ) (1− β2) (1− γiN2) and let 0 < ψ1 < ψ2 < 1,3 which means that winning the first
sponsored slot increases the prominence level for firm N .
4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we derive the equilibrium bidding outcome under the setting of co-
listing structure that includes both organic list and sponsored links. In analyzing the
equilibrium, we investigate the interplay in competing for sponsored links and provide
rationale for different firms to decide their bidding strategies.
3(1− αiN ) (1− βj) (1− γiN j) > 0 because βj < 1 (due to the discounting factor of advertising) and
γiN j < 1 (due to γiN j = 1 representing the extremely positive synergy). (1− αiN ) (1− βj) (1− γiN j) < 1
is to exclude the unrealistic cases in which γiN j takes significantly negative values.
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Along the line of backward induction, we start with the second stage price competi-
tion. We first formulate firms’ market shares under a complete information setting, where
all of the consumers are aware of the two products and know the product details and price
information:
SM (pM , pN) = (1− θ)
(
1− [pM − pN ]+
)
+ θ [pN − pM ]+
SN (pN , pM) = θ
(
1− [pN − pM ]+
)
+ (1− θ) [pM − pN ]+
(4.1)
where firms’ prices pM , pN ∈ [0, 1], and [·]+ represents max{·, 0}. An M -type consumer
will buy product M only if 1− pM ≥ k̃− pN , which explains the first term of SM (pM , pN).
The other terms can be interpreted in a similar way. Notice that consumers have their
own preference of one product over the other, but the degree of their preference varies,
and marginal consumers exist who are almost indifferent between the two products given
the price difference. Such setting allows either firm, even the niche firm, to compete for
market share against its competitor, as long as it can get enough exposure.
Similarly, we can define firms’ market shares in the case of informational monopoly
where consumers are only aware of the one firm’s product information and its price.
AM (pM) = (1− θ) + θ (1− pM)
AN (pN) = θ + (1− θ) (1− pN)
(4.2)
for pM , pN ∈ [0, 1]. In the case of AM , for example, all M -type consumers buy from firm
M , while N -type consumers buy from firm M only if k̃ − pM ≥ 0.
Recall that because of the co-listing structure of the SERP and consumers’ corre-
sponding click behavior, consumers visit firm M ’s website with probability 1. Consumers
visit firm N ’s website with probability 1−ψ1, if N wins the first sponsored link; otherwise,
consumers visit N ’s website with probability 1 − ψ2, where 0 < ψ1 < ψ2 < 1. We simply
denote 1− ψ as the probability of a consumer’s visiting firm N ’s website and
ψ =
{
ψ1 when N wins the first sponsored slot
ψ2 otherwise
Notice that ψ can be interpreted as a measure of information incompleteness within the
market, or it can be viewed as the level of informational dominance of the mainstream firm.
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A larger ψ means that the mainstream firm has greater informational advantage over the
niche firm, in the sense that a larger portion of consumers is unaware of the niche firm’s
product. Winning the top sponsored slot can help the niche firm increase its exposure and
improve the prominence level, by reducing ψ from ψ2 to ψ1.
Based on the notations introduced above, we can now formulate firms’ demand func-
tions for the given informational structure determined by the first stage bidding outcome
(which is characterized by ψ). A proportion ψ of consumers is aware of product M only,
and the other proportion is aware of both products. Therefore,
DM (pM , pN) = ψAM (pM) + (1− ψ)SM (pM , pN)
DN (pN , pM) = (1− ψ)SN (pN , pM)
(4.3)
Firms’ profits can thus be written as
πi (pi, p−i) = piDi (pi, p−i) , i ∈ {M,N} (4.4)
Based on the best responses derived from maximizing the profit function, we can








Notice that in equilibrium, p∗N < p
∗
M ; that is, the niche firm, which is at a disadvantage in
terms of market preference, tends to cut its price to compete for market share against its
stronger competitor. On the other hand, the mainstream firm tends to stay away from the
intense price competition when it has significant informational advantage. In fact, p∗M = 1
when ψ ≥ 1
3
, according to Eq.(4.5). As long as its informational advantage is reasonably
large, firmM forgoes the price competition with N and simply charges the monopoly price
to fully exploit its guaranteed demand.
Next, we derive firms’ equilibrium profits from the second stage price competition,
π∗i (ψ, θ), as a function of the information incompleteness level ψ and the market asymme-
try level θ. By substituting {p∗M , p∗N} into Eq.(4.4), we summarize π∗i (ψ, θ) in Table 4.1.
Lemma 4.1 describes an important property of the equilibrium profit functions.
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Table 4.1: Equilibrium Profit Functions in the Second Stage Price Competition




















Lemma 4.1. Both firms’ equilibrium profit functions are submodular, that is, ∂
2
∂ψ∂θ
π∗i (ψ, θ) <
0, i ∈ {M,N}.
Lemma 4.1 reveals the trend that the marginal benefit of winning a better spon-
sored slot ( ∂
∂ψ
π∗i (ψ, θ)) changes with the market structure (θ). It is a crucial step toward
the revelation of the bidding outcome , as we will discuss in detail soon. As we can
show, ∂
∂ψ
π∗M (ψ, θ) > 0, indicating that firm M benefits from enlarging its informational
dominance by keeping its competitor’s prominence level low. Thus, the submodularity of
π∗M (ψ, θ) implies that such marginal benefit decreases as θ increases, or, in other words, as
the two firms become more comparable. Likewise, generically, ∂
∂ψ
π∗N (ψ, θ) < 0, meaning
that firm N has incentive to reduce ψ by winning a prominent sponsored slot, and the
submodularity of π∗N (ψ, θ) implies that such incentive increases as θ increases.
Based on the equilibrium profits in the second stage price competition, we next in-
vestigate the bidding competition in the first stage. In second-price auctions, it is well
documented that bidding true value is a weakly dominant strategy for all bidders. There-
fore, in the first stage, the unique perfect equilibrium is that both firms bid their true
value b∗i : {
b∗M = [π
∗




N (ψ1, θ)− π∗N (ψ2, θ)]
+ (4.6)
which equals their respective equilibrium profit difference between winning the first spon-
sored slot and otherwise, bounded below at zero.
Applying the results from Lemma 4.1, we uncover the bidding outcome as follows.
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Proposition 4.1. In equilibrium, there exists a cutoff θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2), such that when 0 < θ <
θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2), M bids higher and wins the first sponsored slot, and when θ




N outbids its rival. Here, θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ (0, 12) and is defined by
π∗M (ψ2, θ
∗)− π∗M (ψ1, θ∗) = π∗N (ψ1, θ∗)− π∗N (ψ2, θ∗) (4.7)
Now we are able to provide reasonable answers to some of our initial research ques-
tions: What is a firm’s incentive to bid for a prominent sponsored slot when it is already
placed at a prominent position in the organic list? How does organic listing affect firms’
bidding for sponsored links? How does the effect differ across differentiated firms?
Under the structure that organic list is paralleled with sponsored list, a prominent
sponsored link benefits its winner in at least two aspects. The first aspect is the promotive
effect. Winning a prominent sponsored slot increases a firm’s probability of being noticed
via the additional sponsored click-throughs, and it may also create significant synergy
between the organic and sponsored lists to further enhance the exposure for the firm. The
second aspect can be viewed as the preventive effect. The firm that wins the prominent
sponsored slot can keep its competitor away from that position and effectively prevent the
competitor from increasing its exposure, and can thus reap its informational advantage.
As prominent organic links usually capture the most attention within a SERP, there
is little room to improve exposure for those firms with top organic ranks. In this sense,
those firms’ incentive of bidding for sponsored slots mainly originates from the preventive
side. In contrast, a firm with a less prominent organic rank finds motive more from the
promotive rather than the preventive perspective, as winning a prominent sponsored link
greatly complements its inadequate attention level from the organic list but can barely
affect the high click-throughs attained by its competitors via their prominent organic posi-
tions. Therefore, as a firm’s organic rank improves, the promotive effect of the sponsored
listing for the firm decreases and the preventive effect increases. We capture this trend in
the inherent model setup, and further highlight the trend by letting αiM = 1 such that
the top sponsored link has no promotive effect for firm M and no preventive effect for
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firm N accordingly. As mentioned before, this setup allows us to disentangle the two oth-
erwise intertwined effects, tease out the interplay between the two effects in the bidding
competition, and deliver neat insight on how such interaction evolves with the market
structure.
In this framework, we can think of ∂
∂ψ
π∗M (ψ, θ) as a measure of the marginal pre-
ventive effect of the sponsored listing, and consider − ∂
∂ψ
π∗N (ψ, θ) measuring the marginal
promotive effect. Lemma 4.1 shows the dynamic evolving of the two interacting effects
when the market structure changes. As the market asymmetry decreases (i.e., θ increases),
the marginal promotive effect of the sponsored listing increases and the marginal preven-
tive effect decreases. This is because when the market preference becomes more diverse,
the niche firm is more comparable to its competitor, and it can thus considerably improve
its profit by increasing its prominence level via winning the prominent sponsored slot. In
contrast, the market share that the mainstream firm can capture becomes less, even under
informational monopoly, so the mainstream firm benefits less from blocking its competi-
tor. Since the two effects evolve in the opposite directions as the market structure changes,
naturally, there exists a threshold θ∗, a certain cutoff level of market asymmetry, such that
the promotive effect dominates when θ is above that threshold and the preventive effect
dominates when θ is below that threshold, as is summarized by Proposition 4.1. Eq. (4.7)
states that at the cutoff level of market asymmetry, the promotive benefit for N equals
the preventive benefit for M .
Proposition 4.1 also provides rationale for firms in different types of markets to de-
termine the value of a prominent sponsored slot in bidding competition. In a highly
asymmetric market, the leading firm should bid aggressively to win the top sponsored slot
because occupying a prominent position in both the organic and sponsored list enlarges
its informational dominance, ensures its advantageous position in price competition, and
greatly improves its sales profit. However, when the market preference is relatively di-
versified, the firm at a disadvantage in terms of market preference should bid to win a
prominent sponsored slot, especially when it is placed at a lower organic position with
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an unsatisfactory attention level. This is because its marginal benefit from improving its
prominence level is fairly high in this case.
Notice that the niche firm’s incentive to win the top sponsored link (− ∂
∂ψ
π∗N (ψ, θ))
decreases as θ goes down. It is thus worth pointing out that in a certain parameter region,
such incentive can fall so low that firm N is not willing to bid any positive amount.








, b∗N = 0.
When the market preference is highly asymmetric (i.e., θ is small), if the niche firm
can gain a reasonable level of attention from the organic link and the second sponsored
link (i.e., ψ2 <
1
3
), it will not bother to bid for the top sponsored link at all. The reason
is that should N win the first sponsored slot and increase its prominence level to 1− ψ1,
it would trigger an intense price war with firm M , which eventually results in an even
lower equilibrium profit level for firm N . Weak in competence, the niche firm is better off
staying in a relatively low prominence level and therefore has no intention to bid for the
top sponsored link at all. The driving force here is the unshakable prominence advantage
given to the leading firm in the organic list.
4.4 Effects of Organic Listing
Having derived the equilibrium under the co-listing structure, in this section, we
further investigate the effects of organic listing on the equilibrium outcomes. We first
construct a case absent of organic listing as a benchmark, and then compare the equilibrium
outcomes under the benchmark case with that derived from Section 4.3 in three aspects:
overall social welfare, resulting sales diversity, and search engine benefit.
4.4.1 A Benchmark Case
As a benchmark, we consider a case where each SERP contains the sponsored list
only. The benchmark case can be imagined as the search engine’s choosing to display only
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one list of links, all of which are potential advertising slots to be sold. Similar practices
can be found in some regional search engines, such as Baidu.com, the leading search engine
in China, and in early versions of search advertising, such as those used by Goto.com and,
later, Overture.com, in which there was only one list, mixed with paid advertising links
and organic search results, and advertisers could bid for their ranks. We call the original
case with both organic list and sponsored list the co-listing case.
To be consistent with the original model, we consider two sponsored links on a SERP.
An individual consumer clicks the first sponsored link with probability q1 and the second
with probability q2 (q1 > q2). To make the benchmark case comparable to the co-listing
case, we let q1 = 1 to model the dominant prominence of the first link on a webpage
because it can capture the most user attention, just as the top organic link does in the
co-listing case. Similarly to the co-listing case, we denote q2 ≡ 1 − ψ, where ψ measures
the level of information incompleteness or informational dominance. All other settings
(i.e., firms, market preference, auction rules) follow the original model in Section 4.2.
Similarly, we start the analysis from the second stage price competition. We can
formulate firms’ demand functions when firm i wins the first sponsored slot while the
other firm ī stays in the second, {i, ī} = {M,N}:
Di (pi, pī) = ψAi (pi) + (1− ψ)Si (pi, pī)
Dī (pī, pi) = (1− ψ)Sī (pī, pi)
(4.8)
where pi and pī are the firms’ prices, and Ai (·) and Si (·, ·) are defined by Eq.(4.2) and
Eq.(4.1), respectively. When firm M wins the first sponsored slot and thus attracts most
of the attention, as in the co-listing case, the demand function is exactly the same as
before (see Eq.(4.3)). Therefore, both firms face the same competitive situation, and the
equilibrium prices and profits remain in the same format as Eq.(4.5). The main difference,
however, arises when firm N wins the first sponsored slot and firm M can only have the
less-prominent sponsored position. Notice that the mainstream firm now could become
informationally disadvantaged compared to its competitor, because it no longer has a
guaranteed prominence dominance from occupying the top organic link as in the co-listing
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Table 4.2: Equilibrium Profits in the Second Stage Price Competition (Benchmark Case)
When M wins When N wins




≤ ψ < 1

























case. In other words, the niche firm can now win over significant prominence advantage
to better compete for market shares. We derive the equilibrium prices when N wins the








The equilibrium profit from the second stage price competition can be derived in a similar
way, as summarized by Table 4.2, where π̂ji is firm i’s equilibrium profit in the jth sponsored
position in the benchmark case (i ∈ {M,N}, j ∈ {1, 2}).
In the first stage bidding competition, both firms bid their true value: b̂i = [π̂
1
i − π̂2i ]
+
(i ∈ {M,N}), which again is the difference between the equilibrium profits when they win
the first sponsored slot and when they do not. By comparing two firms’ equilibrium bids
b̂M and b̂N , we can uncover the bidding outcome in the benchmark case.
Proposition 4.2. In the benchmark case, in equilibrium, M always bids higher and wins
the first sponsored slot; that is, b̂M > b̂N .
Proposition 4.2 shows that the only possible outcome of the bidding competition is
that the firm with advantage in market preference wins the most prominent sponsored
slot. Surprising as it might seem, this result can be well understood within the frame-
work of the two aforementioned interacting effects. Recall that in the co-listing case, a
prominent sponsored link engenders mainly preventive effect for the mainstream firm and
mainly promotive effect for the niche firm. In contrast, in the benchmark case, winning a
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prominent sponsored slot engenders both promotive and preventive effects for either of the
two firms. These two effects are amplified when a firm has greater competence in terms of
market preference. As a result, as long as firmM has market preference advantage over N
(i.e., θ < 1
2
), firm M always has greater incentive to win the top sponsored slot compared
to firm N , regardless of the preference advantage magnitude.
It is also worth noting that in equilibrium both firms adopt the same pricing strategies
as in the co-listing case (according to Eq.(4.5)) and firm M charges a higher price than
firm N .
Corollary 4.2. In the benchmark case, the niche firm has a positive bidding incentive in




− 2 < θ < 1
2
, b̂N > 0.
Compared to Corollary 4.1, in the benchmark case, the niche firm bids a positive
amount in a larger region of parameter value. This result also implies that firms’ bidding
incentive could be greater in the benchmark case than in the co-listing case.
Next, we compare the equilibrium outcome in the co-listing case with that in the
benchmark case and investigate the effects of organic listing on social welfare, sales di-
versity, and the search engine’s benefit. To focus on systematic difference rather than
perplexing discussions on parameter values, we let ψ = ψ2 so that we focus on a typical
case in which firm N receives a similar level of exposure in both cases when it does not win
the prominent sponsored slot. The parametric assumption is mainly to facilitate a neat
comparison and does not affect our qualitative results. We use superscript C to denote
the co-listing case and B to denote the benchmark case.
4.4.2 Effect on Social Welfare
We consider the social welfare as the sum of total consumer surplus, both firms’
profits, and the search engine’s revenue. Essentially, social welfare equals the sum of the
realized utility of consumers from consuming the products they have purchased. Recall
that M always outbids N in equilibrium in the benchmark case and M ’s equilibrium price
92
is higher than N ’s in both cases. We therefore can write the equilibrium social welfare as
a function of information incompleteness ψ in a uniform expression.
W (ψ, θ) = ψ
[





+ (1− ψ) (1− θ) (1− p∗M (ψ, θ) + p∗N (ψ, θ))
+ (1− ψ)
[








where p∗M (ψ, θ) and p
∗
N (ψ, θ) are defined by Eq.(4.5). The first term represents the total
realized utility of those consumers who visit firm M ’s website only and make purchases
there. The second term refers to those who visit both firms’ sites and buy from firm M ,
and the third term refers to those who buy from N after visiting both sites. By definition,
the equilibrium social welfare in the benchmark case WB = W (ψ2, θ). The equilibrium
welfare in the co-listing case depends on the bidding outcome according to Proposition
4.1: WC = W (ψ2, θ) when θ < θ
∗ (ψ1, ψ2), and W
C = W (ψ1, θ) when θ > θ
∗ (ψ1, ψ2).
As we can see, when M wins the top sponsored slot, the welfare achieved in both cases
is the same. What we are interested in is whether the presence of the organic list can
increase total social welfare when the niche firm wins the top sponsored slot. The answer
is positive.
Proposition 4.3. Organic listing improves the social welfare in that WC ≥ WB and the
strict inequality holds when θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2) (defined by Eq.(4.7)).
When θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2), N wins the prominent sponsored slot in the co-listing case and
increases its exposure rate from 1− ψ2 to 1− ψ1. Proposition 4.3 reveals that increasing
the niche firm’s exposure improves the total welfare. Notice that social welfare achieves
its maximum when all consumers purchase their preferred products. From Eq.(4.10), we
can identify two main sources of social efficiency loss: One is informational incompleteness
(characterized by the first term in Eq. (4.10)) and the other is lack of competitiveness
(characterized by the second and third terms). When ψ is high, the informational efficiency
loss is high in the sense that many N -type consumers are not aware of product N and end
up buying from M instead. Furthermore, a portion of N -type consumers who visit only
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M ’s website may leave with no purchase because of the high price charged by firm M .
There is also competitive efficiency loss: When the degree of its informational advantage
is high, firm M tends to charge a high price. Consequently, a certain portion of marginal
M -type consumers who visit both sites may purchase product N rather than product M ,
which is socially inefficient. When ψ is reduced, N increases its exposure and M charges
a more competitive price in equilibrium, so both informational and competitive efficiency
losses are mitigated, which leads to an increase in the overall social welfare.
Different from the benchmark case, in the co-listing case, the free prominence advan-
tage given to the leading firm in the organic list diminishes its sponsored bidding incentive
because of the decreased promotive benefit. It thus helps the niche firm to win the promi-
nent sponsored link and better expose itself. In this sense, organic listing adjusts the
competence difference among firms by compensating the dominant firm and thus balances
the equilibrium informational structure to improve overall social welfare.
4.4.3 Effect on Sales Diversity
We use the Gini coefficient to measure the sales diversity. As a popular measure of




where L (x) is the Lorenz curve, which measures the lowest 100x percent population’s
cumulative income percentage. The Gini coefficient measures the difference between the
actual (income) distribution and the perfect equality/diversification case. A higher Gini
coefficient indicates a greater degree of inequality, while a lower coefficient means greater










j=1 yj (and S0 ≡ 0), and {yi}ni=1 is the ordered sequence of the value of
interest (e.g., income) for each individual in the population such that yi ≤ yi+1.
In our model, we use the Gini coefficient to measure the diversification of the realized
sales across the two firms in equilibrium, and the value of interest in Eq.(4.11) is the equilib-
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rium sales amount. By substituting the equilibrium sales amount DN (p
∗





M (ψ) , p
∗
N (ψ) ;ψ) derived from Eq.(4.3) into Eq.(4.11), we can calculate the
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Similarly as before, we have GB = G (ψ2); G
C = G (ψ2) when θ < θ
∗ (ψ1, ψ2) and G
C =
G (ψ1) when θ > θ
∗ (ψ1, ψ2).
Proposition 4.4. Organic listing improves the sales diversity in that GC ≤ GB and the
strict inequality holds when θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2) (defined by Eq.(4.7)).
Similar to the welfare-improving effect, organic listing increases sales diversity when
the niche firm outbids the mainstream one. By winning the prominent sponsored position
under the co-listing structure, the niche firm increases its exposure and attracts more
consumers to visit its site, among whom all the N -type consumers as well as part of the
M -type consumers purchase from it. Therefore, the realized market share of the niche
firm is increased and the overall sales diversity is improved. In this sense, the diversity-
improving effect of organic listing and the aforementioned welfare-improving effect share
the same origin: adjusting the competence difference among firms by compensating the
strong.
4.4.4 Effect on Search Engine Benefit
In evaluating the search engine’s benefit, we consider both the short-term and the
long-term aspects. We decompose the search engine benefit, SB, into two parts: immediate
revenue, IR, and long-term growth, LG. Because we are interested in the general trends
rather than the detailed dynamics, we model search engine benefit in a general and abstract
way such that SB is defined as a function of IR and LG, SB = f (IR, LG), where f (·, ·)
is strictly increasing in both dimensions.
IR is the search engine’s revenue from sponsored bidding when holding the total
consumer base constant (and normalized to 1), and LG reflects the change of future cus-
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tomer base. We consider LG as a strictly increasing function of the equilibrium consumer
surplus, CS, so that LG = g (CS). Here, CS is defined as follows.
CS (ψ, θ) = ψ
[
(1− θ) (1− p∗M (ψ, θ)) + θ
∫ 1
p∗M (ψ,θ)
(x− p∗M (ψ, θ)) dx
]
+(1− ψ) (1− θ) (1− p∗M (ψ, θ) + p∗N (ψ, θ)) (1− p∗M (ψ, θ))
+ (1− ψ)
[









where p∗M (ψ, θ) and p
∗
N (ψ, θ) are equilibrium prices as before. Notice that Eq.(4.13) equals
the expected net utility of any individual customer before entering the search market (with-
out knowing her actual preference before the search). In this sense, we can interpret g (CS)
as the future consumer traffic volume attracted to the search engine when consumers have
outside options (e.g., competing search engines). More specifically, we may consider that
consumers have different reserve utilities which follow a certain distribution, and they use
this particular search engine if the expected utility exceeds their reserve values and leave
for other options otherwise. As a result, the future consumer traffic volume forms an
increasing function of CS, as can be represented by g (CS).
In sum, search engine benefit is modeled as
SB = f (IR, LG) = f (IR, g (CS)) = h (IR,CS) , (4.14)
where ∂
∂IR
h > 0 and ∂
∂CS
h > 0. Notice that the general form of the search engine’s benefit
leaves sufficient flexibility so that SB can either be interpreted as the net present value of
all future revenue flows in a dynamic context or be considered as incorporating benefits
from other non-monetary factors (e.g., reputation and public image).
We are interested in how organic listing affects the search engine’s benefit in both
short-term and long-term perspectives. Thus, we next compare the immediate revenue
and the long-term growth (i.e., consumer surplus, essentially) under both the benchmark
and the co-listing cases.
In second-price auctions, the auctioneer’s revenue equals the second highest bid in
equilibrium. In the benchmark case, since M always wins the auction, search engine’s
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immediate revenue IRB = b̂N . In the case with the organic list, IR
C = b∗N when θ <
θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2) and IR
C = b∗M when θ > θ
∗ (ψ1, ψ2), where θ
∗(ψ1, ψ2) is defined by Eq.(4.7).
Lemma 4.2. Generically, the search engine’s immediate revenue is lower in the co-listing




− 2 < θ < 1
2
, IRC < IRB for all 0 < ψ1 < ψ2 < 1.
Lemma 4.2 shows that compared to the case without the organic list, the co-listing
case may reduce the search engine’s revenue in the short run. In the spirit of Corollary
4.1 and Corollary 4.2, this somewhat disappointing result should not sound too surprising.
It underscores the fact that the free prominence advantage given to the leading firm in
the organic list may reduce advertisers’ bidding incentives and hence sacrifice the search
engine’s direct revenue.
A brief reasoning for the above result is as follows. Since IRB = b̂N and IR
C =
min{b∗M , b∗N}, to conclude that IRB > IRC , it is sufficient to show that b̂N > b∗N . Recall
that a firm’s equilibrium bid equals the difference between its equilibrium profits when
winning the top sponsored slot and when not winning it (i.e., according to Tables 4.1 and
4.2, b∗N = π
∗
N (ψ1, θ) − π∗N (ψ2, θ) and b̂N = π̂1N − π̂2N). On the one hand, as discussed
earlier, when N does not win the top sponsored slot, the equilibrium profit achieved in
both cases is the same (i.e., π∗N (ψ2, θ) = π̂
2
N). On the other hand, when N wins the top
sponsored slot, in the co-listing case, M still possesses significant prominence from the
organic list, which limits N ’s profit due to the consequent intense price competition; in
the benchmark case, however, N could overturn the informational dominance structure
thoroughly and greatly improve the profitability of winning the top sponsored slot. As a
result, N ’s winning profit in the benchmark case is higher in general (i.e., π̂1N > π
∗
N (ψ1, θ)).
In consequence, as long as b̂N > 0 (i.e., under some boundary condition on θ according to
Corollary 4.2), we can conclude that b̂N > b
∗
N and hence IR
B > IRC .
It is also worth noting that, in addition to N ’s decreased bidding incentive, firm
M ’s incentive to bid for a sponsored link is also less under the co-listing case than under
the benchmark case, sometimes even to a greater degree such that firm M might lose
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the bidding competition to firm N in the co-listing case. In other words, paralleling the
organic list with the sponsored list generally results in lower bidding incentives for both
firms.
The effect on the equilibrium consumer surplus can be analyzed in a similar fashion
as the social welfare and the sales diversity. By Eq.(4.13), CSB = CS (ψ2, θ) and CS
C =
CS (ψ1, θ) when θ > θ
∗ (ψ1, ψ2).
Lemma 4.3. The equilibrium consumer surplus in the co-listing case is higher in that
CSC ≥ CSB and the strict inequality holds when θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2) (defined by Eq.(4.7)).
The above result can be understood based on the same two sources of loss in analyzing
the equilibrium social welfare: informational and competitive. In the co-listing case, the
diluted bidding incentive of the leading firm gives the niche firm more chances to win a
better sponsored position for a better exposure. As a result, consumers are more likely
to find the product they prefer—at lower prices due to the intensified price competition.
Therefore, by inducing a lower level of informational incompleteness ψ in equilibrium, the
co-listing case improves the overall consumer surplus.
It is worth noting that the co-listing structure manages to induce the niche firm
to increase its exposure in the sponsored list while keeping the organic list “organic.”
Therefore, it increases the surplus of the potential consumers (i.e., those who are looking
for product information) and meanwhile ensures the general search engine users’ utilities.
Such effects promise growth of the user base in the long run.
Combining the results from Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, we can conclude that the
effect of organic listing on the search engine’s benefit is a balance between short-term
profitability and long-term growth.
Proposition 4.5. Organic listing trades off the short-term revenue for the long-term bene-







An immediate result from Proposition 4.5 is that if the search engine values the long-




f as in Eq.(4.14)), then the overall search engine
benefit can be much higher in the co-listing case. In this sense, separating the organic list
out as an independent major list is essentially a choice between myopic and long-sighted
perspectives.
To conclude, this section analyzes the effects of organic listing on the equilibrium
outcomes. Overall, organic listing reduces search engine revenue in the short run but
improves the equilibrium social welfare, sales diversity, and consumer surplus, which even-
tually benefits the search engine in the long run.
It is worth pointing out that the aforementioned beneficial effects of organic listing
function only under moderate levels of market asymmetry (i.e., firms are not too differ-
ent in market preference so θ is not too small), which can be considered as the general
cases for most markets in reality. It hence justifies the design of organic listing in general.
Nevertheless, these effects malfunction when the competence difference among advertisers
is too large to adjust. For firms at the very tail end of the distribution (i.e., for niche
firms with very small θ), their bidding incentive is still lower than that of their strong
competitors. As a result, the leading firms dominate the prominence in both lists and
no fundamental change occurs in information structure after the sponsored bidding com-
petition. Consequently, while bearing revenue loss, the search engine fails to engender
structural improvement in social welfare, sales diversity, as well as consumer surplus. In
this sense, the typical organic listing design serves the “middles” well, rather than the
“tails.”
4.5 Improving Organic Ranking
The previous section discusses the beneficial effects of organic listing and also pin-
points the malfunction of such effects with regard to “tail” firms. In this section, we
propose a possible direction that could mitigate such drawbacks and can better serve the
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tails.
Instead of assuming that the organic list ranks firms in an order based strictly on their
relative popularity (which we refer to as pure organic ranking mechanism), we consider a
mixed organic ranking mechanism in which the organic list ranks firms by their popularity
with certain probability and in an inverse order otherwise. Following the model setup in
Section 4.2, a mixed organic ranking mechanism can be characterized by a randomization
parameter λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) such that with probability 1− λ the mainstream firm is listed in
a prominent organic slot iM on the SERP and the niche firm is listed in a less-prominent
organic slot iN ; meanwhile, with probability λ, firmN is given a prominent organic position
i
′
N andM stays in a less-prominent organic position i
′
M . Notice that αiM > αiN , αi′N
> αi′M
,
and the pure organic ranking is thus a special case of mixed ranking with λ = 0.
To be consistent with the baseline model, we let αi′N
= αiM = 1 to model the sig-
nificant attention-catching effect of a prominent organic position. When firm M wins
the first sponsored slot, the probability of M ’s being visited by a consumer (q1M) and the
probability of N ’s being visited (q2N) are
q1M = (1− λ) + λ
[
1− (1− αi′M )(1− β1)(1− γi′M1)
]
q2N = (1− λ) [1− (1− αiN )(1− β2)(1− γiN2)] + λ
(4.15)
Similarly, when firm N wins the first sponsored slot, the probability of N ’s being visited
(q1N) and that of M ’s being visited (q
2
M) are
q2M = (1− λ) + λ
[
1− (1− αi′M )(1− β2)(1− γi′M2)
]
q1N = (1− λ) [1− (1− αiN )(1− β1)(1− γiN1)] + λ
(4.16)




)(1−β1)(1−γi′M1) = (1−αiN )(1−β1)(1−γiN1) ≡ ψ1
and (1−αiN )(1−β2)(1− γiN2) = (1−αi′M )(1−β2)(1− γi′M2) ≡ ψ2, ψ1 < ψ2. A mixed organic
ranking mechanism that randomly switchesM ’s and N ’s positions with probability λ is an
example satisfying the above equality. For simplicity, here we let ψ1 = 0 because the first
sponsored link often attracts significant attention so that (1− β1) can be sufficiently small.
The parametric assumptions are only to facilitate derivation of neat analytical results and
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are not essential for the qualitative results to hold. As we can show numerically, insights
remain the same when ψ1 is extended to be positive.
The underlying idea of the mixed organic ranking mechanism is to strategically intro-
duce uncertainty in firms’ organic ranks so that firms’ relative prominence advantage can
be reversed probabilistically. In practice, mixed ranking can be implemented by simply
randomizing the ordering of targeted advertisers with the desired probability. It can also
be interpreted as including additional factors other than the popularity measure into the
organic ranking rule.
We can formulate firms’ demand functions in a similar way. When firm M wins the
first sponsored slot, M possesses informational monopoly power if firm N is placed in the
less prominent organic slot (with probability 1−λ) and is not noticed by a consumer (with
probability ψ2). Therefore, the demand functions facing both firms are as follows.
D1M (pM , pN) = (1− λ)ψ2AM (pM) + [1− (1− λ)ψ2]SM (pM , pN)
D2N (pN , pM) = [1− (1− λ)ψ2]SN (pN , pM)
(4.17)
where Ai (·) and Si (·) are defined as before by Eq.(4.1) and Eq.(4.2). When firm N wins
the sponsored bidding, similarly, the demand functions become
D2M (pM , pN) = (1− λψ2)SM (pM , pN)
D1N (pN , pM) = λψ2AN (pN) + (1− λψ2)SN (pN , pM)
(4.18)
Comparing the above with Eq.(4.3), we can see the major difference from the original
model with pure organic ranking. By strategically randomizing the organic ranking and
probabilistically altering the relative prominence advantage in the organic list, the main-
stream firm no longer possesses guaranteed prominence advantage. In particular, if it
fails to win the sponsored bidding, the mainstream firm might even become inferior to
its competitor in terms of informational exposure. Hence, it is now possible for the niche
firm to gain a certain level of prominence dominance by winning the prominent sponsored
position.
Along a similar approach as before, by considering the best response to its com-
petitor’s price in the second stage, we can first derive firms’ equilibrium price condi-
tional on whether they acquire the first or the second sponsored position, p̃ji , where
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. Plugging {p̃ji , p̃
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ī
} back into the profit function, we can derive











the first-stage bidding competition, again, bidding the true value ∆π̃i = π̃
1
i − π̃2i is the
unique perfect equilibrium, that is, b̃i = [∆π̃i]
+, i ∈ {M,N}.
We are interested to see whether introducing mixed organic ranking can improve
the equilibrium outcome, especially when θ is small. In particular, we investigate the
marginal effect of increasing the randomizing parameter λ on the equilibrium welfare,
sales diversity, and both the short-term and the long-term benefit of the search engine,
evaluated at λ = 0 (which is the case of pure organic ranking). Notice that when λ = 0,
the equilibrium outcome is the same as in the original model: When θ < θ∗ (0, ψ2) (defined




N . As a result, the equilibrium revenue for the
search engine equals ˜IR (ψ2, θ, λ) = [∆π̃N (ψ2, θ, λ)]
+. The equilibrium consumer surplus
and social welfare can be written as
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W̃ (ψ2, θ, λ) = (1− λ)ψ2
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+ [1− (1− λ)ψ2] (1− θ)
(
1− p̃1M + p̃2N
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The sales Gini coefficient in equilibrium is






















Proposition 4.6. When θ < θ0 and ψ2 <
1
3(1−λ) , introducing mixed organic ranking can
improve the search engine’s immediate revenue and long-term growth, social welfare, and
sales diversity concurrently in that (i) ∂
∂λ
∆π̃N (ψ2, θ, λ) |λ=0 > 0; (ii) ∂∂λC̃S (ψ2, θ, λ) |λ=0 >
0 (iii) ∂
∂λ








∆π̃N (ψ2, θ0, λ) |ψ2= 13(1−λ) ,λ=0 = 0.
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The proposition indicates that mixed organic ranking improves both profitability and
efficiency in the cases when pure ranking is unable to engender satisfactory revenue, effi-
ciency, and diversity. Recall the results from Corollary 4.1 and Propositions 4.2 through
4.4: When θ is small and ψ2 is not too large, pure organic ranking cannot induce struc-
tural improvement in consumer surplus, social welfare, or sales diversity, while search
engine revenue is extremely low. In this sense, Proposition 4.6 shows that introducing
randomization serves as a good remedy to relieve the major drawback of the pure organic
ranking mechanism.
Under pure organic ranking, as is discussed, when θ is small and ψ2 is not too large,
the niche firm’s promotive incentive for winning a prominent sponsored position completely
vanishes due to its huge disadvantage in market preference and the mainstream firm’s un-
shakable prominence dominance in organic listing, which hurts the revenue contributed
to the search engine. In contrast, mixed organic ranking gives the niche firm chances to
occupy the prominent position in the organic list, which makes it profitable to win the
prominent sponsored slot because the niche firm can exploit informational monopoly in
these cases. In other words, introducing mixed ranking adds preventive incentive to the
niche firm’s sponsored bidding motivation. Essentially, as bidders become more compa-
rable, they are induced to bid more aggressively, and thus a properly set randomization
factor can improve the auctioneer’s revenue. This rationale is along the same spirit of
promoting disadvantageous players or handicapping advantageous players for competition
purposes in existing studies (Liu et al., 2010).
On the other hand, the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare are improved
as well. The reason is that the mixed ranking reduces the aforementioned two sources of
efficiency loss. Occasional perturbation in organic rank directly improves firmN ’s exposure
and thus effectively reduces the informational loss of consumer surplus and social welfare.
Meanwhile, a smaller prominence difference induces more intense price competition so that
the competitive efficiency loss is also well controlled. Given the increase in the surplus of
the potential consumers and considering that slight perturbation of commercial websites’
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links for certain markets would have little impact on general search engine users (who are
mainly interested in non-commercial websites), overall, introducing mixed organic ranking
could benefit the search engine in the long run.
An interesting aspect of Proposition 4.6 is that welfare and revenue can be improved
simultaneously so that the search engine’s short-term and long-term interests are aligned,
unlike most existing studies in which increasing revenue is often at the cost of welfare.
The key to this result is the auto-balance between organic ranking and sponsored bidding.
Although mixed ranking reduces the mainstream firm’s organic exposure, it does not
significantly decrease the mainstream firm’s overall exposure because the mainstream firm
regains essential prominence by winning the prominent sponsored position. Therefore,
mixed ranking promotes the weak player’s prominence at little cost to the stronger one’s
exposure, which leads to less total informational efficiency loss and thus higher consumer
surplus and social welfare. In this sense, a mixed organic ranking mechanism allocates the
total resource of consumer attention in a more effective way.
Previous discussion shows that it is hardly possible for small firms facing highly
asymmetric market preference to prevail in terms of equilibrium sales amount. In fact, the
organic list in the co-listing case (with pure ranking) performs as an implicit adjustment
to promote the weak players, which has been shown to serve the moderately-weak better
than the very-tail. To mitigate this flaw and better serve the tails, the mixed organic
ranking explicitly adjusts the competence difference by directly promoting the weak in the
organic list and effectively increasing its exposure. As a result, equilibrium sales diversity
improves (the Gini coefficient decreases), and even the weak firms with very small θ manage
to achieve higher market share than under pure ranking.
4.6 Conclusion
Studying the intriguing role of organic listing in search advertising, we take a different
perspective by focusing on the effects of organic listing as a competing information source
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on advertisers’ advertising strategies as well as the equilibrium outcomes. This study thus
complements the existing literature in deepening the understanding of this issue. This
study also provides implications for search engine designers and marketing managers.
First, we provide economic justification for the common practice of the co-listing
structure (with both organic list and sponsored links) in the search industry. On the sur-
face, organic lists provide potential advertisers with prominence for free, which reduces
their bidding incentive for sponsored exposure and thus hurts search engine revenue. Nev-
ertheless, as leading firms typically gain more free prominence and their bidding incentive
would decline more than less competitive firms, organic listings could leverage the com-
petence difference and help the less competitive advertisers win a better position in the
sponsored lists, which increases information completeness and improves equilibrium con-
sumer surplus, social welfare and sales diversity. In this sense, organic listing may sacrifice
profitability from a myopic view, but it could accelerate the growth of the user base and
result in long-term benefit.
Furthermore, we underscore the importance of keeping organic listing “organic”: Or-
ganic ranking should be strictly protected from advertisers’ manipulation. Throughout
this study, we take a cautious approach that organic listing stays under full control of the
search engine. Nevertheless, two alternatives sometimes seem appealing to different parties
and can occasionally be observed in the industry: Search engines may be tempted to “sell”
slots in organic listing, or a third party may be interested in offering the service of promot-
ing firms’ organic ranking. As we show, the beneficial effects of the co-listing structure root
in that it improves the equilibrium information structure through adjusting advertisers’
sponsored bidding incentives rather than impairing the objectivity of the organic listing.
Selling organic positions violates this spirit. It may increase the search engine’s short-term
revenue, but would eventually hurt the long-term growth. This could be the reason why
the leading search engine in China, Baidu, has received increasing criticism for its selling
of top organic slots to paid advertisers (Webster, 2008). The second alternative, known
as search engine optimization (SEO), may cause similar problems; meanwhile, advertisers’
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expenditure flows to SEO companies, which would be even worse from search engines’
perspective. It explains the practice that all search engines keep their organic ranking
mechanism private and constantly develop more sophisticated mechanisms by introducing
new factors into the ranking rule so as to adapt to possible SEO manipulation.
Meanwhile, we also suggest that while keeping organic listing unaltered from adver-
tisers, the organic ranking mechanism could be further improved under certain cases. As
we pinpoint, the drawbacks of popularity-based organic ranking arise in the presence of
highly asymmetric market preference. We propose that slightly mixing the organic ranks of
targeted commercial websites probabilistically may help improve the equilibrium outcomes
for those markets, increasing direct revenue, consumer surplus, welfare, and diversity at
the same time. This possible direction calls for novel algorithm designs to incorporate
strategic perturbation into the organic ranking methods. Possible implementations might
include randomizing between regular and reverse ordering of targeted advertisers with
certain probability, or introducing additional factors beyond website relevance into the
ranking score.
In addition to the implications for search engine designers, our study also provides
rationale for marketing managers in dealing with online search advertising. Advertisers
whose websites have already been placed in prominent positions in organic lists may wonder
whether it is still worth investing in sponsored bidding. We suggest that sponsored bid-
ding is rewarding when they have salient advantage in market preference, and dominating
exposure in both lists maximizes their profitability. When market preference is relatively
diversified, advertisers whose organic position is not satisfactory should bid aggressively to
win the top sponsored slots because the marginal benefit of increasing sponsored exposure
is fairly high in this case. In contrast, for very niche firms or individual sellers without
sufficient competence in market preference, although it may seem appealing to expose
themselves via this new advertising medium, excessive spending in sponsored bidding may
have a low return on investment, because even a very prominent sponsored position with
high click-through rate may bring high advertising bills but not commensurable profits.
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This work triggers interesting directions for future research. For example, as we
suggest that organic ranking could be further improved, especially for highly asymmetric
markets, it leads to a challenging yet important research direction: the optimal design of
organic ranking mechanism, taking into consideration advertisers’ reaction in both spon-
sored bidding competition and product market competition. Notice that the optimal or-
ganic ranking mechanism should depend on the competitive situation among advertisers,
which brings challenges for design science to devise novel algorithms to implement such





Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Denote Fi(p) as F
−
i (p) for p ∈ [p̄i+1, p̄i) and as F+i (p) for p ∈ [p̄i, p̄i−1].
(i) First, Fi(·), i = 1, ..., n, is a well-defined cumulative distribution function. Notice
that all supports are well defined because 0 < ki < 1, i = 1, ..., n − 1, and thus {p̄i}ni=1 is
positive and monotonically decreasing.
















Therefore, each Fi(·) is strictly increasing in its entire support. Since Fi(p̄i+1) = 0 and
Fi(p̄i−1) = 1, Fi(·) is well defined.
(ii) Next, we show that each position i yields a constant expected profit πi within the
entire support [p̄i+1, p̄i−1].
If the firm in position i (i = 2, ..., n− 1) prices at p ∈ [p̄i, p̄i−1], it only competes with
the firm in position i− 1 for the demand αiβi. (Recall that βi =
∏i−1
j=1(1−αj).) Thus, the
expected profit is π+i (p) = [1− F−i−1(p)] · p · αiβi ≡ αiβip̄i. If it prices in the lower interval
[p̄i+1, p̄i], it will win over the firm above and capture the demand αiβi, and meanwhile
compete with the firm below for the demand αi+1βi+1, which leads to the expected profit:
π−i (p) = p · αiβi + [1− F+i+1(p)] · p · αi+1βi+1
≡ αiβip̄i.
Therefore, π+i (p) = π
−
i (p); that is, the expected profit remains constant over the entire
support.
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The firm at position n competes only with the firm above it. A calculation similar to
that for the above π+i (p) shows a constant expected profit βnp̄n. Similarly, we can verify
the constant expected profit for the firm at position 1.1
(iii) Now we verify that no unilateral profitable deviation exists by pricing outside
the given support.
Suppose the firm in position i (≥ 3) prices at p > p̄i−1. If p < p̄i−2, it faces a
competition with the two firms above, and the expected profit is






which is strictly decreasing in p; that is, πi(p) < πi(p̄i−1),∀p ∈ (p̄i−1, p̄i−2). If p ≥ p̄i−2,
then the firm would have zero demand (and thus zero profit) because the firm right above
it charges a lower price for sure. The firms at positions 1 and 2 will clearly not charge
a price higher than p̄1, since p̄1 = w, consumers’ willingness-to-pay. Thus, there is no
unilateral profitable deviation by pricing higher beyond the given support.
Suppose the firm in position i (≤ n−2) prices at p < p̄i+1. If p ∈ [p̄i′+1, p̄i′ ] (i′ ≥ i+1),
it could capture all consumers who stop sampling at any position from i to i′ − 1. We
denote the amount of those consumers as Dii′ . In addition, it competes with the firms in
positions i′ and i′ + 1 for consumers who stop sampling at positions i′ and i′ + 1. Thus,
the expected profit can be written as





= Dii′p+ [1− F−i′ (p)] · αi′βi′ p̄i′




where the second and third steps are derived by substituting in F+i′+1(p) and F
−
i′ (p) from
Equation (2.1), respectively. Note that Dii′ ≥ αi′−1βi′−1 ≥ αi′βi′ , where the last inequality
is due to the assumption αi ≥ αi+1(1−αi). Therefore, πi(p̄i′)−πi(p̄i′+1) = (p̄i′−p̄i′+1)(Dii′−
αi′βi′ ) ≥ 0. Also noticing that πi(p) is convex, we can conclude that πi(p) < πi(p̄i′),
1The only exception is that there will be a downward jump in expected profit at the upper bound p̄1
for the firm in position 2, which is incurred by the mass point in F1(·) at p̄1. However, a jump down at
one single point with zero probability measure does not affect the actual profit.
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∀p ∈ (p̄i′+1, p̄i′). Iteratively, we get πi(p) ≤ πi(p̄i+1), ∀p < p̄i+1. For firms at position n− 1
and n, clearly, it is unprofitable to price below p̄n, since otherwise the profit margin would
decrease without an increase in demand. Hence, there is no unilateral profitable deviation
by pricing below the given support.
Combining (ii) and (iii), we conclude that given other firms’ strategies, each firm is
indifferent in pricing over the given support and has no profitable deviation. Therefore,
the price strategy described in the proposition is a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 2.2
For i = 2, ..., n− 1, denote E−i (pi) and E+i (pi) as the price expectations from position
i, conditional on pi ∈ [p̄i+1, p̄i] and conditional on pi ∈ [p̄i, p̄i−1], respectively. Also denote
f−i (·) and f+i (·) as the corresponding conditional probability density functions. According
to Equation (2.1), both f−i (p) and f
+
i+1(p) take the form of
K
p2
on the same support [p̄i+1, p̄i]
and thus must be identical. (It can also be calculated that K is p̄ip̄i+1





in the latter. They are the same due to Equation (2.2) and Equation (2.3)).
Therefore, E−i (pi) = E
+
i+1(pi+1). Notice that the expected price from the ith position E(pi)
is the weighted average of E−i (pi) and E
+
i (pi), and that from i + 1th position E(pi+1)




i (pi) = E
+
i+1(pi+1) and
E+i (pi) > E
−
i+1(pi+1), E(pi) > E(pi+1). Similar arguments apply to position 1 and position
n.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
First, we show that given consumers’ search strategies (i.e., non-shoppers’ optimal
stopping prices r∗1 and r
∗
2), and other firms’ pricing strategies as Equation (2.8), no firm has





[α + α (1− α)] p+ (1− α)2 p [1− F (p)]2 ≡ 1
3
[α+ α (1− α)] p̄1
by substituting in F (p). If a firm deviates to charge a price equal to r∗1, it forgoes the
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[α + α (1− α)] p̄1. Since any price
p ∈ (r∗2, r∗1) yields an even lower expected profit and any price p > r∗1 results in zero profit,
there is no profitable deviation from pricing above p̄1. Also, there is no profitable deviation
from underpricing, because any p < p̄2 yields a lower profit level than
1
3
[α + α (1− α)] p̄1.
Second, we show that given firms’ pricing strategies in Equation (2.8), r∗1 and r
∗
2 are
rational. By Equation (2.7), consumers’ rationality requires{∫ r∗2
p̄2




(r∗1 − p) dF (p)− k = 0,
which is ensured by
∫ p̄1
p̄2
F (p) dp = k
′
and r∗1 = r
∗
2 + k− k
′
. Notice that since r∗2 < r
∗
1 < 1,
it is rational for both types of non-shoppers to enter the market.
Altogether, the strategy profile specified in Proposition 2.2 is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
First, F (p) in Equation (2.9) is a well-defined cumulative distribution function. We
can verify that F (p̄4) = 0, F (p̄1) = 1, and F is increasing in the two segments of the




α + α (1− α)
(
1 + ϕ+ ϕ2
)
+ 3 (1− α)2 ϕ2
]
= αp̄1. (A.1)










ensures that f (0) < αp̄1 and f (1) > αp̄1. Also, the quadratic coefficient of f (ϕ) is
positive. Hence, ϕ ∈ (0, 1) is well defined. Therefore, substituting Equation (A.1) and
the definition of p̄2 into the first and second equations of (2.9), respectively, we have
F (p̄3) = F (p̄2) = 1 − ϕ. The price support is also well defined. p̄2 > p̄3 because p̄3 =
αp̄1
α+α(1−α)(1+x+x2)+3(1−α)2x2 by Equation (A.1) and its denominator is greater than that of p̄2
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(i.e., α+ α (1− α)
[
1 + x+ x2
]




+ x (1− x)
]
> 0).
Similarly, comparing the denominators of p̄3 and p̄4, we have p̄3 > p̄4.
Next, we show that given consumers’ optimal stopping prices (i.e., r∗1 and r
∗
2), and
other firms’ pricing strategies, no firm has profitable deviation in pricing. When pricing









1 + (1− F (r∗2)) + (1− F (r∗2))
2] p+ (1− α)2 [1− F (p)]2 p,
where the first term on RHS is the expected revenue from the type-1 consumers, the second
term is that from the type-2 consumers, and the third term is that from shoppers. In par-
ticular, the expected revenue from the type-2 consumers consists of three parts: those who
inspect this firm first and stop there (1
3
α (1− α)), those who inspect another firm first but
find its price exceeding r∗2 and continue to inspect this firm (2× 13α (1− α) (1− F (r
∗
2))× 12),
and those who inspect the other two firms first but find both their prices exceeding r∗2 and
continue to inspect this firm (2× 1
3
α (1− α) (1− F (r∗2)) 12 (1− F (r
∗
2))). Substituting F (p)
from the first equation of Equation (2.9) (with F (r∗2) = 1− ϕ) into the above profit func-
tion, we have π (p) ≡ 1
3
αp̄1, ∀p ∈ [p̄4, p̄3]. Similarly, when pricing p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1], a firm’s




αp+ (1− α) [1− F (p)]2 p,
where the first term on RHS is the expected revenue from the type-1 consumers and
the second term is that from the type-2 consumers and the shoppers. Substituting in
F (p) from the second equation of Equation (2.9), we have π (p) ≡ 1
3
αp̄1, ∀p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1].
Therefore, pricing within the support leads to a constant expected profit. In addition, any
price p ∈ (p̄3, p̄2) yields a lower profit than π (p̄2). Any price p > p̄1 yields zero profit. Any
price p < p̄4 yields a lower profit than π (p̄4). Therefore, there is no profitable unilateral
deviation for any firm.
Given firms’ pricing strategies, r∗1 and r
∗
2 are rational because the rationality require-
ments {∫ p̄3
p̄4
(r∗2 − p) dF (p) = k
′∫ p̄3
p̄4
(r∗1 − p) dF (p) +
∫ p̄1
p̄2
(r∗1 − p) dF (p) = k
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are ensured by Equation (2.10). Notice that since r∗2 < r
∗
1 < 1, it is rational for both types
to enter the market.
Altogether, the strategy profile specified in Proposition 2.3 is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.4




3 and that the price
pattern in Equation (2.1) is an equilibrium. Then for both the type-1 and the type-2
consumers, inspecting the first position is dominated by inspecting the third one, because
the third position offers a lower price for sure, while it does not incur a higher search cost.
Thus, the rational search strategy should not involve inspecting the first position. In this
case, the first firm has zero profit by charging p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1] and will deviate to charge a
lower price p
′ ∈ [p̄3, p̄2) which gives positive expected profit. Also, given firm 3’s price
support, no matter what search order consumers choose between firm 2 and firm 3, it is
suboptimal for firm 2 to price p ∈ (p̄2, p̄1). In any case, the given pricing pattern cannot





Proof of Proposition 2.5
First, we show that given consumers’ search strategies and other firms’ pricing strate-
gies, no firm has profitable unilateral deviation. For firm 1, charging ∀p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1] gives a
constant expected profit
π1 (p) = αp+ α (1− α) p [1− F2 (p)] ≡ αp̄1
by substituting in firm 2’s pricing strategies. Similarly, we can show that firm 2 has a
constant expected profit by charging any price within [p̄3, p̄1) because
π2 (p) = α (1− α) p [1− F1 (p)] ≡ α (1− α) p̄2 p ∈ (p̄2, p̄1)
π2 (p) = α (1− α) p+ (1− α)2 p [1− F3 (p)] ≡ α (1− α) p̄2 p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2].
Notice that π2 (p̄1) < α (1− α) p̄2 because of the mass point in F1 at the upper bound.
Nevertheless, since F2 places no mass on p̄1, firm 2’s expected profit is unaffected. Firm 3
also has constant profit by charging any price within its support:
π3 (p) = (1− α)2 p [1− F2 (p)] ≡ (1− α)2 p̄3 p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2].
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If firm 3 deviates to charge p ∈ (p̄2, p̄1), its profit would be
π
′
3 (p) = (1− α)




which is decreasing in p. Therefore, pricing above p̄2 is not profitable for firm 3. Also, firm
1 cannot achieve a higher profit by deviating to charge p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2). To see this, first notice
that after inspecting the first position, type-2 consumers’ search strategy, d (p, {2, 3}), is
to inspect the second position if the price learned from firm 1 exceeds r2, and to stop and
buy from firm 1 otherwise. Here, r2 (p̄3 < r2 < p̄2) is defined by
∫ r2
p̄3
(r2 − p) dF2 (p) = k
′
2.




1 (p) = αp+ α (1− α) p [1− F2 (p)] + (1− α)
2 p [1− F2 (p)] [1− F3 (p)]




which is convex in p. Since π
′
1 (p̄3) = p̄3 < αp̄1 = π
′
1 (p̄2), we can conclude that π
′
1 (p) <
π1 (p̄2) for ∀p ∈ (r2, p̄2). When p ∈ [p̄3, r2], type-2 consumers stop searching and buy from
firm 1, and firm 1’s profit function thus becomes
π
′′
1 (p) = [α + α (1− α)]p+ (1− α)
2 p [1− F2 (p)] [1− F3 (p)] ,
which again is convex in p. We can verify that π
′′
1 (p̄3) < π1 (p̄2) = αp̄1. In addition, the
condition on k
′
2 ensures that π
′′
1 (r2) < π1 (p̄2). This is because (r2 − p̄3)− p̄3 ln r2p̄3 = k
′
2 by






∗ − p̄3) − p̄3 ln γ
∗
p̄3
, r2 < γ






1 (r2) < π1 (p̄2), and thus π
′′
1 (p) < π1 (p̄2) for ∀p ∈ [p̄3, r2]. Therefore, firm 1
has no profitable deviation by underpricing. In addition, for all firms, charging any price
greater than p̄1 leads to zero profit, and charging any price below p̄3 leads to lower profit.
Altogether, all firms achieve constant profit within their given price supports and no firm
has profitable deviation outside their price supports. Therefore, given consumers’ search
strategies, firms’ pricing strategies form an equilibrium.
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Next, we show that given firms’ pricing strategies, the search strategies of non-
shoppers, listed in Table 2.1 are rational. Consider type-1 consumers’ strategies. When
making decision d (z, {1}), if z ≤ r1, by Equation (2.6), the expected gain equals
EG (1; z, {1}) =
∫ z
p̄2
(z − p) dF1 (p)− k1 ≤ 0
because r1 is defined as
∫ r1
p̄2
(r1 − p) dF1 (p) = k1 and
∫ z
p̄2
(z − p) dF1 (p) is increasing in z.
d (z, {2}) is to stop when z ≤ p̄1 because, by the definition of p̄1,
EG (2; p̄1, {2}) =
∫ p̄1
p̄3





1 + α (1− α)
− ln (1 + α (1− α))
1− α
]
p̄1 − k2 ≤ 0.




1 + α lnα
(1−α)[1+α(1−α)]
]
p̄1, we can check
that
EG (3; p̄1, {3}) =
∫ p̄2
p̄3




(1− α) [1 + α (1− α)]
]
p̄1 − k3 < 0.
For d (z, {2, 3}), notice that any z ≤ 1, by Equation (2.6),
EG (2; z, {2, 3}) =
∫ z
p̄3
(z − p) dF2 (p)− k2 = EG (2; z, {2}) .
The reason is that the third term on RHS of Equation (2.6) equals zero because the price p
learned from the second firm is less than p̄1; thus, the lowest price z
′







is to stop. By similar arguments, EG (3; z, {2, 3}) = EG (3; z, {3}).
Therefore, comparing EG (2; z, {2, 3}) and EG (3; z, {2, 3}) is equivalent to comparing
EG (2; z, {2}) and EG (3; z, {3}). Notice that the condition k3 − k2 > p̄3 α1−α lnα +
p̄1
1−α ln (1 + α (1− α)) ensures that EG (2; z, {2}) > EG (3; z, {3}) for ∀z ∈ [p̄1, 1]. There-
fore, if z > p̄1, it is optimal to inspect the second position; if z ≤ p̄1, it is opti-
mal to stop because both EG (2; z, {2}) and EG (3; z, {3}) are non-positive. For the
decision d (z, {1, 3}), we can similarly show that EG (1; z, {1, 3}) = EG (1; z, {1}) and
EG (3; z, {1, 3}) = EG (3; z, {3}). Notice that the condition k1 < α(1−α)−ln(1+α(1−α))1+α(1−α) p̄1
ensures that EG (1; p̄1, {1}) > 0 and p̄2 < r1 < p̄1 by the definition of r1. Recall that
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EG (3; z, {3}) < 0 if z ≤ p̄1. We can also conclude that for ∀z ≥ p̄1, EG (1; z, {1}) >
EG (3; z, {3}). Therefore, the decision d (z, {1, 3}) listed in Table 2.1 is rational. For
d (z, {1, 2}), when z ≤ p̄2, EG (1; z, {1, 2}) = EG (1; z, {1}) < 0 and EG (2; z, {1, 2}) =
EG (2; z, {2}) < 0, and thus to stop is optimal. Finally, we need to check the first-step
decision d (1, {1, 2, 3}). We need to compare EG (1; 1, {1, 2, 3}), EG (2; 1, {1, 2, 3}), and
EG (3; 1, {1, 2, 3}). Based on the subsequent strategies, we can conclude that EG (1; 1, {1, 2, 3}) =
EG (1; 1, {1}) > 0, which indicates that to enter the market is always rational. Also,
EG (3; 1, {1, 2, 3}) = EG (3; 1, {3}), and we have EG (1; 1, {1, 2, 3}) > EG (3; 1, {1, 2, 3})
because EG (1; 1, {1}) > EG (3; 1, {3}), as is already shown. We can write the expected
gain of first inspecting the second position as
EG (2; 1, {1, 2, 3}) =
∫ p̄1
p̄3





(p− x) dF1 (x)− k1
]
dF2 (p)
< (1− p̄1) +
[∫ p̄1
p̄3







(p̄1 − x) dF1 (x)− k1
]
dF2 (p)
< (1− p̄1) + 0 +
[∫ p̄1
p̄2
(p̄1 − x) dF1 (x)− k1
]
= EG (1; 1, {1, 2, 3}) .
Therefore, it is optimal to start searching from the first position rather than the second or
the third. In a similar manner, we can check that all strategies of the type-2 consumers
listed in Table 2.1 are rational.
Altogether, under the given parametric conditions, the strategy profile specified in
Proposition 2.5 is a rational-expectations equilibrium.
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Appendix B
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1
(i) If αw > c and such that m = αw, FH(p) =
p−αw
p−c with a mass point at the upper
bound w (with probability αw−c
w−c ), and FL(p) =
p−αw
(1−α)p . We can verify that firms have no
profitable deviation. This is because, according to firms’ payoff function (denote πji (p) as
the expected profit of firm i in position j charging price p),
π1H(p) = αp+ (1− α)p[1− FL(p)]
π2L(p) = (1− α)(p− c)[1− FH(p)]
(B.1)
both firms achieve a constant expected profit level within the support (i.e., π1H(p) ≡ αw,
π2L(p) ≡ (1− α)(αw − c), ∀p ∈ [αw,w)).
If αw ≤ c and such that m = c, H takes advantage of its low cost, charging pH = c for
sure (FH(p) ≡ 1, ∀p ∈ [c, w]), which gives L zero profit. Meanwhile, L plays mixed strategy
FL(p) =
p−c
(1−α)p such that H has no profitable deviation, because π
1
H(p) ≡ c, ∀p ∈ [c, w),
according to Eq.(B.1).
Additionally, in both cases, neither firm has incentive to charge higher than w or lower
than m, since the former leads to no purchase and zero profit and the latter is dominated
by charging m.
(ii) Similarly, we can verify that both firms have constant profit level within the
support:
π2H(p) = (1− α)p[1− FL(p)] ≡ (1− α)[α(w − c) + c]
π1L(p) = α(p− c) + (1− α)(p− c)[1− FH(p)] ≡ α(w − c)
(B.2)
Again, we can check that there is no profitable deviation by charging outside the given
support.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1
According to Table 3.1,
∆πL = π
1
L − π2L = α(w − c)− (1− α)(m− c) (B.3)
∆πH = π
1
H − π2H = m− (1− α)(c+ α(w − c)) (B.4)
For firm L, if αw ≤ c, ∆πL = α(w−c) > 0; if αw > c, ∆πL = α(αw−c)+(1−α)c > 0.
Therefore, ∆πL > 0.
For firm H, if αw ≤ c, ∆πH = α(2 − α)c − α(1 − α)w , and thus ∆πH < 0 iff
c < 1−α
2−αw. If αw > c, ∆πH = α
2w − (1 − α)2c, and thus ∆πH < 0 iff c > α
2
(1−α)2w.







(1−α)2w = αw (three lines intersect at one point). Therefore,
∆πH < 0 iff
α2
(1−α)2w < c <
1−α
2−αw.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
By Eq.(B.3) and Eq.(B.4), if αw ≤ c, ∆πH − ∆πL = α[(3 − α)c − (2 − α)w], and
thus ∆πH > ∆πL iff c >
2−α
3−αw. If αw > c, ∆πH − ∆πL = (−α
2 + 4α − 2)c, and thus
∆πH > ∆πL iff 2 −
√
2 < α (< 1). Notice the line 2−α
3−αw intersects with line αw at
α = 2 −
√
2. Therefore, ∆πH > ∆πL if α > 2 −
√
2 or c > 2−α
3−αw. By Proposition 3.1,
∆πL > 0 and ∆πH < 0 only when
α2
(1−α)2w < c <
1−α
2−αw. So, when α > 2−
√
2 or c > 2−α
3−αw,
bH = ∆πH > ∆πL = bL > 0. When α < 2 −
√
2 and c < 2−α
3−αw, ∆πH < ∆πL, and thus
bH = max{0,∆πH} < ∆πL = bL.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
(i) In this case, L wins the first position. According to Eq.(3.2), FL(p) < FH(p),∀p ∈
(c+α(w− c), w], which means that the price by firm L first order stochastically dominates
the price by firm H. Thus, E(pL) > E(pH).
(ii) In this case, H wins the first position. If αw ≤ c, by Eq.(3.1), H plays pure
strategy at c while L mixes over [c, w]. Clearly, E(pH) < E(pL).
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(1−α)2 ]. Apply Taylor expansion on lnα at α = 1,
lnα = ln 1− (1− α)− 1
2

























] < 0, for any α ∈ ( c
w
, 1)
Thus, f(α, c, w) is concave in α.
Note that limα→(c/w)+ f(α, c, w) = w[c/w+
c/w






< 0. Since f(α, c, w) is continuous and concave in α, f(α, c, w)
crosses zero only once from below when varying α. That is, there must exist an α∗(c, w)
such that when α ∈ (α∗(c, w), 1), f(α, c, w) > 0, which means E(pH) > E(pL). Here,
α∗(c, w) is defined by f(α∗, c, w) = 0, which yields Eq.(3.3).
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Appendix C
More Results for Chapter 3
C.1 Heterogeneous Consumer Valuation
In the baseline model, we assumed that consumers have the same willingness-to-pay
to avoid unnecessary distraction from the demand factor. Now we relax this assumption
by considering heterogeneous consumer valuation and allow consumers’ willingness-to-pay
to be different from one to another. As we will see, the main results continue to hold.
We assume that consumers’ willingness-to-pay satisfies a distribution with a sup-
port [0, v]. Correspondingly, the demand function is thus D(p), where p ∈ [0, v] with
D(0) = 1 and D(v) = 0. Technically, we assume that D(·) is twice-continuously differ-
entiable and non-increasing, and the revenue function pD(p) is concave. Denote pm =
argmaxp∈[0,v] pD(p) as the optimal monopoly price for H. We let p
m > c to rule out trivial
cases; otherwise, H ’s optimal monopoly price is below L’s marginal cost, which leads to a
simple pure strategy for H regardless of its winning position.
We can conduct a similar analysis as in the baseline model to derive the equilibrium.
Again, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the second stage price competition. When
H wins the first position, as in the baseline model, the two firms randomize their prices
over a common support [p, p̄] with a possible mass point at the upper bound. The upper
bound now is H ’s optimal monopoly price pm, since H has no incentive to charge a higher
price given the demand function (i.e., p̄ = pm). By charging the lower bound price p, H
can attract all consumers and earn the same profit as charging the upper bound price.
Therefore, if we define pl as the solution to plD(pl) = αpmD(pm), then p = pl. Given
the concavity of the revenue function, both pm and pl are well defined. As in the baseline
model, one exception from the above common-support mixed strategy equilibrium is that
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when the cost advantage is dominating, H may play a pure strategy (while L still plays a
mixed strategy). H is better off playing a pure strategy of simply charging a price equal
to L’s marginal cost to occupy the entire market, if doing so generates more revenue than
randomizing its price; that is, if cD(c) > αpmD(pm), or c > pl by the definition of pl.
Combining the two cases together, the two firms’ pricing strategies are characterized by













p ∈ [p, p̄)
p = p̄
(C.1)
where p̄ = pm and p = max{pl, c}. The expected profits are π1H = D(p)p and π2L =
(1− α)D(p)(p− c), respectively.
Similarly, when L wins the first position, we also have a support of the price distri-
bution [p′, p̄′]. The upper bound price L may charge is its optimal monopoly price (i.e.,
p̄′ = argmaxp∈[0,v]D(p)(p − c)). The lower bound price is the one that attracts all con-
sumers and leads to the same profit (i.e., p′ solves D(p′)(p′ − c) = αD(p̄′)(p̄′ − c)). The
two firms adopt the following strategies:
FH(p) =
D(p)(p−c)−D(p′)(p′−c)








p ∈ [p′, p̄′)
p = p̄′
(C.2)
and the resulting expected profits are π2H = (1 − α)D(p′)p′ and π1L = D(p′)(p′ − c),
respectively.
The equilibrium outcomes (e.g., equilibrium bidding and price dispersion) can be
similarly derived as in the baseline model. Figure C.1 illustrates the equilibrium outcome
with uniformly distributed consumer valuations (i.e., D(p) = 1− p
v
, p ∈ [0, v]). Similar to
the baseline case, while the prominent position is always desirable for the low-type firm,
the high-type firm may find the less-prominent position more profitable in some cases
(shadowed region in Figure C.1(a)). Consequently, the high-type firm bids aggressively
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to win the prominent position only when either its competitive advantage or the location
prominence difference is salient (unshadowed region in Figure C.1(b)); otherwise, the low-
type firm wins the prominent position (shadowed region in Figure C.1(b)). Regarding the
expected prices from the two locations, a similar pattern is observed: The expected price
from the prominent position will be higher (shadowed region in Figure C.1(c)), unless firms’
competence difference overrides the location prominence difference (unshadowed region in
Figure C.1(c)).
(a) Endogenous Valuation (b) Bidding Outcome (c) Price Dispersion
Figure C.1: Uniformly Distributed Consumer Valuations
Heterogeneity in consumer valuation affects the firms’ pricing decision only in that it
induces a trade-off between the profit margin and the demand quantity (as in a standard
monopoly pricing setting) facing both firms; yet, it does not alter the relative competitive
situation between firms and thus has little influence on the major insights we have already
obtained. When reflected in the graph, its effect can be depicted as a distortion in shape
with no change in pattern.
C.2 Strategic Choice of Ordering: A Brief Analysis
The following analysis mainly focuses on the case with a relatively small portion of
sophisticated consumers (i.e., β < 1
2
). For the case where β > 1
2
, similar analysis applies.
Along the line of backward induction, we start with the second-stage price compe-
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tition. Notice that in the second stage, sophisticated consumers can only expect firms’
equilibrium price distributions rather than actually observe them. Therefore, by the con-
cept of rational-expectations equilibrium, firms decide their pricing strategies given so-
phisticated consumers’ ordering choice (which is in turn rational given firms’ equilibrium
pricing strategies). It thus implies that a firm’s total payment to the auctioneer (i.e., a
unit amount times the number of consumer visits) is considered as fixed when it makes
the price decision. Therefore, we can derive the equilibrium pricing independent of the
first-stage bids.
Again, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the second-stage price competition, and
firms play mixed strategies in equilibrium. First, we consider the case in which H wins the
first position. By Lemma 3.1, firms’ equilibrium pricing strategies follow Eq.(3.1), given
that all consumers start searching from the first position (i.e., σ = 1). Notice that σ = 1
holds in equilibrium if E(p1) ≤ E(p2). Recall that by Proposition 3.3, when α < α∗(c, w),
E(p1) < E(p2), where α∗(c, w) is defined by Eq.(3.3). Therefore, when α < α∗(c, w), all
consumers starting searching from the first position and both firms pricing according to
Eq.(3.1) are an equilibrium in the second stage.
When α > α∗(c, w), however, E(p1) > E(p2), and sophisticated consumers thus will
not start from the first position. Assume that all sophisticated consumers start sampling
from the second position (i.e., σ = 0). Then, the mixed-strategy equilibrium in pricing
can be derived as
F 1H(p) =
[1−α(1−β)](p−p)
(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [p, w)
F 2L(p) =
(1−αβ)(p−p)
(1−α)p p ∈ [p, w]
(C.3)
where p = α(1−β)
(1−αβ)w. Notice that H has a mass point at the upper bound as long as
c < α(1−2β)
1−αβ w. For the above to be an equilibrium, we need to ensure that E(p
1) ≥ E(p2).
























Notice that α∗(c, w) in Eq.(3.3) can be rewritten as α̂(c, w; 0). As can be verified, when
α > α̂(c, w; β), E(p1) > E(p2). Therefore, when α > α̂(c, w; β), sophisticated consumers
starting from the second position and firms pricing according to Eq.(C.3) are an equilibrium
in the second stage.
In the region where α̂(c, w; 0) < α < α̂(c, w; β), as can be concluded from the above
analysis, there exists no equilibrium in which sophisticated consumers play pure strategy.
Instead, sophisticated consumers play mixed strategy with 0 < σ < 1, and the expected
prices from the two positions are equal (i.e., E(p1) = E(p2)). For any β′ ∈ (0, β), we
can define a curve α = α̂(c, w; β′) according to Eq.(C.4). When (α, c
w
) lies on that curve,
sophisticated consumers playing mixed strategy σ = 1− β′
β
, and firms pricing the following
strategies are an equilibrium in the second stage:
F 1H(p) =
[1−α(1−β′)](p−p)
(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [p, w)
F 2L(p) =
(1−αβ′)(p−p)
(1−α)p p ∈ [p, w]
(C.5)
where p = α(1−β
′)
(1−αβ′)w.
We next consider the case where L wins the first position. Proposition 3.3 indicates
E(p1L) > E(p
2
H), given that all consumers start searching from the first position. Therefore,
σ = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium. We then assume that all sophisticated consumers
start sampling from the second position (σ = 0). The resulting pricing strategies are
F 2H(p) =
(1−αβ)(p−p)
(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [p, w]
F 1L(p) =
[1−α(1−β)](p−p)
(1−α)p p ∈ [p, w)
(C.6)
where p = α(1−β)(w−c)
1−αβ + c. As we can show, FL first order stochastically dominates FH
such that E(p1L) > E(p
2
H), which is consistent with σ = 0. Thus, in the second-stage game
when L wins the first position, the equilibrium is that sophisticated consumers start from
the second position and the two firms price according to Eq.(C.6).
We can summarize firms’ equilibrium expected profits from sales in different positions
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(αw, (1− α)(αw − c))(
α(1− β)w, [1− α(1− β)](α(1−β)
(1−αβ)w − c)
)(









< α < α̂(c, w; 0);
if α̂(c, w; β) < α < 1;






1−αβ + c), α(1− β)(w − c)
)
(C.7)
For the first-stage bidding, notice that here the weighting factors (or the expected
clicks at the first position) may not equal 1. For example, in the parameter region III
in Figure 3.5(c), ωH = 1 and ωL = 1 − αβ because when L wins the first position, its
equilibrium price expectation is higher so that sophisticated non-shoppers will visit the
second position directly. Nevertheless, as is shown in the paper, firms’ weakly dominant
strategy is to submit a per-click bid bi =
max{∆πi,0}
ωi
, where ∆πi = π
1
i − π2i and i ∈ {H,L},
and the auctioneer ranks the firms according to the score si = ωibi = max{∆πi, 0}, which
is independent of ωi.
By comparing ∆πH and ∆πL (and then checking whether the winning bids are posi-
tive), we can derive the bidding outcome and pin down the boundaries of firms’ winning
regions. Use Figure 3.5(c) for illustration. When 0 < α < c
w





(region II). When c
w
< α < α̂(c, w; 0), comparing ∆πH and ∆πL leads to the bound-
ary of region III: c
w
= αβ(1−α)(2−α)











= α intersect at one point. When α̂(c, w; β) < α < 1,




(1−β)(1+2β) (region IV). When α̂(c, w; 0) < α < α̂(c, w; β),




(1−αβ′)[(1+β−β2−ββ′)α2−(4−β−β′)α+2] defines a cutoff in comparing ∆πH and ∆πL. The bound-
ary of region V consists of all these cutoffs. Together with the discussion on the expected
prices in the second-stage pricing game, the spatial price dispersion pattern can be sum-
marized as by Figure 3.5(c).
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C.3 Equilibrium Pricing in the Three-Firms Case
In this section, we provide a complete description of the equilibrium pricing strategies
in the case of three competing firms. We organize the results by different parameter regions
under different scenarios. The proofs to the first two results are outlined, and the rest can
be analyzed in a similar fashion. For convenience, denote H − L− L as the case when H
stays in the first position and two L firms are in the second and third positions. Similar
interpretations apply to L−H −L and L−L−H. Also, we call the firm in position i as
firm i, where i = 1, 2, 3. As before, we use Fi (·) to represent the cumulative distribution
function (cdf ) for the pricing strategy of firm i.
(1) The Case of H − L− L









p−c p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1)




p−c p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2)
1− (p̄1−p)
(1−α)p p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1]
, (C.8)
F3 (p) = 1− α(p̄2−p)(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2],
where p̄1 = w, p̄2 =
1
1+α(1−α) p̄1, and p̄3 = α (p̄2 − c) + c.
For convenience, we use the superscript “+” to denote the cdf in the upper half of
the support, and we use the superscript “−” as the cdf in the lower half of the support.
For example, in Eq.C.8, we refer to F2 (p) = 1− (p̄1−p)(1−α)p for p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1] as F
+
2 (p) and refer
to F2 (p) = 1− p̄3−cp−c for p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2) as F
−
2 (p).
First, we show that Fi (·) (i = 1, 2, 3) are well-defined cumulative distribution func-
tions. Notice that c < p̄3 < p̄2 < p̄1 = w, so that the supports are well defined. Also,
we can check all the bounds: F1 (p̄2) = 0, F
−
1 (p̄1) = 1 −
p̄2−c
p̄1−c < 1, F2 (p̄3) = 0, and











(1−α)(p̄3−c) = 0, and F3 (p̄2) = 1. Moreover, all Fi (p) are increasing in p. Therefore,
all Fi (·) are well-defined cdf s.
Second, we can show that each position i yields a constant expected profit πi within
the entire support, i = 1, 2, 3. For example, consider the second position. For p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2),
π−2 (p) = α (1− α) (p− c) + (1− α)
2 [1− F3 (p)] (p− c) ,
where the first part on the right-hand side accounts for the demand from those consumers
who stop searching at the second position (they purchase from position 2 for sure because
p is lower than the lower bound of F1’s support, p̄2), and the second part accounts for
the demand from shoppers when its price is lower than the third position. Substituting in
F3 (p), we have:
π−2 (p) = α (1− α) (p− c) + (1− α)
2 α (p̄2 − p)
(1− α) (p− c)
(p− c)
≡ α (1− α) (p̄2 − c) .
Similarly, for p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1], we have:
π+2 (p) = α (1− α) [1− F1 (p)] (p− c)
= α (1− α) p̄2 − c
p− c
(p− c) ≡ α (1− α) (p̄2 − c) .
Therefore, firm 2 achieves a constant expected profit level π2 = α (1− α) (p̄2 − c) when
charging any price within its support [p̄3, p̄1]. Similar analysis applies for both π1 = αp̄1
and π3 = (1− α)2 (p̄3 − c).
Finally, we need to verify that there is no profitable unilateral deviation. For example,
if H deviates to price p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2), the profit function would then become:
π
′

























1 (p) < π1 (p̄2) for ∀p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2). Thus, when cw <
α2
1+α(1−α) , H will not deviate to charge
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a price below the given support. Similarly, we can show that it is not profitable for firm 3
to charge a price above its given support.
Altogether, we can conclude that the price strategy described is a mixed-strategy
equilibrium.






equilibrium pricing strategies are:
F1 (p) =

F ∗1 (p) p ∈ [p̄4, p̄3]
1− αp̄1−c
α(p−c) p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1)
1 p = p̄1
F2 (p) =

F ∗2 (p) p ∈ [p̄4, p̄3)
1− α(p̄2−c)
p−c p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2)
1− (p̄1−p)




F ∗3 (p) p ∈ [p̄4, p̄3)
1− α(p̄2−p)
(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2],
where p̄1 = w, p̄2 =
1
1+α(1−α)w, p̄4 = αw, and p̄3 is the solution between p̄4 and p̄2 to the
equation:
[1 + α (1− α)] p̄23 − [α (1− α) (1 + 2c) + 2c] p̄3 + [1 + α (1− α)]
2 c2 = 0, (C.10)
and {F ∗1 (p) , F ∗2 (p) , F ∗3 (p)} solves:
αp+ α (1− α) p [1− F ∗2 (p)] + (1− α)
2 p [1− F ∗2 (p)] [1− F ∗3 (p)] = αw
α (1− α) (p− c) [1− F ∗1 (p)] + (1− α)
2 (p− c) [1− F ∗1 (p)] [1− F ∗3 (p)] = (1− α) (αw − c)
(1− α)2 (p− c) [1− F ∗1 (p)] [1− F ∗2 (p)] = (1− α)
2 (αw − c) .
(C.11)
Following similar analysis, we can show that the strategy is indeed an equilibrium, as
is briefly outlined below.





, F1 (p̄2) = 1 − αp̄1−cα(p̄2−c) > 0, which indicates that H may charge a price lower than







[1+α(1−α)]2} ensures that there is a unique solution to Eq.(C.10) between p̄4 and p̄2.
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In fact, if we denote the right-hand side of Eq.(C.10) as g (p̄3), under the given parameter
condition, g (p̄4) < 0 and g (p̄2) > 0, which ensures that p̄3 is well defined. Moreover,
notice that p̄3 actually solves F
∗
1 (p̄3) = F1 (p̄2). To see this, by substituting p = p̄3 and
F ∗1 (p̄3) = 1−
αp̄1−c
α(p̄2−c) into Eq.(C.11), we can then solve the last two equations of Eq.(C.11)
together and get: {
F ∗2 (p̄3) = 1−
α(p̄2−c)
p̄3−c
F ∗3 (p̄3) = 1−
α(p̄2−p̄3)
(1−α)(p̄3−c) .
Substituting back into the first equation of Eq.(C.11), we have Eq.(C.10).
Second, firms achieve constant profit within their price supports: (i) Notice that the
left-hand sides in Eq.(C.11) are in fact the profit functions for the three firms when charging
p ∈ [p̄4, p̄3], and the right-hand sides are the constant expected profit they achieve over
their entire price supports. Therefore, Eq.(C.11) ensures that the three firms all achieve a
constant profit level when pricing p ∈ [p̄4, p̄3]. (ii) F1 (p̄3) = F1 (p̄2) indicates that F1 does
not put any mass over the interval (p̄3, p̄2), which means that H does not charge any price
between p̄3 and p̄2. Thus, for p ∈ (p̄3, p̄2), firm 2 and firm 3 achieve a constant profit:{
π2 (p) = α (1− α) (p− c) [1− F1 (p̄2)] + (1− α)2 (p− c) [1− F1 (p̄2)] [1− F3 (p)] ≡ (1− α) (αw − c)
π3 (p) = (1− α)2 (p− c) [1− F1 (p̄2)] [1− F ∗2 (p)] ≡ (1− α)
2 (αw − c) .
(iii) F3 (p̄2) = 1, indicating that firm 3 does not charge any price above p̄2. Therefore, for
p ∈ (p̄2, p̄1), {
π1 (p) = αp+ α (1− α) p [1− F2 (p)] ≡ αw
π2 (p) = α (1− α) (p− c) [1− F1 (p)] ≡ (1− α) (αw − c) .
Finally, as we can check, firm 1 pricing p ∈ (p̄3, p̄2) and firm 3 pricing p ∈ (p̄2, p̄1)
both result in lower profits. Therefore, there is no profitable deviation. As a result, the
pricing strategy described is a mixed-strategy equilibrium.









F ∗1 (p) p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2)
1− αp̄1−c
α(p−c) p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1)
1 p = p̄1
F2 (p) =
{
F ∗2 (p) p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2)
1− (p̄1−p)
(1−α)p p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1]
(C.12)
F3 (p) = F
∗
3 (p) p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2],
where p̄1 = w, p̄2 =
1
1+α(1−α)w, and p̄3 = αw, and {F
∗
1 (p) , F
∗
2 (p) , F
∗
3 (p)} solves Eq.(C.11).
The analysis in this case is similar to that for Result 2.
Result C.4. In the case of H −L−L, when c
w
> α, firm 1 pricing p1 = c, firm 3 pricing




(1−α)p p ∈ [c, w)
1 p = w
, (C.13)
is an equilibrium.
This is a trivial case in which the cost advantage is so significant that H simply
charges c and both L firms achieve zero profit. Firm 2 prices in a way that firm 1 has no
profitable deviation.
(2) The Case of L−H − L
Result C.5. In the case of L−H−L, when c
w





p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1)




p−c p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2)
1− (p̄1−p)
(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1]
(C.14)
F3 (p) = 1− α(p̄2−p)(1−α)p p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2] ,
where p̄1 = w, p̄2 =
p̄1+(1−α)c
1+α(1−α) , and p̄3 = α2p̄2.
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This case can be analyzed similarly to the analysis of Result 1.
Result C.6. In the case of L−H−L, when c
w
> α, firm 1 pricing p1 = w, firm 2 pricing




(1−α)p p ∈ [c, w)
1 p = w
, (C.15)
is an equilibrium.
This is a trivial case, similar to Result 4.
(3) The Case of L− L−H




p−c p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1)





p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2)
1− (p̄1−p)
(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [p̄2, p̄1]
(C.16)
F3 (p) = 1− α(p̄2−p)(1−α)(p−c) p ∈ [p̄3, p̄2] ,
where p̄1 = w, p̄3 = α (p̄2 − c) + c, and
p̄2 =
− (1− α) (1− 2α) c+ w +
√
5 (1− α)2 c2 − 2 (1− α) (1− 2α)wc+ w2
2 [1 + α (1− α)]
.
This case can be analyzed similarly to the analysis of Result 1 and Result 5.
C.4 More Results for the Three-Firms Case
Recall the equilibrium profits in the price competition from Table 3.2. We denote the
three firms’ second-stage equilibrium profits in the case of H − L − L (i.e., H wins the
first position and the two L firms are in the second and third positions) as u1H , u
2
L, and
u3L, respectively. Similarly, we denote the equilibrium profits in the L−H −L case as v1L,
v2H , and v
3
L, and we denote the equilibrium profits in the L− L−H case as w1L, w2L, and
w3H .
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In deriving the bidding outcomes, we focus on the particular type of equilibria in
which the two low-type firms behave symmetrically, that is, they adopt the same bidding
strategies. Figure C.2 summarizes the bidding outcome. In the shadowed region, which









}, H bids lower than the
two L firms and stays in the third position. More specifically, in this region, bH = u
1
H−w3H
and bL = (1− α) (u1H − w3H) + w1L − w2L. Notice that the two low-type firms submit the
same bid bL because they are indifferent between one position higher or not, and hence
win a higher position with equal probability. Also, notice that in our setting, all three
firms generate the same number of clicks when they are in the same position. Therefore,
they have the same weighting factor, and the ranking is determined by the amount of
their per-click bids bi. As a result, when u
1





, bH < bL, and H is therefore
placed in the third position. To ensure that the bidding strategy is an equilibrium, we
need to further check the possible deviations. As we can see, given bL, H does not want to
outbid L because its net profit would be u1H − bL, which is lower than its net profit in the
third position, w3H . Similarly, given bH and the other L firm’s bid bL, neither L firm has a
profitable deviation: First, staying in the first position yields a net profit w1L − bL, which
equals the net profit from the second position w2L − (1− α) bH (notice that the number of
click-throughs in the second position is 1− α). Second, underbidding to stay in the third
position is not optimal either because the net profit then would be v3L—lower than the










1−α }), H outbids both L firms and wins the first position. In this case,
bH = u
1




1−α . Following similar arguments, we can show that none of
the three firms has a profitable deviation. For H, because bL < u
1
H − w3H , underbidding
to be in the third position would lead to a lower net profit (w3H) than being in the first
position (u1H − bL). For L, staying in the second or the third position results in the same
net profit because u2L − (1− α) bL = u3L. It is not profitable for L to outbid H because
being in the first position yields a payoff of v1L − bH , which is lower than the payoff in the
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second or third position (u3L).
Figure C.2: Bidding Outcome in the Case of Three Firms
An interesting result is found in the dotted region in Figure C.2. In this region, firms
may adopt mixed-strategy bidding in equilibrium. We use an example to better illustrate
the idea.
Example C.1. When α = 0.4, c = 0.3, and w = 1, in equilibrium, both L firms symmet-
rically bid bL = 0.219 and H adopts mixed-strategy bidding. With probability p = 0.23, H
bids as high as b
′
H = 0.352 and wins the first position; with probability 1 − p = 0.77, H
bids as low as bH = 0.155 and stays in the third position.
The example illustrates a bidding outcome in which the high-type firm switches be-
tween a top position and a lower position. In this case, bL = u
1
H − w3H so that H is
indifferent between attaining the first position and attaining the third one. For this rea-
son, H is willing to mix its bid. H mixes in such a way that neither L wants to overbid or
underbid its counterpart (i.e., bidding bL is optimal, given that the other L firm also bids
bL). For this reason, the mixing probability p satisfies:
p =
bL − (1− α) bH − w1L + w2L
(u2L − u3L)− (w1L − w2L)− (1− α) bH + αbL
.
In addition, H’s high bid b
′
H = (1− α) bL+ v1L−u2L is high enough that L will not deviate
to bid higher than b
′




1−α is low enough that bidding




As we can see from Figure C.2, the dotted region with mixed-strategy bidding serves
as a natural transition between the two deterministic cases that involves only pure-strategy
bidding.
Figure C.3: Price Dispersion in the Case of Three Firms
Figure C.3 illustrates the spatial price dispersion pattern in the three-firms case. As
we can see, similar results exist. In the highlighted region, the high-type firm wins the
first position, and the expected price from the first position is lower than that from the
second position, indicating that, depending on the endogenous competitive situation, an
expensive location may not necessarily be associated with expensive products.
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Appendix D
Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 4.1. According to Table 4.1, (i) If 1
3
≤ ψ < 1, then ∂2
∂ψ∂θ
π∗M (ψ, θ) =
−1 < 0 and ∂2
∂ψ∂θ
π∗N (ψ, θ) = − 14(1−θ)2 < 0.





π∗M (ψ, θ) =
f(ψ,θ)
(3−3θ−3ψ+7θψ)4 , where f (ψ, θ) is a polynomial
function of ψ and θ with degree of 8 (ψ4θ4). We can show that f (ψ, θ) is convex in ψ for
0 < ψ < 1
3
and 0 < θ < 1
2
. We can verify that f(0, θ) < 0 and f(1
3
, θ) < 0 for ∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
).
Therefore, f (ψ, θ) < 0 for ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1
3
) and ∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
), which implies ∂
2
∂ψ∂θ




π∗N (ψ, θ) =
g(ψ,θ)
(1−θ)2(3−3θ−3ψ+7θψ)4 , where g (ψ, θ) is a polynomial function of
ψ and θ with degree of 10 (ψ4θ6). Again, we can show that g (ψ, θ) is convex in ψ for
0 < ψ < 1
3
and 0 < θ < 1
2
. Since g(0, θ) < 0 and g(1
3
, θ) < 0 for ∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
), we can
conclude that g (ψ, θ) < 0 for ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1
3





π∗N (ψ, θ) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Define h (ψ, θ) = π∗M (ψ, θ) + π
∗
N (ψ, θ). Since both
π∗M (ψ, θ) and π
∗
N (ψ, θ) are submodular by Lemma 4.1, h (ψ, θ) is also submodular. We
then define
H (θ, ψ1, ψ2) ≡ [π∗M (ψ2, θ)− π∗M (ψ1, θ)]− [π∗N (ψ1, θ)− π∗N (ψ2, θ)]
= h (ψ2, θ)− h (ψ1, θ) .





≤ ψ1 < ψ2 < 1, then
∂
∂θ























H (θ, ψ1, ψ2) < 0.
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If 0 < ψ1 <
1
3
≤ ψ2 < 1, then
∂
∂θ























h (ψ, θ) < 0, ∂
∂θ
H (θ, ψ1, ψ2) < 0.
In sum, H (θ, ψ1, ψ2) is decreasing in θ. Notice H (0, ψ1, ψ2) =
5(ψ2−ψ1)
9(1−ψ1)(1−ψ2) (in the





(in the case of 1
3
≤ ψ1 < ψ2 < 1), or 20−9(1−ψ2)(3+ψ1)36(1−ψ2) (in
the case of 0 < ψ1 <
1
3









< 0 in all three cases. Since H (θ, ψ1, ψ2) is continuous
in θ, we can conclude that there exists a cutoff θ∗ ∈ (0, 1
2
) such that H (θ∗, ψ1, ψ2) = 0,
H (θ, ψ1, ψ2) > 0 for θ < θ
∗, and H (θ, ψ1, ψ2) < 0 for θ > θ
∗. Notice that π∗M (ψ2, θ) −
π∗M (ψ1, θ) > 0 always holds, that is, b
∗





for θ < θ∗, and b∗M < b
∗
N for θ > θ
∗.




π∗N (ψ, θ) =
[(1+θ)(1−θ)+θ(3θ−1)ψ]f(ψ,θ)
(1−θ)[3(1−θ)(1−ψ)+4θψ]3 , where f (ψ, θ) is a polynomial function of ψ and θ with degree of 5
(ψ2θ3). ∂∂ψf (ψ, θ) = −θ (1− 3θ) (3− 7θ)ψ− (1− θ)
(
20θ2 − 13θ + 3
)
. Within the given parameter
region, ∂
∂ψ























π∗N (ψ, θ) >
0, and thus π∗N (ψ1, θ)− π∗N (ψ2, θ) < 0 and b∗N = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We let ∆π̂i = π̂
1
i − π̂2i , i ∈ {M,N}. When 13 ≤ ψ < 1,
according to Table 4.2, ∆π̂M −∆π̂N = (1−2θ)4(3+ψ)2(1−θ)F (ψ, θ), where
F (ψ, θ) = −4
(




5ψ2 + 17ψ2 + 19ψ + 7
)
.





> 0, and F (ψ, θ) is linear in θ, we can conclude that F (ψ, θ) >
0 and hence ∆π̂M −∆π̂N > 0 for ∀θ ∈ (0, 12).
When 0 < ψ < 1
3
, similarly, ∆π̂M − ∆π̂N = ψ(1−2θ)(1−θ)(3+ψ)2(3−3ψ−3θ+7θψ)2G (ψ, θ), where







> 0 and ∂
∂θ
G (ψ, θ) < 0 for ∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
), G (ψ, θ) > 0 and thus ∆π̂M−∆π̂N > 0
for ∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
).
We can further check that b̂M = [∆π̂M ]
+ > 0. Therefore, b̂M > b̂N for ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1)
and ∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
).
Proof of Corollary 4.2. (i) When ψ < 1
3
, according to Table 4.2, π̂1N − π̂2N can
be simplified as ψF (ψ,θ)
(1−θ)(3+ψ)2[3(1−θ)(1−ψ)+4θψ]2 , where F (ψ, θ) is a polynomial function of ψ
and θ with degree of 8 (θ4ψ4). We can show that ∂
2
∂θ2
F (ψ, θ) is monotonic in θ for ∀θ ∈
(0, 1
2
), and both ∂
2
∂θ2








are negative. Therefore, ∂
2
∂θ2
F (ψ, θ) < 0, and
thus ∂
∂θ







> 0 and thus
∂
∂θ
F (ψ, θ) > 0 for ∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2


























> 0 for ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1
3
). Therefore, F (ψ, θ) >
0 and π̂1N > π̂
2






) and ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1
3
).
(ii) When ψ ≥ 1
3




N as functions of ψ, it is







for ∀ψ ≥ 1
3







































Proof of Proposition 4.3. We plug in p∗M (ψ, θ) and p
∗
N (ψ, θ) from Eq.(4.5) into
Eq.(4.10), and want to show ∂
∂ψ
W (ψ, θ) < 0.




W (ψ, θ) = F (ψ,θ)
2(1−θ)[3(1−θ)(1−ψ)+4θψ]3 , where F (ψ, θ) is a polynomial
function of ψ and θ with degree of 8 (θ5ψ3). By its concavity ( ∂
2
∂ψ2
F (ψ, θ) < 0), we can
show that F (ψ, θ) < 0 for ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, ∂
∂ψ
W (ψ, θ) < 0, for ∀ψ ∈ (0, 1
3
) and
∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
).




W (ψ, θ) = 12θ
2−12θ+1














, we can check that M outbids N in both cases, and therefore WB =WC .
Altogether, according to Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, when θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2), W
C =
W (ψ1, θ) > W (ψ2, θ) = W
B; when θ < θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2), W
C =WB =W (ψ2, θ).
138
Proof of Proposition 4.4. (i) When ψ < 1
3





3(1−θ)(1−ψ)+4θψ . By Eq.(4.12), we have
∂
∂ψ
G (ψ) = θ·F (ψ,θ)
(−3+3θ+3ψ−5θψ−θ2ψ+θ2ψ2)2 ,
where F (ψ, θ) is a quadratic function of ψ and can be proved positive. (If we write F (ψ, θ)
as Aψ2 + Bψ + C, we can show A > 0 and B2 − 4AC < 0.) Therefore, ∂
∂ψ






and ∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
). (ii) When ψ ≥ 1
3














Therefore, G (ψ) = (1−θ)ψ
2(1−θψ) , which is increasing in ψ. Altogether,
∂
∂ψ
G (ψ) > 0 for
∀θ ∈ (0, 1
2
) and thus, according to Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, GC = G (ψ1) < G (ψ2) = G
B
when θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2), and G
C = GB = G (ψ2) when θ < θ
∗ (ψ1, ψ2).
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Recall that b̂N = [π̂
1
N − π̂2N ]
+
, b∗N = [π
∗
N (ψ1, θ)− π∗N (ψ2, θ)]
+,
and π̂2N = π
∗
N (ψ2, θ). By Table 4.2, π̂
1
N is increasing in ψ (by simply checking the first-
order derivative) and thus π̂1N (ψ2) > π̂
1
N (ψ1) for all 0 < ψ1 < ψ2 < 1. From Corollary
4.2, π̂1N (ψ) > π̂
2






). Therefore, π̂1N (ψ2) >
π̂2N (ψ1). As π̂
2
N (ψ1) = π
∗











), since b̂N > 0 by Corollary 4.2,
IRB = b̂N > b
∗
N ≥ min{b∗M , b∗N} = IRC for all 0 < ψ1 < ψ2 < 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. We plug in p∗M (ψ, θ) and p
∗
N (ψ, θ) from Eq.(4.5) into
Eq.(4.13), and want to show ∂
∂ψ




CS (ψ, θ) = (1−2θ)F (ψ,θ)
2(1−θ)[3(1−θ)(1−ψ)+4θψ]3 ,













F (ψ, θ) > 0 when θ > 3
7
. In other
words, F (ψ, θ) is either increasing or convex in ψ. Notice that F (0, θ) = (1− θ)2(−33−













, we can con-











(ii) When ψ ≥ 1
3
, we have CS (ψ, θ) = (1−2θ)(1+2θ)
8(1−θ) (1− ψ) , which is decreasing in ψ. Al-
together, according to Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, CSC = CS (ψ1, θ) > CS (ψ2, θ) = CS
B
when θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2), and CS
C = CSB = CS (ψ2, θ) when θ < θ
∗ (ψ1, ψ2).
Proof of Proposition 4.5. By Lemma 4.3, CSC > CSB when θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2).
Since LG = g (CS) is strictly increasing in CS, LGC > LGB when θ > θ∗ (ψ1, ψ2).
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Combining the result from Lemma 4.2, we have IRC < IRB and LGC > LGB when





Proof of Proposition 4.6. We first derive the second-stage equilibrium prices.




































M) according to Eq.(4.18) and Eq.(4.17). We then have ∆π̃N (ψ2, θ, λ) =
π̃1N − π̃2N , and ∂∂λ∆π̃N (ψ2, θ, λ) |λ=0 =
ψ2F (ψ2,θ)
27(1−θ)[4ψ2θ+3(1−ψ2)(1−θ)] , where F (ψ2, θ) is a poly-
nomial function of ψ2 and θ with degree of 8 (θ
5ψ32). We can show that
∂2
∂ψ22
F (ψ2, θ) =
f (θ) [4ψ2θ + 3 (1− ψ2) (1− θ)], where f (θ) is some expression that only contains θ. For
a given θ, ∂
2
∂ψ22
F (ψ2, θ) does not change sign for ∀ψ2 ∈ (0, 1); that is, ∂∂ψ2F (ψ2, θ) is mono-
tonic in ψ2. We can check that
∂
∂ψ2
F (0, θ) < 0 and ∂
∂ψ2


















(3− θ)2 (32θ3 + 244θ2 − 523θ + 129)






> 0 when θ ∈ (0, θ0). By
monotonicity of F , F (ψ2, θ) > 0 and thus
∂
∂λ
∆π̃N (ψ2, θ, λ) |λ=0 > 0, for ∀ψ2 ∈ (0, 13(1−λ))
and ∀θ ∈ (0, θ0). We can further check that θ0 < θ∗ (0, ψ2) (as defined by Eq.(4.7)) for the
given parameter region, which validates the presumed bidding outcome (i.e., bN < bM).
(ii) Substituting equilibrium prices in Eq.(D.1) into the expression of equilibrium
consumer surplus in Eq.(4.19), we can derive ∂
∂λ
C̃S (ψ2, θ, λ) |λ=0 = (1−2θ)ψ2G(ψ2,θ)2(1−θ)[4ψ2θ+3(1−ψ2)(1−θ)]3 ,
where G (ψ2, θ) is a polynomial function of ψ2 and θ with degree of 7 (θ
4ψ32). As we can





, G (ψ2, θ) is decreasing in ψ2 when θ <
3
7
, and G (ψ2, θ) is
concave in ψ2 when θ >
3
7










(3− θ)2(33− 37θ + 10θ2) > 0, we can conclude that G (ψ2, θ) > 0 and hence
∂
∂λ





and ∀θ ∈ (0, θ0).
(iii) Substituting equilibrium prices in Eq.(D.1) into the welfare function in Eq.(4.20),
we can derive ∂
∂λ
W̃ (ψ2, θ, λ) |λ=0 = ψ2H(ψ2,θ)2(1−θ)[4ψ2θ+3(1−ψ2)(1−θ)]3 , where H (ψ2, θ) is a polynomial
function of ψ2 and θ with degree of 8 (θ
5ψ32). Following similar arguments as in (i), we














)2 − 8)+ 3] > 0 for 0 < θ < 1
2
. Therefore, H (ψ2, θ) > 0,
and thus ∂
∂λ
W̃ (ψ2, θ, λ) |λ=0 > 0 for ∀ψ2 ∈ (0, 13(1−λ)) and ∀θ ∈ (0, θ0).
(iv) Substituting equilibrium prices in Eq.(D.1) into the expression of sales Gini co-
efficient in Eq.(4.21), we can derive ∂
∂λ




A = θ3 − 15θ2 + 13θ − 3, B = −2θ3 + 18θ2 − 22θ + 6, and C = θ3 − 7θ2 + 11θ − 5. As we
can verify that B2 − 4AC < 0 and A < 0, ∂
∂λ
G̃ (ψ2, θ, λ) |λ=0 < 0 for ∀ψ2 ∈ (0, 13(1−λ)) and
∀θ ∈ (0, θ0).
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Appendix E
More Results for Chapter 4
In this section, we extend the model from duopolistic to oligopolistic competition and
show that the qualitative results and the main implications continue to hold.
E.1 Model
We now consider n (≥ 2) firms in the market. One of them sell products catering to
the mainstream market, which is termed asM ; the other n−1 firms’ products are designed
for particular niche markets, which are denoted as N1, ..., Nn−1. There is a continuum of
consumers with mass 1. Each consumer has a unit demand of the product. Consumers
have different preferences. Following the main model, we assume θ (0 < θ < 1
2
) of them
are N -type consumers who prefer the niche firms’ products to the mainstream firm’s,
and 1 − θ are M -type consumers who prefer the mainstream product. Among the n − 1
niche firms, we consider the case in which niche firms develop particular features of the
product that are mutually exclusive so that each consumer may accept only one niche
firm’s product and derives zero utility for the others. For ease of exposition, we assume
all niche firms equally share the market preference. An N -type consumer derives utility v
from consuming the particular type of the niche product that she can accept, and derives
discounted utility k̃v from consuming the mainstream product. An M -type consumer
derives utility v from consuming the mainstream product and discounted utility k̃v from
consuming the niche product that she can accept. k̃ is uniformly distributed between 0
and 1 among all consumers. We normalize v to 1 without loss of generality.
We follow a similar way in modeling consumers’ click behavior on the search engine
results page. The M firm is listed in a top organic position which attracts most attention
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(i.e., αiM can be very high). Similar as before, we let αiM = 1 to emphasize the diminishing
promotive incentive when an advertiser’s organic rank is high. In other words, consumers
click M ’s link with probability 1. In contrast, the niche firms’ organic ranks are much less
satisfactory and the differences among their organic exposures can be negligible compared
to the difference between the mainstream’s and theirs. We thus assume that the niche



















for any k, k
′ ∈
{1, ..., n − 1}. More specifically, for a niche firm winning the jth sponsored slot, the
combined probability of its link (either organic or sponsored) being clicked is 1 − ψj.
There are m (≥ 2) sponsored slots and we only discuss the case in which m ≥ n. Similar
analysis can easily be applied to the case of m < n. Without loss of generality, we let the
exposure of sponsored positions monotonically decrease from the first to the last, that is,
0 < ψ1 < ... < ψn < 1.
E.2 Analysis and Results
We can derive the equilibrium pricing similarly as in the main model. The demand
function facing the niche firm staying in the jth sponsored position, given M ’s price pM ,




(1− ψj)SN (p, pM) ,
where SN is defined by Eq.(4.1). Maximizing the profit function pD
j
N(p; pM) gives the
optimal pricing. Notice that the maximization problem is actually independent of ψj,
which implies that all niche firms charge the same price in equilibrium. Given niche firms’







[ψiAM (p) + (1− ψi)SM (p, pN)]










i ̸=k ψi. Maximizing the profit functions simultaneously, we can derive























where πkM is the equilibrium profit for the M firm if it stays in the kth sponsored position,
and π
j(k)
N stands for the equilibrium profit of the N firm staying in the jth sponsored
position when M gets the kth sponsored slot (j ̸= k). Here, π∗M (ψ, θ) is the same as is
defined in Table 4.1, while f (ψ, θ) is defined as












Before we derive the bidding equilibrium, we first summarize a result which will be
useful in the analysis of equilibrium bidding. In fact, the following result is a counterpart of
Lemma 4.1 in the oligopolistic case. It shows that the difference between the mainstream
firm’s and the niche firms’ incentives to improve their sponsored ranks decrease as the




























decreasing in θ, where 1 > ψ
′
> ψ
′′ ≥ ψ′′′ > 0 and 1 > x2 ≥ x1 > 0.
To derive the bidding equilibrium, we follow Edelman et al. (2007) and consider the
locally envy-free equilibrium in the generalized second-price auctions. In a locally envy-
free equilibrium, any advertiser does not want to exchange bids with the one ranked one
position above it in the sponsored list. We focus on the particular type of locally envy-free
equilibrium studied by Edelman et al. (2007), in which each advertiser bids an amount
equals its own payment plus its own value difference between staying in the current position
144
and moving one position up. In other words, each advertiser’s payment is equal to the
negative externality that it imposes on all the other advertisers. The equilibrium analysis
is more complex in our setting because any change of M ’s position will change the values
of all niche firms in all positions.
We are particularly interested in two types of equilibria, namely, when the main-
stream firm wins the first sponsored position and the niche firms stay in the second to
the nth sponsored positions, and when the niche firms stay in the first n − 1 sponsored
positions while the mainstream firm gets the last. Applying the results from Lemma E.1,
we show that when θ is large, the latter may hold in equilibrium, and the former can be
an equilibrium when θ is small, which are very similar to Proposition 4.1.
Proposition E.1. Generically, there exist cutoffs θ̂ (ψ1, ..., ψn) and θ̃ (ψ1, ..., ψn), such that
when 0 < θ < θ̂ (ψ1, ..., ψn), M winning the first sponsored position and all niche firms




all niche firms staying in the first n−1 positions andM staying in the last is an equilibrium.
Proposition E.1 reveals a similar pattern in the equilibrium bidding outcomes. With
reasonable market preference shares, although still weaker than the leading firm, niche
firms have higher bidding incentives and get better sponsored positions. Such outcome,
which is not aligned with advertisers’ inherent competitive strength, reflects the interplay
between organic listing and sponsored bidding, and the balance between the promotive
and preventive effects. On the other hand, when niche firms are too weak, the leading
firm’s preventive motivation dominates, making it occupy the top sponsored position.
Given the similarity in the equilibrium bidding outcomes, the rest analysis and the
main results from the duopoly case can be expected to hold qualitatively when extended
to the oligopoly case.
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E.3 Proofs










































Recall that Lemma 4.1 shows that ∂
2
∂ψ∂θ





















< 0, that is, the first half of the LHS of Eq.(E.1) is negative. Also, we can
show that when θ ≥ 0.153, ∂2
∂ψ∂θ
f (ψ, θ) ≤ 0. Notice that ∂
∂θ






































Thus, when θ ≥ 0.153, the second half of the LHS of Eq.(E.1) is also non-positive, which
implies that Eq.(E.1) holds.
When θ < 0.153, the second half of the LHS of Eq.(E.1) could be positive so that
we need to compare the magnitudes of the two parts. We discuss the case in which
ψ
′′′ ≤ ψ′′ < ψ′ ≤ 1
3






























































































′ − ψ′′′ ≥ ψ′ − ψ′′ , we can conclude

















π∗M (ψ, θ) and
∂2
∂ψ∂θ





































, which means the
objective function is decreasing in θ.
Proof of Proposition E.1. (i) Consider the locally envy-free equilibrium in which the

















N , 0}+ b3N
and the mainstream firm bids any amount greater than b2N . As a result, M wins the first
position and niche firms stay in the 2nd through the nth positions.
Now we investigate under what conditions the above bidding strategy profile is indeed
an equilibrium. It is easy to see that all niche firms have no profitable deviations. To ensure
no profitable deviation of M , π1M − b2N ≥ πkM − bk+1N has to be satisfied for all k = 2, ..., n





















N ≥ πkM − π
k(1)
N k = 2, ..., n
π1M − π
2(1)
N ≥ πkM − π
k(1)
N k = 2, ..., n
,







































holds for all k = 2, ..., n. By Lemma E.1, the LHS of the first inequality is decreasing in
θ. Also, it is easy to show that the LHS of the second inequality is decreasing in θ, given
that ∂
∂θ







































for k = 2, ..., n, which is a loose parametric condition that can be satisfied under most
values of {ψi}ni=1, we can conclude that there exists θ̂ (ψ1, ..., ψn)such that when 0 < θ <
θ̂ (ψ1, ..., ψn), the described bidding strategy profile is an equilibrium.
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(ii) Similarly, consider the locally envy-free equilibrium in which the n−1 niche firms’
bids (labeled such that bn−1N < b
n−2


















and the mainstream firm bids bM = π
n−1
M − πnM . As a result, the niche firms stay in the
first n− 1 positions and M stays in the last one.
To see under what conditions the above bidding strategy profile is indeed an equilib-













(k = 1, ..., n− 1), as well as that M does
not have profitable deviation, such that πkM − bkN ≤ πnM for k = 2, ..., n− 1. (Note that no
deviation to the first position for M can easily hold as long as b1N is high enough.) We can
organize these conditions as{

















































where k = 2, ..., n − 1. By Lemma E.1, the LHS of the first inequality is decreasing in θ.
Also, it is easy to show that the LHS of the second inequality is decreasing in θ, given that
∂
∂θ























































for k = 2, ..., n − 1, which is not difficult to be satisfied under most values of {ψi}ni=1,




described bidding strategy profile is an equilibrium.
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